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Chapter One: Introduction 
1. Objectives and Goals 
The Republic of Korea (Korea)1 is one of the countries the economy of which has developed rapidly 
over the past four decades.  According to the World Bank, in 2016, Korea had the world’s eleventh-largest 
economy2 and was in eighth place in the world for trade.3  Considering its land mass, population, and 
natural resources, it is amazing how fast and big the Korean economy has developed.  In the 1980s, Korea 
was known as one of the “Asian Dragons” along with Taiwan,4 Hong Kong,5 and Singapore.6  All these 
countries were believed to have great economic potential and the possibility for development.  Among the 
four countries, Korea showed the greatest economic growth.  In fact, Korea has become a model for 
national economic development.  Other emerging countries in Asia are trying to emulate Korea’s strategy 
of economic development.7  
At the beginning of the industrialization of the Korean economy, Korea pursued an export-oriented 
                                                             
1 In this dissertation, “Korea” refers to “the Republic of Korea.” 
2 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. (last visited on 8th August, 2017). This rank was given by the World 
Bank based on national gross domestic product (GDP).  
3 According to the statistics provided by the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), in 2016 Korean trade took up 2.8% 
of the world trade by taking up US $438,211 million out of US $15,519,700 million in total.  Korea also possessed the world’s 
seventh largest exporter (3.1%) and ninth largest importer (2.6%) in 2016.  The KITA presents this statistics based on 
information provided by the IMF.  http://stat.kita.net/stat/world/major/KoreaStats01.screen. 
4 Based on GDP, Taiwan is in 22nd place.  http://statisticstimes.com/economy/projected-world-gdp-ranking.php (last visited on 
8th August, 2017). 
5 Based on GDP, Hong Kong is in 32nd place.  http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (last visited on 8th August, 
2017). 
6 Based on GDP, Singapore is in 36th place.  http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. (last visited on 8th August, 
2017). 
7 Some of Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia try to learn the Korean’s strategy 
of economic development.  There are many scholars, government officials, and entrepreneurs who visit Korea for this purpose.  
Moreover, countries in Central Asia including Mongo have also become interested in studying Korean economic development.  
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industrialization by combining mass production-mass exports with relatively high productivity-low 
wages.8  At that time, Korean trade focused mainly on the export of goods manufactured in Korea through 
cheap labor.  Since the 1990s, however, the Korean strategy for economic development changed because 
of the rapidity of its economic development; labor-intensive industry declined and more technology-
intensive industry began to develop.9  As a result, Korea is now a player in international business activities.  
Unlike the past - when Korea was simply manufacturing products through borrowed technology - Korean 
companies now create the technology they use and, as a result, compete effectively in global commerce.10  
The Korean brand has become a guarantor of high quality.  For example, the Hyundai cars have a good 
reputation abroad and combine relatively high quality with reasonable prices.  Electronic goods 
manufactured by LG or Samsung are recognized as having the highest quality in various Middle Eastern 
countries.  
As Korean companies engaged in more complex international business transaction, they became 
involved in contracts for sales of goods, licensing, agency, distribution, franchise, construction, and turn-
key operations.  For example, the Hyundai automobile company began exporting Korean-made cars to 
countries all over the world; nowadays, they build factories abroad and employ local people to produce 
cars locally.  Thus, Hyundai avails itself of many transactional contracts; agency or distributorship 
contracts with business partners abroad to sell the cars; service contracts with carriers for the transportation 
                                                             
8 Sung-Hoon Jung, The Korean Development Strategy: Trajectories of the Korean Economic Development, 1961~2010, 14 
Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea 453, 453 (2011). 
9 Since labor costs increase rapidly in Korea, Korean manufacturing companies start producing their products abroad where 
labor costs are cheap like China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, and etc.  Thus, Korean companies become involved 
with more various and complicated business transactions compared to the past.  
10 In the past, Korean companies exported the goods under the Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) method, so they 
manufactured goods as foreign companies ordered and exported them with foreign companies’ brand names.  Now, however, 
Korean companies have foreign companies in southeastern countries to produce goods under the OEM method with Korean 
companies’ own brand names.     
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of cars; construction contracts with constructors to build local factories; and supply contracts to service 
manufacturing abroad.  In addition, the company enters into employment contracts with local employees 
and to address consumers.  Just like Hyundai, other Korean companies are also conducting international 
business in more complex ways.  They, too, encounter greater transactional disputes with foreign 
companies, consumers, and employees.  Contracts are used to identify and provide for the best ways to 
solve disputes.  Arbitration dominates dispute resolution in international business.  To bolster its 
competitive edge, Korea has begun to devote greater attention to arbitration in ICA.   
There is now no doubt that arbitration is more efficient and effective for the adjudication of 
international commercial disputes as a necessary appendage to the legal system.  In Asia, Hong Kong with 
Singapore as a close second has become the center of ICA.  It is the Korean conviction that Korea offers 
a better society, economy and government and can outdistance either Hong Kong or Singapore.  While 
China seeks to be the Asian leader in ICA, Korea is better positioned geographically to intermediate 
between China11 and Japan12 - the two Asian economic giants.13  In ICA, contracting parties generally 
choose a country with no ties with either party.  This practice enhances the neutrality of the arbitration.  
In comparison to Chinese or Japanese venue, Korea offers greater neutrality.  Hong Kong is well-
developed as a place for ICA, but that venue might well favor Chinese interest.  In addition, Korea’s status 
in Asia has expanded significantly over the last fifteen years, primarily because of the Hallyu.14  The 
Hallyu started spreading among the younger generation and now it has spread to the middle-aged 
                                                             
11 China’s GDP was 11,199,145 (millions of US dollars) in 2016 and it took the second place after USA. 
12 Japan’s GDP was 4,939,384 (millions of US dollars) in 2016 taking the third place in the world.  
13 As trade increases, the disputes will increase proportionately.  Because there has been a steep increase of trade among the 
three countries, it has become an important issue to find efficient and fair ways to handle disputes that arise.   
14 The Hallyu is also called ‘Korean wave’ or ‘Korean fever’.  It refers to the sudden increase in popularity of South Korean 
culture around the world in the last fifteen years.  This phenomenon was caused largely by the Korean entertainment industry 
and the popularity of kdrama and kpop.    
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generation.  With a combination of economic development and improved image,15 organizations like the 
Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB), the Korean Bar Association (KBA), the Korea Chamber 
of Commerce (KCC) have urged that Korea take advantage of its position and use it as a platform to 
become a center of ICA in Asia.  Moreover, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and scholars have advocated that the 
Korean government should aggressively develop its infrastructure in ICA.  In 2013, the Seoul International 
Dispute Resolution Center (Seoul IDRC) was established through the support of the Seoul Metropolitan 
Government, the Ministry of Justice, Korea Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB), and the Korean Bar 
Association (KBA).  The purpose of the Seoul IDRC is to act as a center for Asian ICA proceedings by 
providing hearing facilities with the cooperation of leading arbitral institutions including the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA), the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and 
the Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC).16   
There needs to be even more progress.  Because the legal system and courts are instrumental to the 
functionality of arbitration, judges need to undertake special training and the current Korean perception 
                                                             
15 In 2012, the Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange conducted a survey regarding the Hallyu in nine countries: 
China, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, the U.S.A., Brazil, France, the U.K., and Russia.  The respondents were composed of the 
same number of male and female respondents and were selected from four different groups divided into according to the age; 
the respondents aged from 15 to 19, from 20 to 29, from 30 to 39 and from 40 to 49. Each group consisted of 25% of total 
respondents.  The question was if the Hallyu had affected them regarding the image of Korea and how they thought of Korea.  
They were asked to answer the questions by selecting one among ‘positive’, ‘neutral’, and ‘negative’. The result is as follows. 
  (http://www.kofice.or.kr/index.asp) 
 
 China Taiwan Japan Thailand 
Positive 32% 29% 10% 45% 
Neutral 58% 59% 58% 49% 
Negative 10% 12% 32% 6% 
 
16 http://www.sidrc.org/main/main.php 
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of arbitration needs to be revamped.  The Korean arbitration law should be reexamined.  The national 
arbitration law measures the depth of the legal acceptance of arbitration.  The Korean Arbitration Act 
(KAA) was enacted as an independent law for the first time in 1966; it was completely amended in 1999 
after two partial amendments in 1973 and 1993.  In 1999, the KAA was brought into line with UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter, UNCITRAL Model Law).  The 
UNCITRAL Model Law aims to unify and harmonize worldwide arbitration laws.  It was intended to 
allow jurisdictions in the developing world especially to become instantly seen as favorable to arbitration.  
Some countries in the developed world (like Germany) also relied on the UNCITRAL Model Law because 
it reflected global standing and regulation of arbitration.  Because of their participation in the development 
of ICA, countries (like France, the United States, and England) enacted their own statutes on arbitration.17  
Korea amended the KAA in keeping with the UNCITRAL Model Law, allowing it to participate in the 
global law of arbitration.  Korea is now hospitable to arbitration and regulates it in a manner that allows 
it to be autonomous and effective.  The Korean law is fully conversant with the global regulation of 
arbitration.18 
In terms of the 1999 amendment to the KAA, Korean scholars and practitioners strongly argued that 
the KAA had to reflect the changes in the Korean economy and integrate the international regulation of 
ICA.19  The need to amend the KAA became more evident when the UNCITRAL Model Law was itself 
                                                             
17 There has been lively scholarly discussion about not adopting, in whole or in part, the UNCITRAL Model Law. See Alan S. 
Reid UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMEFCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE ENGLISH 
ARBITRATION ACT: ARE THE TWO SYSTEMS POLES APART, 21 J. Int'l Arb. 227 (2004); Sanders, Pieter, Unity and 
Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law , 11 J. Int’l Arb. 1 (1995); Saxby, John, User’s Perspective of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, 2 J. Int'l Arb. 164 (1986). 
18 The KAA (1999) was nothing more than a pure duplication of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
19 See Jang-ho Choi, Academical Understanding and Institutionalization on Commercial Arbitration in Korea, 30 Journal of 
Arbitration Studies 281 (1996); Jang-ho Choi, A Comparative Study on the Revision of the Arbitration Law in Korea and 
Taiwan, 14-3 Korea International Commerce Review 109 (1999); Kang Bin Lee, The Development History and Activation 
Measures of Commercial Arbitration System in Korea-with respect to 40 years of Korean arbitration law and practice, 32 
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amended in 2006.  Nonetheless, it took a decade to achieve the evident emendation.  The KAA was finally 
amended in 2016.  The 2016 amendment focuses on (i) the removal of inefficiency and the restriction on 
arbitration law, (ii) adding or drafting new regulations to help arbitral proceedings to operate more 
smoothly and effectively.  By doing so, Korea may have taken its initial step toward becoming an Asian 
Hub for ICA.   
 
2. Methodology and Content  
First, the KAA in its first version20 will be analyzed.21  That text is obsolete because it embraces old 
economic and political realities.  It is not a 21st Century law.  It was constituted when Korea gained its 
independence from Japan.  Arbitration was not fully understood in Korea.  The initial KAA demonstrates 
how arbitration began in Korea and provided some indications of how the KAA was developed.  Each 
article is analyzed individually.  The analysis addresses these questions; (i) how Korean arbitration was 
developed, (ii) what were the old KAA’s deficiencies, (iii) what was needed to remedy the deficiencies of 
the KAA, and (iv) why Korea adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law as a whole as its national arbitration 
law.   
                                                             
The International Commerce & Law Review 59 (2006); Mun Chul Jang, A Study on Amendment of Korean Arbitration Act, 
9 Journal of Arbitration Studies, 3 (1999). 
20 After the KAA was enacted for the first time in 1966, there were partial amendments twice in 1973 and 1993. During these 
partial amendments, there was almost no change in content.  However, the KAA was totally amended in 1999 by adopting 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, so the KAA (1999) is completely different from the previous version of the KAA. Therefore, 
because there is a big difference between the KAA (1997) and the KAA (1999), the KAA before 1999’s complete amendment 
is called as “old Korean Arbitration Act’ (Gu Joongjaebub) and the KAA after 1999’s amendment is called as “new Korean 
Arbitration Act” (Shin Joongjaebub) in Korea in order to distinguish them clearly. 
21 The first version of the KAA is the KAA (1966), but the KAA (1997) will be analyzed because it is the latest version of the 
KAA (1966) and there was almost no change in content during the partial amendments in 1973 and 1993. 
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The UNCITRAL Model Law is the second topic of study.  Although the Model Law tried to unify 
and harmonize international arbitration laws, its success on this score is somewhat doubtful.  Significant 
countries failed to adopt it.  The reasons for the rejection will be examined through case studies.  Also, 
contemporary issues in the decisional law applying to the UNCITRAL Model Law will be assessed.  The 
considerations on the UNCITRAL Model Law will be provided the background to exam why the KAA 
(1999) needed to be amended.  The KAA (1999) is very close to the UNCITRAL Model Law.  The 
deficiencies of the UNCITRAL Model Law were excluded from the amendment of the KAA. 
Third, the newly revised KAA (2016) will be studied.  The background and rationale for amendment 
of each article will be discussed based on the commentary in the legislative history.  The Korean 
government believed that the amendment of KAA is an essential prerequisite to developing a framework 
for contemporary arbitration and to promote Korea as a venue for ICA in the Asian region.  To be a force 
in the world of arbitration, the national laws and case law must reflect the latest developments.  The legal 
system must allow arbitration to function autonomously and to avoid judicial restriction.  Our final step is 
to determine whether the KAA (2016) can secure the goals.  
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Chapter Two: The First Korean Arbitration Act 
1. General   
1.1 The Beginning of Korean Arbitration 
For centuries, it was traditional practice in Korea to settle village-level disputes via alternative 
dispute resolution (vs. resorting to the judicial system).22  Indeed, most of the civil and commercial 
disputes were brought to elders who (i) were trusted and respected in tribes or villages; (ii) proposed 
settlements for disputes according to a moral dignity that (a) had developed naturally, over extended time 
frames and (b) was based on the customs and practices of a tribe or village; and (iii) made decisions that 
had binding effects on both parties and were based on implied rules—namely, that the parties should 
accept such decisions without objection and follow them voluntarily. 23   Indeed, up until the Joseon 
Dynasty (1392-1910), 24  arbitration played a significant role in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
                                                             
22 The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board, SANGSAJUNGJE 30 NYEONSA [30 Years of Commercial Arbitration], at. 37 
(1996). 
23 Id. 
24 The Joseon Dynasty is the old name of Korea.  After the Joseon Dynasty (1392~1910), Korea went through the colonial 
period by Japan from 1910 to 1945, and after liberation from Japan, the Republic of Korea became an official name. 
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systems;25  in fact, it had as much of a binding effect as the associated judicial system and was further 
strengthened by Hyang’yak26 (and the development of local governments) since the Joseon Dynasty.27  
Hyang’yak is essentially a set of rules based on Confucian thinking and a spirit of mutual help;28 it 
was originally developed to lead people to worship Confucianism (vs. Buddhism), became a set of 
regulations during the Joseon Dynasty, and led to the development of local governments.  The Yangban29 
(i.e., ruling class) utilized and applied Hyang’yak to govern themselves as well as the lower-class people 
in their societies.30  Consequently, it became important to follow Hyang’yak (i.e., as the governing law in 
society).31  
During the Joseon Dynasty, most of the societal disputes were settled autonomously via arbitration 
by Yangban under the rules of Hyang’yak; 32  indeed, if an individual asked the district office of 
government to settle his or her dispute (and thereby ignored the Yangban’s decision), he or she was 
                                                             
25 At that time, although the term, ‘arbitration’ was used, the meaning of arbitration was different from the one in a modern 
society.  It did not require a written agreement and parties did not get a chance to select an arbitrator just like how it works 
now.  It has to be understood that arbitration was just one typical method for settlement of dispute by asking the elderly, who 
was believed to be wise and thoughtful.  Also, there were some occasions where wise elderly man tried to persuade parties 
in disputes to reach an amicable agreement, which is more like negotiation.  Here, arbitration and mediation were 
distinguished depending on whether there was a binding effect: if the parties had to follow the elderly’s decision without 
objecting to it, it was considered arbitration while mediation was understood as a way to settle their dispute by trying to get 
an advice from the elderly.  
26 Before the Joseon Dynasty, Confucianism and Buddhism were two dominant thoughts.  From the Joseon Dynasty, however, 
Confucianism became more important and more emphasized.  Consequently, rules or regulations were formed based on 
Confucianism and Hyang’yak was the name for these rules or regulations in the Joseon Dynasty. 
27 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op cit., at 37. 
28 The Academy of Korean Studies, Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr. (The base of Confucian 
thinking is that fine customs and public morals for society are strengthened by spreading Confucian proprieties and custom 
throughout the village).  
29 Yangban is the name for the highest class people in the caste system in the Joseon Dynasty.  Pyungmin is the name for the 
middle class people and Chunmin is the name for the lowest class people.  
30 The Academy of Korean Studies, Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr. 
31 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 37. 
32 Although the disputes were settled by Yang-Ban’s arbitration involving a third person for settlement, it was considered as an 
autonomous settlement as long as governmental authority was not involved.   
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punished.33  Moreover, by the end of the Joseon Dynasty, even the government encouraged the use of 
arbitration (i.e., by the Yangban) for dispute settlement.34  
 
1.2. Korean Arbitration during the Colonial Era 
Korean commercial arbitration has a longer history than what is presently, widely known. The first 
record on the Korean commercial arbitration system is found within “Sang-mu-he-y-so gyu-chic (i.e., the 
Rules for Commercial Matters),35” which was enacted on November 10, 1895;36 Article 3 (4) of “Sang-
mu-he-y-so gyu-chic” regulates that “this institute can settle the commercial disputes when there is a 
requirement of parties concerned.”37  Korean arbitration was institutionalized for the first time when the 
Japanese Civil Procedure Act was implemented as a Korean national law in 1912.38  During the Japanese 
colonial era, Chapter VIII (i.e., within the Japanese Civil Procedure Act) contained some regulations 
regarding arbitral procedures, which became Korean arbitration laws.39  This section of Japanese law fully 
constituted Korean arbitration laws—even after the Liberation from Japan in 1945.40  During this period, 
however, arbitration was not conducted in Korea at all; thus, the arbitration section was eliminated 
                                                             
33 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 37. 
34 Id. 
35 At that time, because there was no English name translated officially for this rule, the Korean name is used here as it sounds 
and the author makes and inserts an English name in the parenthesis considering the meaning of it.  Therefore, this English 
name is not an official name. 
36 Id. at 38. 
37 Id. at 38~39. 
38 Seungwoo Cho et al., ARBITRATION LAW OF KOREA: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 10 (Kap-You Kim et al. eds., 2012).  On 
July 12, 1909, Japan forced Korea to ratify a treaty about handing over jurisdiction to Japan to take a judicial power and 
colonize Korea.  After this treaty, during colonial era, Korea did not have independent judiciary system and national laws. 
39 Id.  It did not have a separate section for arbitration.  Some parts of the Japanese Civil Procedure Act contained regulations 
regarding arbitration. 
40 Jang-ho Choi, Academical Understanding and Institutionalization on Commercial Arbitration in Korea, 30 Journal of 
Arbitration Studies 281, 281 (1996). 
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completely when Korea enacted the Korean Civil Procedure Act independently in 1960.41  Consequently, 
there was a lack of arbitration law and an arbitration system under Korean law from 1960 to 1966.42  
 
1.3. Korean Arbitration after Colonial Period 
On October 7, 1957, Korea ratified a treaty entitled “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation between Korea and the U.S.A.”43  Article 5 of this treaty provided a regulation regarding the 
settlement of disputes between the two countries, stating that “when there is a dispute between companies 
or citizens of two countries, they will get the same legal rights.”44  Furthermore, Article 5 (2)45 confirmed 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards between Korea and the United States by providing that “both 
countries shall recognize the validity of arbitration agreement if parties concerned agree to settle their 
dispute by arbitration, and both countries shall recognize and enforce the arbitral award rendered based 
on the arbitration agreement.”46  
                                                             
41Jang-ho Choi, A Comparative Study on the Revision of the Arbitration Law in Korea and Taiwan, 14-3 Korea International  
Commerce Review 109, 112 (1999). 
42Jang-ho Choi, Academical Understanding and Institutionalization on Commercial Arbitration in Korea, 30 Journal of 
Arbitration Studies 281, 281 (1996) 
43 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit. at 39. 
44 Id. at 39. 
45 Article V Paragraph 2: Contracts entered into between nationals and companies of either Party and nationals and companies 
of the other Party, that provide for the settlement by arbitration of controversies, shall not be deemed unenforceable within 
the territories of such other Party merely on the grounds that the place designated for the arbitration proceedings is outside 
such territories or that the nationality of one or more of the arbitrators is not that of such other Party. No award duly rendered 
pursuant to any such contract, and final and enforceable under the laws of the place where rendered, shall be deemed invalid 
or denied effective means of enforcement within the territories of either Party merely on the grounds that the place where 
such award was rendered is outside such territories or that the nationality of one or more of the arbitrators is not that of such 
Party.  
46 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op cit., at 39.  At that time, because there was no chance to 
conduct arbitration and arbitration was not widely recognized in Korea, Korea did not consider this arbitration part when 
they ratified this treaty. 
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Even after Korea ratified the treaty with regulations aimed at arbitration with the United States, no 
arbitral award was recognized or enforced under this treaty.47  Moreover, Korea eliminated the arbitration 
section from Korean national law in 1960.48  Thus, notwithstanding the treaty to settle any dispute by 
arbitration between Korea and United States, Korea did not have any national laws or regulations 
regarding arbitration until the Korean Arbitration Act was reenacted in 1966.49  
This reappearance of the law of arbitration in Korea in 1966 resulted from the first “Five-Year 
Economic Development Project.”50  In the early 1960s, the Korean government planned to develop the 
national economy and believed the only way to do so was to revitalize the export industry.51  The basic 
plan was to sell more goods and consequently earn more money abroad; thus, more people would be hired 
to produce more goods.  The Korean government commenced the project in 1962 via an export-oriented 
economic development project.52  Under this project, the Korean government brought up many merchant-
                                                             
47 Id.  From this time, the term, arbitration, means what arbitration is in a modern society: one of alternative dispute resolution 
systems which requires an arbitration agreement and in which a binding award is rendered by arbitrators.  It is different from 
the one that was used in the Joseon Dynasty. 
48 Id.  At that time, there was no separate and independent arbitration law in the Korean legal system.  Some regulations as to 
arbitration were included in the Korean Civil Procedure Act and these regulations were taken out when the Korean Civil 
Procedure Act was amended. 
49 Although it is ‘re-enactment’, it is the first enactment as a separate and independent arbitration law. 
50 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op cit., at 39. 
51 HANLIMHAKSA, TONGHAP-NONSIL-GAENYUM-SAJEUN, 12 (2007). (In the 1960s, Korean economy was developed 
strictly under the government’s plan and control. This government-oriented economy development plan focused on only 
economic growth and export. As a result, Korea accomplished high growth in economy and the national income increased 
dramatically, which led Korea to one of newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia.  However, this development caused 
side effects such as increased gap between rich and poor, as well as between city and countryside, over-reliance on 
international economy, conglomerate-oriented economic structure, and so on.) 
52 Id. (Although the first Korean government (Syngman Rhee government) after liberation from Japan declared ‘Five-Year 
Economic Development Project’(this project was called ‘Kyung-jea-gae-bal-oh-gae-nyun-gae-hek’ if it is translated as it 
sounds in Korean) in 1959 for the purpose to develop economy, this project foundered because of the 4.19 revolution in 1960 
and the military coup in 1961.  After the second government (Park Chung-hee government) was established, this project was 
finally put into action.  From 1962 to 1971, the first and second economic development plans were executed.  During this 
period, the government focused on the light industry and economic development based on export.  From 1972 to 1981, the 
third and fourth economic development plans were carried out and focused on development of the heavy and chemical 
industry based on export.)  
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friendly policies and supported merchants who were doing international business. 53   Consequently, 
Korea’s exports started increasing rapidly—and its amounts were also expanding.54  
Along with the increase in international commercial transactions involving Korean merchants, 
international commercial disputes increasingly arose abroad.55  A typical foreign merchant at that time 
(i.e., an importer of goods from Korean merchants) requested to settle associated claims with Korean 
governmental organizations abroad (e.g., consulates).56  These organizations, however, were not designed 
to deal with frequently occurring claims, struggled to do so, and requested that the Korean government 
find a solution for this problem. 57   Although arbitration was one of the ADR systems that foreign 
merchants preferred over litigation, Korea did not have an arbitration system established at that time.58  
                                                             
53 The typical examples of merchant-friendly policies were to award export bonus, to provide export subsidies, to deduct export 
tax, and to procure export insurance for merchants.  By giving financial benefits to merchants who were doing international 
business, the government encouraged merchants to focus more on export abroad. 
54 HANLIMHAKSA, op. cit., The following table shows the goals and results of economic development during the 1st plan 
under ‘Kyung-jea-gae-bal-oh-gae-nyun-gae-hek'. 
 
  
GDP 
Agriculture, 
forestry & 
fishery 
Mining & 
manufacturing 
industries 
GNP per 
person 
Export of 
goods 
Import 
of 
goods 
1st Plan 
(1962~1966) 
Goal 7.1* 5.7 15.0 4.2 28.0 8.7 
Result 7.8 5.6 14.3 5.0 38.6 18.7 
*Average annual increasing rate  
 
According to the table above, the goal and the result of increasing rate in export of goods and import of goods are high, 
indicating 28.0% and 38.6% respectively in export of goods and 8.7% and 18.7% respectively in import of goods.  Having 
considered the status of economy in Korea from 1962 to 1966, 38.6% and 18.7% were great economic growth rate.  
55 At that time, most Korean merchants did not have a good knowledge about international business and they had great 
difficulties in understanding foreign culture, foreign language and the way of doing business with foreigners. 
56 Jang-ho Choi, Academical Understanding and Institutionalization on Commercial Arbitration in Korea, 30 Journal of 
Arbitration Studies 281, 283 (1996).  As a foreign merchant who was located in their own country, it was easy for them to 
go and complain to the Korean governmental organization which was located in their country rather than taking an official 
step for their complaint either in Korea or in their country.  In this sense, the Korean governmental organization had to deal 
with matters which they were not supposed to do. 
57 Id.  The Korean arbitration system and Korean arbitration law were established by request of Korean merchants with practical 
necessity and needs. 
58 Because ad hoc arbitration is not easy to conduct, institutional arbitration is preferred.  However, because there was no 
arbitral institute in Korea at that time, Korean merchants had no choice but to agree to arbitrate their dispute abroad where 
they could get a full service from an institute when they submitted their dispute to arbitration. 
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Thus, Korean merchants had no choice but to agree to settle disputes abroad by arbitration even when they 
were in a better position to negotiate. 59   Korean merchants subsequently vehemently promoted the 
necessity of an arbitration system that they could use for the settlements of their disputes with foreign 
merchants.60  
 
1.4. How the First Korean Arbitration Act (1966) was Enacted 
Korea joined the Commercial Arbitration Committee in Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East (ECAFE) in 1959; 61  subsequently, the Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KCCI) 
launched a research initiative to study arbitration systems in foreign countries.62  In 1963, the KCCI 
proposed a plan to establish a permanent arbitration body.  Consequently, the government, scholars, the 
committee of merchants, and lawyers would gather regularly to discuss the text of new arbitration law, its 
possible enactment, and the establishment of a permanent arbitration institute.63 On March 16, 1966, the 
Korean Arbitration Act (KAA (1966) was enacted as an independent body of law (i.e., as Act No. 1767)64 
                                                             
59 Id. at 285.  Absence of an arbitration system and arbitration law in Korea was one obstacle that made Korean merchant 
arbitrate abroad.  Most of all, however, because Korean merchants did not have knowledge about arbitration, and because 
they did not think of the effects of arbitration agreement, they easily agreed on what foreign merchants requested. 
60 Id. at 285.  As Korean merchants understood and realized what arbitration was, they realized that it was a great benefit to do 
arbitration in their own country.  
61 http://www.unescap.org/ (viewed on January 20, 2015) ECAFE was established in 1947 to encourage economic cooperation 
among its member states.  The name was changed as United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(UNESCAP) or Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ESCAP) in 1974.  ESCAP’s regional focus is managing 
globalization through programs in environmentally sustainable development, trade and human rights.  
62 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 40. 
63 Id. at 41. 
64 Prior to 1966, even though the KAA was enacted as an independent body of law, it did not have its own independent name.  
The regulations regarding arbitration were inserted as a part of Korean Civil Procedure Act. 
 １５ 
 
to regulate international commercial disputes.65  The International Commercial Arbitration Committee 
(ICAC) was then quickly founded under the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB) 66  and, 
several months later, on October 13, 1966, the Commercial Arbitration Rules were promulgated by 
approval of the Supreme Court.67  The Korean arbitration system was thus finally established as an official 
ADR system.  
Consequently, the Korean government would encourage merchants to use arbitration for the 
settlement of their international commercial disputes, especially in Korea.68  The government’s strong 
desire to have such an approach appeared in the KAA (1966) itself.  In the supplementary section of the 
KAA (1966), one provision69 specified that the Korean government would bear some or all expenses 
incurred in ICA.70  
 
 
                                                             
65 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op cit., at 41.  The first arbitration case after the enactment of 
the KAA was the case where a Japanese company submitted the case for arbitration against a Korean company.  It was 
submitted on May 31, 1966 and an arbitral award was rendered on December 16, 1966 after several hearings were held. The 
issue of this case was non-conformity of goods (ore) and delayed shipment.  The Japanese company claimed US$9,508.12, 
but the arbitral award was rendered for US$1,946.25. 
66 The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (the KCAB) was established on March 22, 1966. 
67 Kang Bin Lee, The Development History and Activation Measures of Commercial Arbitration System in Korea-with respect 
to 40 years of Korean arbitration law and practice, 32 The International Commerce & Law Review 59, 60 (2006). 
68 Id. 
69 ADDENDA (2) (Subsidy) When any dispute on commercial affairs has arisen between a Korean and a foreigner, the 
government may, for the purpose of promoting exportation and encouraging trade, furnish any incorporated association 
designated by Minister of Trade and Industry with all or part of expenses necessary for ICA so as to resolve the dispute 
promptly and establish trust in international transactions until such matters are otherwise determined in Act. 
70 The basic idea of this provision was to invite more ICA to Korea by aiding the cost of arbitration.  This provision was 
eliminated when the KAA was amended in 1999. 
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1.5. Impact of the First Korean Arbitration Act (1966) on Korean Arbitration   
After the Korean Arbitration Act was enacted in 1966, more commercial arbitrations were 
conducted in Korea.71  Table I shows the statistics of the cases submitted for arbitration and the cases 
settled by arbitration in Korea from 1967 to 197972—and indicates how many cases were submitted in 
each year.  The numbers therein include the cases submitted (but not settled) in the previous year, and the 
numbers in parentheses indicate how many unsettled cases were transferred from the previous year.  For 
example, in 1973, eight cases were submitted for arbitration to the ICAC in Korea; five were new cases 
therein and three cases were submitted in 1972 but could not be settled.  In 1973, only six cases were 
settled by arbitration and two cases were transferred to 1974.73  
Table I. Statistics regarding arbitration from 1967 to 1979 
Year 
Number of cases 
submitted for 
 arbitration 
Number of cases 
settled by 
arbitration 
Number of cases 
transferred to 
the next year 
1967~1970 24 10 14 
1971 2 + (14)* 16 0 
                                                             
71 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 42. 
72 Id. at 58. 
73 This table only shows the number of cases regarding arbitration.  It does not clearly show, for example, whether the case that 
was not settled in 1973 and transferred to 1974 was settled or transferred as unsettled case to 1975.  Although there is no 
indication regarding this matter, it was quite unlikely to transfer the case again which was transferred from the previous year 
because the KAA (1966) had a provision fixing the time-limit for rendering an arbitral award.  The time-limit for arbitral 
award is three months after the arbitration commences according to Article 11 (5) of the KAA (1966). 
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1972 4 + (0) 1 3 
1973 5 + (3) 6 2 
1974 13 + (2) 5 10 
1975 11 + (10) 18 3 
1976 12 + (3) 8 7 
1977 25 + (7) 5 27 
1978 11 + (27) 11 27 
1979 20 + (27) 30 14 
*The numbers inside parentheses shows how many cases were not settled in the previous year (and were thus transferred 
to the next year). 
 
The following table (i.e., Table II) shows the number of cases that were submitted for conciliation 
or mediation as well as arbitration from 1966 to 1979.74  From 1971 to 1979, the number of cases therein 
(i.e., submitted for arbitration) generally increased, with a drop twice in 1975 and 1978.  Also, during the 
same period, except in 1975 (which shows a rapid drop), the number of cases submitted for conciliation 
or mediation increased substantially.75  
 
                                                             
74 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 65. 
75 Id. at 62. 
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Table II. Statistics regarding conciliation/mediation and arbitration from 1966 to 1979 
Year 
Claims submitted 
for  
conciliation/mediation* 
Claims submitted 
for arbitration* 
Percentage of 
arbitration to 
conciliation/mediation 
1966~1970 231 24 10 %  
1971 117 2 1.7 % 
1972 225 4 1.7 % 
1973 284 5 1.76 % 
1974 595 13 2.1 % 
1975 60 11 1.8 % 
1976 686 12 1.7 % 
1977 769 25 3.2 % 
1978 891 11 1.2 % 
1979 1,125 20 1.7 % 
*The number of claims submitted for each ADR shows how many cases, in total, were newly submitted in each year. This 
number does not show how many claims were settled by each ADR. 
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According to Table II, the percentage of cases submitted for arbitration (vs. conciliation or 
mediation76) was 10% from 1966 to 1970.  From 1971, however, the percentages sharply dropped to less 
than 2% (from 1.2 to 1.8%)—except in 1974 (2.1%) and 1977 (3.2%).77  The reason why mediation was 
much more popular (vs. arbitration) is due to the difference in character between mediation and arbitration; 
the specific reasons are as follows. 
Since the ICAC was founded in 1966, it had been providing a mediation service as well as 
arbitration.78  Fifty years ago, however, Korean merchants preferred mediation (vs. arbitration) since they 
were more familiar with it.79  Conciliation or mediation is conducted by a conciliator or a third-person 
mediator who gives advice to help parties settle their disputes amicably and reach a settlement, whereas 
arbitrators unilaterally render a decision that has a binding effect on both parties;80 this was the main 
reason why conciliation or mediation was preferred (vs. arbitration) in Korea at that time and is related to 
Korean ethnicity.81  Koreans believe that the best way to settle their disputes is (i) on their own, (ii) via an 
                                                             
76 Margaret L. Moses, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION  (2nd ed. 2012), at 15.  
The terms, conciliation and mediation are usually used interchangeably.  These are different from negotiation because they 
invite a third party as an impartial and independent helper for the resolution of their disputes.  In most legal systems, 
conciliation and mediation are not considered as substantially different concepts.  The traditional way of these two concepts, 
mediators being more facilitative and conciliators being more directed, does not work truly anymore. 
77 Being submitted for mediation or arbitration does not mean that these cases were settled by mediation or arbitration.  Table 
II just indicates the number of cases which were submitted for mediation or arbitration. There is no information regarding 
how many cases were settled by mediation or arbitration.  In a case of arbitration, once the case is submitted to arbitration, 
it is certainly settled because usually arbitrators should make a decision in any way.  On the other hand, in a case of mediation, 
there are more unsettled cases than settled ones because it is parties who reach a decision by themselves.  When the case is 
not settled by mediation, it results in waste of time, because the parties have to find other ways to settle their dispute. 
78 Kang Bin Lee, op. cit., at 61. 
79 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 65.  In Korea, the term, ‘mediation’(‘Jojeung’ in 
Korean), is much more familiar because it is commonly used in a general everyday life.  So, although there is no special 
knowledge regarding alternative dispute resolution systems, most Korean people understand what mediation means: a third 
person is involved and helps the parties to negotiate and reach an agreement amicably.  However, the term, 
‘arbitration’(‘Joongjae’ in Korean), is an unfamiliar word and it is not common to use this word in a general everyday life. 
80 Margaret L. Moses, op. cit., at 14. 
81 Once one party invited a third party for settlement of their dispute either by bringing the case before the court or submitting 
the case to arbitration, Koreans tended to believe that the opposing party did not have any intention to negotiate again with 
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amicable negotiation, (iii) without receiving a binding order (i.e., given by a third person), (iv) via the 
attainment of settlements that can lead to lengthy business relationships. 82   This is why most cases 
submitted for conciliation or mediation were domestic commercial disputes (i.e., between Korean 
merchants) whereas arbitration is usually involved when there are international commercial disputes 
between Korean and foreign merchants.83  Also, it was not common for Korean merchants to utilize 
attorneys when negotiating deals with business partners at the time;84 indeed, they were not generally (i) 
used to writing precise business contracts under the advice of attorneys, (ii) accustomed to inserting 
arbitration clauses in their contracts, (iii) sufficiently aware of arbitration, and (iv) accustomed to 
consulting with attorneys who could give them advice regarding such matters.85  
Conversely, most international business transactions (i.e., between Korean and foreign merchants) 
involved written contracts with arbitration clauses.86  In the 1970s, Korean merchants did not have strong 
negotiation power and were eager to enter into contracts with foreign merchants.  Consequently, they just 
signed contracts that contained arbitration clauses during negotiations with foreign merchants without 
                                                             
them about their dispute or to do business again with them.  Consequently, Koreans thought that they were aggrieved by the 
action of inviting a third person for a binding decision.  
82 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 66. 
83 Id., at 66 
84 In traditional Korean culture, merchants feel inhospitable if the other party brings a lawyer when they negotiate the deal.  
Korean merchants tend to think that the business should be just between merchants, so they feel that a lawyer as a third 
person interferes in their business.  Moreover, bringing a lawyer gives an impression that the other party is already prepared 
for disputes that have not occurred.  Although this practice has changed today, many merchants still feel uncomfortable 
confronting the other party’s lawyer when they negotiate and try to make a contract. 
85 Nowadays, there are several model contracts provided by different institutes like the Korea International Trade Association 
(KITA), the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KTIPA), The Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KCCI) 
in Korea.  Most Korean merchants use these model contracts as a draft of their contracts, and in these model contracts, an 
arbitration clause is almost always contained. 
86 Unlike Korean culture, Western merchants prefer to write down a precise contract under the advice from their lawyers.  When 
Korean and foreign merchants negotiate and enter into a contract, foreign merchants try to insert an arbitration clause which 
is drafted in their favor under their lawyer’s advice. 
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understanding the meaning of an arbitration clause.87 This also explains why most cases submitted for 
arbitration were international, while the cases submitted for conciliation or mediation were domestic.  
When domestic commercial disputes arose between Korean merchants and they could not settle the 
disputes on their own via negotiation, they tended to bring their disputes before courts or go to conciliation 
or mediation—vs. arbitration.88  Although conciliation or mediation also required consent from two parties 
(i.e., on a par with arbitration), the attitude of Korean merchants towards conciliation or mediation was 
totally different (vs. their assessments of arbitration); 89  indeed, this is another reason why Korean 
merchants preferred conciliation or mediation (vs. arbitration) for dispute resolution.  
In sum, most Korean merchants believed that they could manage conciliation or mediation by 
themselves. 90   Conversely, arbitration involves an arbitrator who renders a binding decision—and 
merchants are obligated to follow the decision as it stands.91  Moreover, arbitration was not widely known 
and recognized by Korean merchants in the 1970s, so most Korean merchants doubted the credibility and 
reliability of arbitration.92  
                                                             
87 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 68. 
88 At that time, most Korean merchants believed that they had an option between mediation and litigation. Arbitration was not 
something that could be considered as a method of dispute settlement. 
89 Korean merchants agreed to do mediation without taking it seriously because they thought they could try other settlement 
methods if they failed to settle their dispute by mediation.  On the other hand, in a case of arbitration, they were more careful 
with agreeing on arbitration because they knew that they had to accept subsequent consequences as a final settlement. THE 
KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 68 
90 Id. 
91 ‘Following the decision without any objection’ means that either party cannot appeal with the same issue. When there is any 
reason that the arbitral award can be vacated based on grounds under the law, either party can bring an action for its 
nullification.  The grounds, however, are very much limited, so an arbitral award is considered as a final and conclusive 
decision. 
92 THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BOARD, op. cit., at 68.  Because an arbitrator is a private person and 
there is no official minimum qualification to be an arbitrator in Korea, it was generally believed that an arbitrator is not good 
enough to settle a dispute and make a decision on the dispute.  In contrast, to be a judge in Korea, s/he has to not only pass 
a bar exam, which was incredibly hard to pass, but also get an excellent result during the train period in the Judicial Research 
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2. The Commencement of Arbitration 
Following the 1966 enactment of the Korean Arbitration Act (KAA), the Act was amended partially 
four times (i.e., in 1973, 1993, and 1997).93  Then, in 1999, the KAA was completely amended through 
the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law.94  The 1999 version of the KAA was totally different from 
previous enactments.95  For example, while there were only 18 articles in the KAA prior to adopting the 
Model Law, the KAA was amended in 1999 and subsequently had eight chapters with 41 articles.96  In 
order to examine the change between the provisions before and after the Act’s amendment in 1999, the 
1997 version of the KAA will be analyzed, article by article, because it is the latest version of the KAA 
(i.e., before the 1999 amendment);97 through this analysis, the questions of why the KAA required a total 
amendment (and how this amendment was accomplished) will be considered.  
First, it is helpful to know that the Japanese law heavily influenced the KAA prior to 1999.98  The 
earlier provisions of the KAA were similar to the provisions found in the Japanese Civil Procedure Act 
                                                             
and Training Institute.  Consequently, most merchants used to think that a judge is much better at making a decision regarding 
their dispute. 
93 Kang Bin Lee, op cit., at 60. 
94 Id. 
95 Because there is a big difference between the KAA (1997) and the KAA (1999), in Korea, the 1997 Act is called “old Korean 
arbitration law’ (Gu Joongjaebub) and the 1999 Act is called “new Korean arbitration law” (Shin Joongjaebub).  Therefore, 
when the KAA is mentioned, instead of using the year which the Korean Arbitration Act was amended in, two descriptions 
are used: “old Korean arbitration law’ (Gu Joongjaebub) and “new Korean arbitration law” (Shin Joongjaebub).  Generally, 
the Acts are not termed using the dates of amendment (e.g. KAA (1973), KAA (1993), KAA (2010), etc.).  In this dissertation, 
however, the names, the KAA (1997) and the KAA (1999) will be used.  Note: the KAA (1997) is the last version of the 
KAA before total amendment in 1999, and the KAA (1999) is the first version of the KAA after total amendment. 
96 The KAA (1999) has a different format from the KAA (1997).  The KAA (1997) states eighteen articles without dividing 
them into chapters, but the KAA (1999) has eight chapters with a title for each chapter and forty-one articles.  The KAA 
(1999) is more detailed and organized. 
97 During the Act’s partial amendments in 1973, 1993, and 1997, there were no significant changes in terms of the structure 
and content.  Amendments were either about changing the name of the organization that governed an arbitration system or 
changing the words used or written in the provisions to make them easily understood.  
98 Kang Bin Lee, op. cit., at 63. 
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(Articles 786 to 805).99  Indeed, just like previous versions, the KAA (1997) had only 18 articles and left 
most matters to be determined by party discretion.100  
 
2.1. Aim of the Law 
The title of Article 1 is ‘Purpose’ of the KAA:101 
 
Article 1 (Purpose)102 
The purpose[103] of this Act is to promptly resolve disputes under the private law, 
not by the judgment of court, but through the awards made by arbitrators, in 
accordance with the agreement between the parties concerned.[104] 
 
                                                             
99 Mun Chul Jang, A Study on Amendment of Korean Arbitration Act, 9 Journal of Arbitration Studies, 3, 5 (1999).  Although 
the arbitration law was re-enacted as an independent body of law after elimination from the Civil Procedure Act in 1960, its 
contents were very similar to the previous regulations that were part of the Japanese Civil Procedure Act. 
100 Seungwoo Cho et al., op. cit., at 12.  The provisions of the KAA (1997) are not as detailed as the ones in the KAA (1999). 
For example, regarding the procedure of arbitration, the KAA (1997) just mentions who will decide on the procedure of 
arbitration. The KAA (1997) states first, “the procedure for arbitration may be determined by an arbitration agreement”, 
second, “if there is no agreement between parties, the procedure for arbitration shall be governed by the procedure determined 
by this Act”, and third, “such matters as those not specifically prescribed in this Act shall be determined by the arbitrators” 
So, the KAA (1997) simply states who has a right to determine the procedure of arbitration: first, parties concerned, second, 
the law, and third, arbitrators. In contrast, the KAA (1999) stipulates how the arbitration should be conducted in each 
procedure and also provides detailed provisions step-by-step. 
101 The English version of the KAA is translated by The Korean Legislation Research Institute and it is named as an official 
one.  However, it expressly declares that when there is conflict in meaning between the Korean and English version, the 
Korean one prevails over the English one.  http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/main.do. 
102 Article 1 of The KAA (1999) states that, “the purpose of this Act is to ensure the appropriate, impartial and prompt settlement 
of disputes in private laws by arbitration.”  So, the KAA (1999) emphasizes not only promptness but also impartiality of 
arbitration. 
103 The better word would be “aim”.  The English version of the KAA (1997) is an official one translated by the Korean 
Legislation Research Institute, but the author changes words and phrases to make more accurate translation for English 
speakers.  For the parts changed by the author, they will be underlined and new words or phrases will be written in footnotes.  
The footnote number will be in parenthesis. 
104 Parties concerned can be rewritten as “contracting parties”. 
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This text clearly states herein that the purpose of the KAA is to “promptly resolve disputes”;105 
indeed, by doing this, the Korean legislative body wanted to emphasize the efficiency and speed of 
arbitration (i.e., one of the principal characteristics of arbitration).106  In addition, Article 1 provides 
information about arbitration (e.g., the definition of arbitration,107 how arbitration is conducted,108 and the 
scope of disputes that can be submitted to arbitration109).  As for the definition of arbitration, Article 1 (i) 
makes it evident that arbitration is a dispute resolution process that differs from ordinary litigation,110 (ii) 
clarifies that arbitration is a resolution system wherein arbitrators settle a dispute by rendering an arbitral 
award,111 and (iii) stipulates that arbitration should be conducted in accordance with an agreement between 
contracting parties. Thus, it is clear that parties can agree on arbitral procedures in their arbitration 
agreements.112 Indeed, it also places limitations on arbitrability by stating that arbitration resolves disputes 
only under private laws.  This means that disputes related to public laws (e.g., anti-trust and property 
rights) cannot be resolved by arbitration.113  Also, although Article 1 mentions the scope of the disputes 
                                                             
105 As the purpose of this law states, in the KAA (1999), there are several provisions that emphasize the promptness of 
arbitration.  However, there have been some arguments on whether it is reasonable to sacrifice other issues like the fairness 
of arbitration in order to strengthen the promptness of arbitration. 
106 In contrast to litigation, arbitration law or arbitral rules have regulations or provisions fixing a time-limit for rendering an 
arbitral award.  So, settling a dispute by arbitration is much faster than doing so by litigation. 
107 Article 1 of the KAA (1997) states that “……. resolve disputes…., not by the judgment of court, but through the award 
made by arbitrators, …..” 
108 Article 1 of the KAA (1997) states that “…..resolve disputes…… in accordance with the agreement of the parties concerned.” 
109 Article 1 of the KAA (1997) states that “….. resolve disputes under the private law……” 
110 It does not state the difference between arbitration and litigation, but it just makes it clear that arbitration is not a judicatory 
system by stating “not by the judgment of court.” 
111 It says that the judge is not involved in arbitration.  The arbitrators play the role of a judge. 
112 Because arbitration is initiated by a private agreement between parties concerned, they can agree on anything about 
arbitration as long as it is not against the law, and the party agreement will have priority over the law or regulations of 
arbitration. 
113 Mun Chul Jang, op. cit., at 15. 
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that can be settled by arbitration, it does not stipulate the scope of application of the KAA (1997) or 
whether the KAA (1997) applies to domestic or international arbitrations.114  
 
2.2. Arbitration Agreement 
The title of Article 2 is ‘Arbitration Agreement’: 
 
Article 2 (Arbitration Agreement) 
(1) An arbitration agreement shall take effect under an agreement between the 
parties concerned to settle through an arbitration the whole or part of any dispute 
which has arisen or will arise in the future between them with respect to any legal 
relationship under the private law (hereinafter referred to as an “arbitration 
agreement”): Provided, That this shall not apply to those legal relations which the 
parties concerned shall not change.  
(2) An arbitration agreement under the preceding paragraph shall be a document 
agreeing to the arbitration which is signed and sealed by the parties concerned, 
an arbitration clause mentioned in an agreement, or exchanged letters or 
telegrams in which an arbitration clause is mentioned.  
 
                                                             
114 Seungwoo Cho et al., op. cit., at 12.  Unlike the KAA (1997), the KAA (1999) has a provision stating the scope of application 
of the law (e.g. to what extent the KAA (1999) applies).  Article 2 of the KAA (1999) (The Scope of Application) (1) This 
Act shall apply to cases where the place of arbitration under Article 21 is in the Republic of Korea: Provided, That Articles 
9 and 10 shall apply even in cases where the place of arbitration is not yet determined or is not in the Republic of Korea, 
and Articles 37 and 39 shall apply even in cases where the place of arbitration is not in the Republic of Korea.  (2) This Act 
shall not affect any other Act by virtue of which certain disputes may not be referred to arbitration or may be referred to 
arbitration only according to provisions, other than those of this Act, nor those treaties which come into operation in the 
Republic of Korea. 
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Article 2 specifies the effectiveness, scope, and forms of the arbitration agreement.  (i) Namely, 
Article 2 (1) stipulates that (a) arbitration agreements become effective when concerned parties agree to 
settle their disputes and (b) arbitration requires an agreement between concerned parties.  (ii) Regarding 
the scope of an arbitration agreement, the contracting parties can (a) agree to arbitrate either part or all of 
the dispute115 and (b) extend the scope of arbitration from the one that has already arisen to the one that 
will arise in the future.116  Article 2(1) also repeats the limitation on arbitrability; however, it is more 
detailed (vs. Article 1).117  For example, the dispute (i.e., the issue requiring a settlement via arbitration) 
should be about a legal relationship under private law.  The contracting parties must clarify the legal 
relationship that they cannot change; if the legal relationship is something that they cannot change, the 
arbitration agreement is not valid.118  This means that there are some disputes that contracting parties 
cannot agree to arbitrate.119  
                                                             
115 The parties can agree to settle a part of dispute.  It means that the parties can agree to settle the dispute related to a certain 
issue.  For example, an arbitration agreement can be written as, ‘any dispute regarding payment under this contract shall be 
settled by arbitration.’  In this case, if a dispute arises and the dispute is about payment, then it has to be settled by arbitration.  
116 There are two ways to conclude an arbitration agreement.  First, the contracting parties can insert an arbitration clause as 
one of terms and conditions in their main contract when they conclude the main contract.  In this case, the arbitral clause 
usually states that it covers the dispute that will arise in the future.  Second, the parties can also agree to settle their dispute 
after the dispute has arisen by concluding a separate and independent arbitration agreement from the main contract.  In this 
case, this arbitration contract states that it covers the dispute that has already arisen.  In practice, the second case is not 
common because it is not easy for parties to agree on something that is related to their dispute especially after the dispute 
has arisen. 
117 Article 1 just states, that “disputes under the private law.” 
118 When the contracting parties agree to arbitrate a dispute that is ‘inarbitrable’ under the law, even if the arbitral award is 
rendered under an arbitration agreement, it will be vacated because inarbitrability is one ground for nullification of arbitral 
award. 
119 The English version says, “those legal relations which the parties concerned shall not change.”  The meaning of “shall not 
change” is not clear in the English version.  However, if what the Korean version says is taken into consideration, the 
meaning of “shall not change” can be interpreted as ‘shall not be able to deal with.’  As it was mentioned before, the Korean 
version prevails when there is difference in meaning.  It is assumed that the English version was not precisely translated at 
that time. Whenever there is a difference in meaning between the Korean and English versions, and when it was caused by 
inadequate translation, the English version will be re-translated by the author considering the meaning contained in the 
Korean version. 
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Thus, the role of Article 2(1) is to make clear that there is a limitation on freedom of contract; indeed, 
it clearly says that there are some matters that are inarbitrable—notwithstanding contracting parties’ 
submission to arbitration.  (iii) The next section of Article 2 focuses on the form of an arbitration 
agreement.  Article 2(2) states the requirements for an arbitration agreement in terms of the written form 
(e.g., as a separate arbitration contract120 or an arbitration clause contained in an underlying contract121).  
An exchange of letters or telegrams can also be considered as the basis of a written agreement, as long as 
these documents contain an arbitration clause or describe the parties’ intent to submit their disputes to 
arbitration.  However, this in-writing requirement can create practical difficulties because many merchants 
conclude oral contracts quite often.122  
When Article 2 is interpreted, a concern arises as to how broadly an arbitration agreement should 
be interpreted.  The first issue involves the validity of an arbitration agreement found in the “general terms” 
of a contract.123  The Korean Supreme Court (KSC)124 has held that an arbitration clause inserted in the 
“general terms and conditions” section is valid (i.e., as an arbitration agreement) as long as there is 
evidence showing that the parties consider the “general terms and conditions” to be a part of the contract 
                                                             
120 Article 2(2) states that “a document agreeing to the arbitration which is signed and sealed by the parties concerned.” 
121 Article 2(2) states that “an arbitration clause mentioned in an agreement.” 
122 Although there are some legal systems that consider an oral contract invalid, there are many occasions where merchants 
conclude a contract orally.  However, most countries, even the countries that approve oral contracts, require a written 
arbitration agreement. 
123 Although the KAA (1997) and other national laws approve an arbitral clause inserted in a main contract as a valid arbitration 
agreement, the issue here is whether the ‘general terms and conditions’ section is part of the contract.  If this arbitral clause 
had been inserted as part of the master contract, there would have been no doubt in approving this arbitral clause valid as a 
part of the contract. 
124 Unlike the U.S. legal system, which is a common law system, the Korean legal system does not use case names.  Supreme 
Court [S. Ct.], 96Da24385, Feb. 25, 1997 (S. Kor.). 
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when performing the agreement.125  A subsequent KSC case126 confirms this holding; the Court herein 
found that when there were other documents that contain an arbitration agreement (and thus show a party’s 
intent to resolve disputes through arbitration), they could become part of the contract (i.e., if the 
contracting parties refer to these documents during the performance of the contract).127  
Next is the issue of how to properly interpret an arbitration clause containing specific limits or 
conditions.  The KSC tends to construe this occurrence broadly and in favor of arbitration.128  The Court129 
has held that an arbitration clause may limit the period for the submission of arbitration.  Furthermore, the 
                                                             
125 The facts of this case are as follows: The seller and the buyer concluded a contract for sale of imported beef.  There was no 
arbitration agreement in their main contract.  However, there was an ‘Invitation to Bids,’ written separately from their main 
contract and it contained ‘Importing Terms and Condition.’  Inside the ‘Importing Terms and Condition,’ there was an 
arbitral clause.  When the dispute arose, the buyer tried to settle the dispute by arbitration, whereas the seller asserted that 
this arbitral clause was not valid because it was not contained in the main contract.  Regarding the role of ‘Import Terms 
and Condition,’ the buyer had to carry out his obligation to perform the contract in accordance with the ‘Import Terms and 
Condition,’ and the Terms additionally contained the process of bid and how the buyer should perform the bid.  
Consequently, the buyer had to look at the ‘Importing Terms and Conditions’ to perform the contract while the seller did 
not need to look at it at all to perform his/her part of contract. Prior to this case, the Korean Supreme Court made it clear 
that where both contracting parties sign the contract and where the ‘general terms and conditions’ are attached as a printed 
form, contracting parties accept this ‘general terms and conditions’ as a part of their contract.  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
89DaKa20252, April. 10, 1990 (S. Kor.). 
126 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da45543, 45550 Oct. 12, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
127 The facts of this case are as follows: The seller (a Brazilian), and the buyer (a Korean), entered into a contract for sale of 
Brazilian beef.  The contract stated that both contracting parties agreed to follow the General Terms and Conditions for 
N.L.C.F. Bid-Commodity & Freight (General terms), unless otherwise indicated in the contract.  Article 14 (B) of the 
contract stated that the General Provision for Bidding and Contract (General Provision), governed the terms and conditions 
that the General Terms did not govern.  Article 22 of this General Provision stated that all disputes arising under this 
contract shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Korean Arbitration Rules of the Korean Commercial 
Arbitration Board.  The governing law shall be the Korean Arbitration law and arbitration shall be conducted in the Republic 
of Korea.  When the dispute arose the seller brought the case to the Korean court, but the buyer asserted that the dispute 
had to be settled by arbitration.  Notably, the seller admitted that s/he agreed to the condition to follow the General Terms 
for the contract’s terms and conditions and that both parties agreed to this.  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da45543, 45550 Oct. 
12, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
128 The arbitration agreement stated that, absent the seller’s objection to the buyer’s decision, via submission of the claim to 
arbitration within 30 days, the buyer’s decision regarding the matter was final. The buyer claimed, because this clause did 
not allow the buyer to submit a dispute to arbitration, the agreement was unconscionable. In contrast, the seller claimed that 
this agreement was not an arbitration agreement, but it provided the buyer with a special right to make a decision regarding 
the dispute.  The Korean Supreme Court held that this was an arbitration agreement that showed intent to arbitrate if the 
seller submitted for arbitration.  This clause simply required the seller to submit a case to arbitration within 30 days if s/he 
wanted to object to the buyer’s decision.  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 88Daka7795, Nov. 13, 1990 (S. Kor.). 
129 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 88Daka7795, Nov. 13, 1990 (S. Kor.). 
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Court130 has provided guidelines for interpreting the scope of an arbitration agreement.131  Indeed, the 
court has held that when an arbitration agreement defines the scope of arbitration using specific words 
like “legal dispute,” these words should be interpreted broadly.132  The Court has held that the scope of 
this phrase includes disputes about the (i) interpretation of conditions written in a contract, (ii) formation 
of a contract, (iii) performance of a contract, (iv) the effects of validity, and (v) termination of the 
contract.133  A later Supreme Court case upheld this holding.134  The Court found that an arbitration 
agreement affected the formation, performance, and validity of a contract that contained an arbitration 
agreement.135  Furthermore, the Court has clarified that an arbitration agreement can affect disputes 
directly or closely related to the contract.136 
Lastly, regarding the interpretation of an optional arbitration agreement, the KSC137 has held that 
the effectiveness of an optional arbitration agreement depended on the intent of the party against whom 
                                                             
130 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 91Da17146, 91Da17153, April 14, 1992 (S. Kor.). 
131 The facts of this case are as follows: The seller and the buyer concluded a contract for the sale of a factory with other 
facilities.  This contract had an arbitral clause and the clause said that if parties cannot settle any legal dispute regarding the 
contents of this contract, it should be settled by arbitration.  After performance of contract, the buyer was damaged by a 
hidden defect of the factory.  Therefore, the buyer submitted the case to arbitration that the damage, caused by non-
performance, was a legal issue that arose from the contract. 
132 The issue of this case concerned what ‘legal disputes’ meant regarding the contents of the contract. 
133 The court reasoned, because damage resulted from the hidden defects and transfer of the object (factory and other facilities), 
there was no full performance.  The legal issue of the contract involved the contents of the contract and because there was 
non-performance, the dispute had to be settled by arbitration. 
134 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da13577, 13584, April. 10, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
135 The facts of this case are: Two parties contracted for investment of amusement park development (Investment Contract).  In 
this contract, there was a clause stating that all disputes arising in relation to the contract shall be finally settled by arbitration.  
Additionally, two contracting parties made another agreement (Agreement), regarding performance of this investment 
contract and this agreement contained a clause stating that anything not stated in the Agreement shall be governed by the 
Investment Contract.  The Agreement did not have any clause regarding dispute resolution or arbitration.  Later, one party 
did not fulfill the obligation under the Agreement.  Consequently, the other party declared the avoidance of the Investment 
Contract as well as the Agreement.  The issue in this case was whether the dispute arising under the Agreement should be 
settled by arbitration while the Agreement did not say anything about dispute resolution.  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
99Da13577, 13584, April. 10, 2001 (S. Kor.).   
136 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da13577, 13584, April. 10, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
137 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da318, Aug. 22, 2003 (S. Kor.). 
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the submission to arbitration was made.138  The Court has held that an option to choose between litigation 
and arbitration (i.e., in an arbitration agreement) had a valid effect only when there was no strong objection 
to the commencement of arbitration by the opposing party (when one party has submitted a case to 
arbitration).139  Under an optional arbitration agreement, when one party submits a case to arbitration (vs. 
brings a case before a court), the arbitration agreement will be effective if the opposing party makes no 
objection to the submission.140 However, if the other party claims that the arbitration agreement is invalid 
and objects to the commencement of arbitration, the optional arbitration agreement becomes invalid. 
Indeed, the disputes cannot be settled by arbitration unless the parties so agree.141  
 
 
 
                                                             
138 The facts of this case are as follows: The provider and the purchaser concluded a contract for sale of goods.  Article 28 (1) 
of the contract stated that, “the provider and the purchaser shall do their best in order to settle any dispute arising out of the 
contract by negotiation amicably.”  In addition, Article 28 (2) of the contract stated that “if the provider and the purchaser 
cannot reach an agreement within 30 days after the commencement of negotiation, either party may require that the dispute 
be referred for resolution to the formal mechanisms specified in the Special Condition of Contract.”  Here, Article 10 (1) 
of the ‘Special Condition of Contract’ stated that, “the dispute shall be referred to adjudication/arbitration in accordance 
with the law of the Purchaser’s country.”  When the purchaser breached the contract, the provider submitted the case to 
arbitration.  The purchaser, however, claimed that there was no valid arbitration agreement. 
139 Just as the ‘other’ party did in this case, the court held that when the other party is required to submit an answer in response 
to the request of arbitration submitted by one party, if the other party strongly asserts invalidity of the arbitration agreement 
in the answer, then the optional arbitration agreement is invalid.  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da318, Aug. 22, 2003 (S. 
Kor.) 
140 It can be interpreted that the ‘other’ party impliedly agrees to settle their dispute by arbitration if the ‘other’ party does not 
object to the submission of the dispute by one party.   
141 Objecting to commencement of arbitration does not mean that the parties agree to settle their dispute by litigation.  Since 
there is an option between arbitration and litigation, the arbitration, which requires an agreement between parties, cannot 
be commenced when there is an objection to it.  Litigation however, does not need an agreement by parties to be initiated.  
Thus, either party can brings the dispute to the court regardless of consent. 
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2.3. Prohibiting Lawsuit 
Article 3 is about the binding effect of a valid arbitration agreement: 
 
Article 3 (Prohibition of Lawsuit)142 
Parties concerned in an arbitration agreement shall abide by arbitration awards: 
Provided, That they may institute a lawsuit, only when the arbitration agreement 
is invalidated, loses its effect, or becomes impossible to carry it out.  
 
The effect of a valid arbitration agreement is, as the title says, to prohibit lawsuits.143  There is no 
recourse to the court unless the arbitration agreement is invalid, becomes void, or is impossible to perform.  
Indeed, the KSC144 has made the “no recourse to the court under a valid arbitration agreement” principle 
clear;145 it has held that a court should not rule on a dispute when a valid arbitration agreement is inserted 
into the contract.  A later case strengthened this principle.146  The issue therein was whether an arbitration 
agreement became invalid when (i) one party brought a case before a court (notwithstanding a valid 
                                                             
142 The better title would be “prohibiting lawsuit”. 
143 It means that there is no way to settle the dispute by litigation as long as a valid arbitration agreement exists. 
144 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], Ja 82Maka77, Aug. 1, 1983 (S. Kor.). 
145 The facts of this case are: An arbitration agreement was inserted in a charter party entered between a ship owner and a 
charterer.  The arbitration agreement said that, “any dispute arising in relation to this charter party shall be settled by 
arbitration.”  The dispute arose because of disagreement on charter freight between the ship owner and the charterer.  
Although the issue of this dispute more closely related to a consignee who did not pay for carriage, the parties concerned 
there were the ship owner and the charterer.  The court said that this dispute should have been settled by arbitration because 
there was a valid arbitration agreement between the ship owner and the charterer. 
146 The facts of this case are: The seller and the buyer concluded a contract for sales of goods.  Article 26 of the contract stated 
that, “unless otherwise stipulated in this contract, any dispute arising out of this contract shall be settled by parties’ 
agreement through a negotiation between parties.”  Additionally, “if parties cannot reach an agreement for the settlement 
of disputes, the dispute shall be settled by arbitration under the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board.”  When the buyer 
did not make a payment, the seller brought a case before the court claiming breach of contract.  While the litigation was 
pending, the buyer did not object.  Later, the court rendered a decision against the buyer and the buyer claimed that the 
decision rendered by the court was not effective and the dispute should be settled again by arbitration because there was a 
valid arbitration agreement.  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 91Da7774, 91Da7781, Jan. 21, 1992 (S. Kor.). 
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arbitration agreement), (ii) the other party did not raise any objection to it, and (iii) the court rendered a 
ruling.147   The Court held the contracting parties therein had not agreed to invalidate their existing 
arbitration agreement simply because one of the parties did not take any action against the commencement 
of litigation—and rendered a ruling thusly on the matter.148  Indeed, the court found that the dispute 
between the contracting parties should have been settled by arbitration because there was a valid 
arbitration agreement.149  
In addition to the effect of a valid arbitration agreement, Article 3 also recognizes that arbitral 
awards are binding; it says that when parties agree to arbitrate, they will be bound by a final award.  Thus, 
an award, once rendered, constitutes a final and binding decision.  Finality of the arbitral award means res 
judicata; when a losing party seeks another decision and brings a suit before a court for a retrial to oppose 
the rendered award, the court will dismiss it.  This provision prohibits appeals or retrials before a different 
court.150  Clearly, the role of this provision is to confirm that arbitration (i) is an independent dispute 
resolution system151 and (ii) cannot be conducted alongside litigation.152  Prohibition to access to second 
opinions from the court is necessary for a prompt arbitral process.  
 
                                                             
147 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 91Da7774, 91Da7781, Jan. 21, 1992 (S. Kor.). 
148 The arbitration agreement in this case was not an optional arbitration agreement.  The arbitration agreement in this case was 
a valid one and it did not provide any option between arbitration and litigation. 
149 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 91Da7774, 91Da7781, Jan. 21, 1992 (S. Kor.). 
150 There are some occasions where either party can bring an arbitral award to the court for nullification.  However, the grounds 
for nullification of arbitral awards are limited.   
151 Because arbitration is a totally independent dispute resolution system from the judicial litigation, the court only gets involved 
when there is a request from either the arbitrators or the parties or when the law allows the court to do so. 
152 There is a misunderstanding among merchants that arbitration is a preliminary step to litigation and they can bring a case to 
the court again after arbitration has been done.  
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3. Composition of Arbitral Tribunal 
3.1. Designation of Arbitrators 
Article 4 provides for the appointment of arbitrators:  
 
Article 4 (Designation of Arbitrators) 
(1) Parties concerned[153] may determine the method of designating arbitrators[154] 
under an arbitration agreement and the number of arbitrators.[155]  
(2) If the designation of the arbitrators is not stipulated in an arbitration agreement, 
each party concerned[156] shall designate one arbitrator.  
(3) If the designation of arbitrators is not stipulated in an arbitration agreement 
relating to a legal relation caused by[157] a commercial transaction, or if the 
intention of the parties concerned is not clear, it shall be presumed to be governed 
by the commercial arbitration rules of incorporated associations designated by the 
Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, notwithstanding the provisions of the 
preceding paragraph.  
(4) If one of the parties who have[158] entered into an arbitration agreement refuses 
to designate arbitrators, or designated arbitrators fall under any of the following 
subparagraphs, the other party may demand the designation of arbitrators, or 
filling or substitution[159] of any vacancy:  
1. When any arbitrator neglects or refuses to carry out his duties; 
2. When any arbitrator is unable to carry out his duties; and 
                                                             
153 The phrase, ‘parties concerned’ can be re-written as “parties to an arbitration agreement.” 
154 The phrase, ‘designating arbitrators’ can be changed as “their appointment.” 
155 The rest parts should be taken out. 
156 The better expression for the words, ‘parties concerned’ would be “contracting parties.”  
157 This phrase would be re-written as “a legal relationship that results from.” 
158 The word, ‘have’ should be taken out.  
159 Because filling and substitution have the same meaning, it can be written “the filling”. 
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3. When any arbitrator is deceased.[160] 
(5) If a person who has received the demand referred to in paragraph (4) above 
fails to designate, fill, or replace the arbitrator within seven days of the demand, 
the court shall, upon request of the party making the demand, select, fill, or replace 
the arbitrator.  
 
The basic principle of Article 4 is to explain that parties can agree on (i) how arbitrators are to be 
appointed and (ii) how many arbitrators should be named (Article 4(1)). For the cases wherein there is no 
agreement on such matters, Article 4 provides two different rules to assist the parties.  First, according to 
Article 4(2), each party appoints an arbitrator and these two appointed arbitrators compose an arbitral 
tribunal.  While the KAA (1997) allows two arbitrators to make a decision on disputes, the resolution of 
a dispute by an even number of arbitrators is clearly not practical or efficient—especially when each party 
gets a chance to appoint one arbitrator.161  The obvious concern is what would happen if the two arbitrators 
were not able to agree on a decision.  (This answer can be found in Article 11 and will be clarified 
herein.)162   
Second, when a dispute arises in a commercial transaction, a different rule will be applied under 
Article 4 (3), which states that arbitrators will be appointed in accordance with the commerce al arbitration 
rules of the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB).  This prevails over Article 4 (2).  The reason 
for making different regulations (i.e., for commercial disputes) is to supplement the shortcomings of 
                                                             
160 It can be simply said as “an arbitrator dies.” 
161 Most national arbitration laws or rules do not allow parties to have an even number arbitral tribunal anymore.  The KAA 
(1999) also requires an odd number arbitral tribunal. 
162 Article 11 of the KAA (1997) concerns arbitration awards.  Article 11(2) states, “except as otherwise stipulated in the 
arbitration agreement, if there are a number of arbitrators, and in the event of an equality of opinions on the award, the 
arbitration agreement concerned shall lose its effect.” 
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arbitration law that cannot cover everything related to commercial disputes in practice.163  Therefore, the 
KAA (1997) tries to incorporate the rules of KCAB whenever it is necessary.164  
As mentioned previously, the purpose of enacting the new arbitration law in 1960 was to provide a 
sound arbitration law for the settlement of international commercial disputes;165 indeed, by making the 
rules of the KCAB applicable, the KAA (1997) tried to make the law more practical and precise.  For 
example, when two contracting parties cannot agree on a method for arbitrator appointment in ICA, Article 
4 (3) provides for the application of the KCAB rules.  According to the rules of the KCAB, in a case 
wherein a dispute is referred to a sole arbitrator, the KCAB will request that both parties agree to the one 
arbitrator within a certain period of time established by the KCAB.166  Similarly, in a case wherein a 
dispute is referred to three arbitrators, the KCAB will request each party to appoint one arbitrator within 
the established period of time.  The two appointed arbitrators then nominate the third arbitrator.  If the 
parties fail to appoint an arbitrator within the time set by the KCAB, the Secretariat will appoint the 
                                                             
163 Because arbitration was uncommon and not much developed in other legal areas, in Korea, the KAA (1997) focused more 
on commercial transactions.  It is still true that Korean arbitration law targets commercial arbitration, especially ICA. 
164 Mun Chul Jang, op. cit., at 5. 
165 Id. 
166 Article 12 (1) of International Arbitration Rules by the KCAB: Where the dispute is to be referred to a sole arbitrator, the 
parties shall agree upon and appoint a sole arbitrator within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the Request for Arbitration by 
the Respondent or the decision of the Secretariat that the number of arbitrators shall be one (1) as provided in Article 11 
above. If the parties fail to jointly appoint a sole arbitrator within that time frame or within such additional time as may be 
allowed by the Secretariat, the Secretariat shall appoint the sole arbitrator. 
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arbitrators.167  In sum, by incorporating the rules of the KCAB into the KAA (1997), arbitration can 
proceed smoothly and promptly, without procedural delay.168  
Next, Articles 4(4) and 4(5) provide rules on the replacement of an arbitrator.  Article 4(4) states 
that one party can demand that the other party appoint an arbitrator to replace an arbitrator when (i) the 
other party did not appoint an arbitrator or (ii) the arbitrator, appointed by the other party, is not able to 
participate in the arbitration.  Specifically, Article 4(4) provides the list of occasions wherein the appointed 
arbitrator cannot conduct the arbitration.  Under Article 4 (5), if the other party does not replace the 
arbitrator within seven days (i.e., of such a demand from the requesting party), the courts are invited to 
perform this task—even though it is not ideal to have court action in arbitration.  Indeed, arbitration works 
best when courts are not involved.169  There are some occasions, however, when court involvement is 
necessary, since it is not possible for parties to agree on every matter.170  If the parties cannot or do not 
agree, a third neutral person should decide.  In arbitration, this third person is also an arbitrator; however, 
because Article 4(5) is about replacing arbitrators (which procedurally is before the arbitral tribunal is 
                                                             
167 Article 12 (2) of International Arbitration Rules: Where the parties have agreed that the dispute is to be settled by three (3) 
arbitrators, the Claimant shall appoint an arbitrator in its Request or within such additional time as may be allowed by the 
Secretariat, and the Respondent shall appoint an arbitrator in its Answer or within such additional time as may be allowed 
by the Secretariat. Where the dispute is to be referred to three (3) arbitrators pursuant to the decision of the Secretariat as 
provided in Article 11 above, each party shall appoint an arbitrator within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice from 
the Secretariat or within such additional time as may be allowed by the Secretariat. If either party fails to appoint an 
arbitrator within that time limit, the Secretariat shall appoint such arbitrator. Upon appointment of the first two arbitrators, 
the two arbitrators shall agree upon the third arbitrator, who shall act as chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal. If, within thirty 
(30) days of the appointment of the second arbitrator, the two arbitrators have not appointed a third arbitrator to act as 
chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Secretariat shall appoint such arbitrator. 
168 Mun Chul Jang, op. cit., at 11. 
169 Id.,  
170 Most national laws or arbitral rules have regulations about the court being involved. 
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formed), there is no neutral third person who can make a decision on behalf of contracting parties except 
the courts.171  
Regarding the selection of arbitrators by a court, the KSC172 has held that a court could not select 
an arbitrator when both contracting parties have named one specific arbitrator in their arbitration 
agreement but the named arbitrator has refused to conduct arbitration.173  The Court has added that if 
contracting parties agree on one specific person as an arbitrator for their dispute settlement and specifies 
this arbitrator in their arbitration agreement, their intent is to receive an arbitral award from this specific 
arbitrator.174  Consequently, if the nominated arbitrator refuses to conduct arbitration, it constitutes an 
impossibility of performance and the arbitration agreement becomes invalid.175  Thus, the Court found 
Articles 4 (4) and 4 (5) inapplicable to this case; however, it did provide three typical examples to 
demonstrate when Article 4 (4) and 4 (5) could apply: (i) when one party requests that the other party 
select or replace an arbitrator within the fixed period of time but the other party does not do so, (ii) when 
one party has a right to select or replace an arbitrator according to the arbitration agreement but this party 
refuses to do so, and (iii) when a selected or replaced arbitrator refuses to function as an arbitrator.  Under 
such circumstances, a court will need to be involved to assist arbitration.176  
                                                             
171 Basically, the reason why the court is invited to arbitration is to facilitate the arbitration proceeding.  By doing so, it can 
strengthen arbitration’s promptness.  
172 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 96Da280, April 12, 1996 (S. Kor.). 
173 The facts of this case are: Two parties agreed to settle their dispute by arbitration and they specified ‘the Mayor of Seoul’ 
as sole arbitrator for their dispute.  The Mayor of Seoul, however, refused to conduct this arbitration, so one of parties 
brought the case to the court requesting the court to appoint an arbitrator as replacement.  The issues of this case were 
twofold.  One was whether the arbitration agreement still remained valid after the nominated arbitrator in the agreement 
refused to conduct arbitration.  The other issue was whether the court could select an arbitrator on behalf of contracting 
parties by exercising Article 4(4) and 4(5) of the KAA (1997). 
174 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 96Da280, April 12, 1996 (S. Kor.). 
175 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 96Da280, April 12, 1996 (S. Kor.). 
176 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 96Da280, April 12, 1996 (S. Kor.). 
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3.2. Disqualification of Arbitrators       
Article 5 is about the disqualification of arbitrators:  
 
Article 5 (Disqualifications for arbitrators)[177] 
No person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs may be an 
arbitrator.  
1. Person[178] who is incompetent or quasi-incompetent;  
2. Person who has been declared bankrupt but not reinstated yet[179];  
3. Person who has been sentenced to imprisonment without prison labor or heavier 
punishment, and for whom three years have not passed since the execution of such 
sentence was completed, or non-execution thereof became definite;  
4. Person who was sentenced to imprisonment without prison labor or heavier 
punishment and is in the period of suspended sentence;  
5. Person who is in the period of deferred sentence, if his sentence to imprisonment 
without prison labor or heavier punishment was deferred; and  
6. Person who is subject to a restriction on his civil rights or a punishment of 
suspension of qualifications. 
 
This article provides a list of conditions that render persons incapable of being appointed as 
arbitrators.  The title of Article 5 clearly states that anyone who falls under any of the categories should 
be disqualified; however, the article does not say anything about arbitrators’ neutrality or impartiality 
because these are more related to challenges of arbitrators, which are regulated by Article 6.180  
                                                             
177 It would be better to change the title as “Disqualification of Arbitrators.” 
178 The word, ‘person’ should be replaced to “someone” in this article. 
179 It should be changed as “and not yet reinstated.” 
180  Under the KAA (1997), the difference between ‘disqualification of arbitrators’ and ‘challenge of arbitrator’ is that 
‘disqualification of arbitrator’ is related to the time before arbitrators are selected, whereas ‘challenge of arbitrator’ is related    
to the time after arbitrators are selected. 
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3.3. Challenge to Arbitrators 
As stated before, Article 6 provides the reasons for challenging the appointment of arbitrators:  
 
Article 6 (Challenge to Arbitrators) 
Any party may apply [181] for a challenge to any arbitrator with the court for such 
reasons[182] as prescribed in Article 37 or 39 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act, only 
unless otherwise provided in the arbitration agreement or in this Act. Provided, 
That once he has[183] made a statement before the arbitrator, he[184] may not 
challenge an arbitrator for the reasons under Article 39 (1) of the Civil Procedure 
Act. 
 
If an arbitrator meets the conditions prescribed in Article 37185 or 39(1)186 of the Civil Procedure 
Act (1995),187 either party can apply to a court to challenge an arbitrator.188  The reasons stated under 
Article 37 of the Civil Procedure Act (1995) clarify when arbitrators might be biased.  Although these 
provisions do not use the words neutrality, independence, or impartiality, they provide a list of specific 
circumstances wherein it is difficult for arbitrators to be neutral, independent, or impartial.  Thus, 
                                                             
181 It would be better to insert the phrase, “to a court.” 
182 The better translation is “to an arbitrator for such reasons are.” 
183 If it is written like “Provided that once, he has”, it would be better.  
184 “That person” is better word instead of ‘he’. 
185 Article 37 of the Civil Procedure Act (1995) Cause of Exclusion: The judge shall be excluded from the exercise of his duties 
in the following cases. (1) If the judge or his spouse or his former spouse is a party to the case or is related  to a party to the 
case as a co-creditor, co-debtor or a person bound to make a reimbursement; (2) If the judge has or had the relationship of 
a relative, family headship, or family membership with a party; (3) If a judge made a testimony or appraisal on the case; (4) 
If the judge is or was an attorney for the party in the case; (5) If the judge has participated in the decision of previous case 
which is subject to appeal; Provide That this shall not preclude him from exercising his duties as an entrusted judge by the 
entrustment of another court. 
186 Article 39 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act (1995) Right to Challenge by Parties: In a case where there are such circumstances 
likely to cause difficulties in ensuring fairness of adjudication, on the part of judge, any party may challenge him. 
187 Although it is not ideal to make the Civil Procedure Act, as part of the judicatory system, be incorporated with an arbitration 
law, the KAA (1997) has some gaps to fill.  At that time, the Civil Procedure Acts filled these gaps. 
188 Because the matter is about arbitrators, it is a court that has to make a decision on it. 
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arbitrators cannot be challenged unless a situation fits in a case listed in Article 37 of the Civil Procedure 
Act (1995). 189   Furthermore, even though there may be doubt about an arbitrator’s neutrality or 
impartiality, he or she cannot be challenged if the issue does not fit into one of the listed situations.190  
Here, the question is whether the list of specific cases (i.e., provided in the provisions) is broad enough to 
cover arbitrators’ neutrality, independence, or impartiality. 
Article 39 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act uses the word “fairness” to clarify the standard of arbitrator 
neutrality, independence, or impartiality.  According to this provision, if any party has difficulty in 
asserting the fairness of an arbitrator, that party may challenge the arbitrator.  Furthermore, because this 
provision specifically states “fairness of adjudication, on the part of judge,” it is clear that “fairness of 
adjudication” is related to an arbitrator’s neutrality, independence, or impartiality (vs. other factors that 
may arise during the arbitration procedure).191  
In addition, regarding an arbitrator’s fairness, under Article 6 of the KAA (1997), the KSC192 has 
held that once a lawyer is nominated as an arbitrator, there will be limitations on his or her attorney-related 
activities.193  For example, after a lawyer is selected as an arbitrator, he or she is not allowed to consult 
with any client who is associated with a case wherein the lawyer serves as an arbitrator;194 thus, even 
                                                             
189 Mun Chul Jang, op. cit., at 19. 
190 If this is the case, the party who claims the challenge of arbitrator bears a burden of proof.  
191 In a case where any party has a doubt as to the fairness of adjudication during the procedure of arbitration, s/he should make 
a claim under other provisions.  This provision only governs matters about arbitrators. 
192 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da21995, March 12, 2004 (S. Kor.). 
193 The facts of this case are as follows: The LG (a construction company) employed Mr. Park as a lawyer and gave him 
authority to represent the company and select an arbitrator on behalf of the company.  Mr. Park nominated Mr. Kim as an 
arbitrator appointed by the LG.  While the arbitration was being conducted, Mr. Kim was employed by the LG as a lawyer 
of LG with two other lawyers.  Later, Mr. Kim helped two other lawyers prepare documents for arbitration where Mr. Kim 
was an arbitrator.  After an arbitral award was rendered, the counter party of LG filed a case for nullification of arbitral 
award. 
194 The issue of this case was whether the arbitrator’s conduct constituted grounds for setting aside under Article 13 (1) 1, if 
one arbitrator performed two independent arbitrations for two different cases with closely related legal matters and where 
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though the cases might be entirely different, the lawyer is strictly prohibited from working with a client 
who is also a party in a case wherein the lawyer is an arbitrator.195  This is to secure the arbitrator’s 
neutrality and independence;196 if the arbitrator takes a case from a client who is also a party to a case 
wherein the lawyer is an arbitrator, the arbitral award (i.e., rendered by this arbitrator) will be invalidated 
under Article 13 (1) 1 of the KAA (1997).197 
The last part of Article 6 is critical; it stipulates that once one party makes a statement before the 
arbitrator, he or she cannot challenge the arbitrator under Article 39(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, which 
addresses the fairness of an arbitrator.  In other words, the parties are deprived of any chance to question 
the arbitrator’s fairness when the parties have made a statement before the arbitrator during a hearing.  
Indeed, it is more likely that the parties will doubt an arbitrators’ fairness during an arbitral hearing if they 
are given a limited opportunity to challenge an arbitrator (i.e., on his or her impartiality).  
Lastly, if the situation fits into the case listed in the provisions of Article 37 or 39 (1) of the Civil 
Procedure Act and if any one of parties wants to challenge an arbitrator, he or she has to submit the case 
to the court.198  This means that the court is again invited into the procedure of arbitration.  The idea is to 
                                                             
one of the parties in one case was the same party in the other case.  Here, the arbitrator will be challenged.  If, however, 
these two arbitrations were conducted one after another, it would not be a problem. 
195 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da21995, March 12, 2004 (S. Kor.). 
196 Generally, a lawyer can conduct arbitration as an arbitrator and at the same time s/he also can consult other customers as a 
lawyer and get attorney’s fee for his/her service as long as the cases are totally independent and a party of arbitration is 
completely independent from a customer of the other case.  
197 Since this case was submitted for nullification of a rendered arbitral award, Article 13 applied.  The issue of the case, 
however, was the arbitrator’s fairness.  However, if, during the procedure of arbitration, one party claimed that the arbitrator 
was related to the other party in a different case, and there was therefore difficulty in ensuring fairness of adjudication, 
Article 6 would have applied. 
198 Unlike the KAA (1997), the KAA (1999) requires a party who wants to challenge an arbitrator to submit a written statement 
for challenge of arbitrator to the arbitral tribunal first.  If a challenge is not successful, the party can request the court to 
decide on the challenge.  Therefore, the KAA (1999) provides two steps for challenge of arbitrator and states that the court’s 
decision is final. 
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invite courts as a neutral third party because (i) arbitrators cannot be totally neutral third parties when they 
are challenged and (ii) sometimes arbitrators can be challenged even before the arbitral tribunal is finally 
formed.199  
 
4. Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings 
4.1. The Procedure for Arbitration 
Article 7 is about the procedure of arbitration:  
 
Article 7 (Procedures for Arbitration)[200] 
(1) The procedures for arbitration may be determined by an arbitration agreement.  
(2) If there is no agreement between the parties concerned[201] with regard to the 
procedures[202] for arbitration, it shall be governed by the procedures determined 
by this Act, and such matters as those not otherwise specifically prescribed in this 
Act shall be determined by the arbitrators.  
(3) If there is no agreement between the parties concerned,[203] or if the intention 
of the parties concerned is unclear, with regard to the procedures for commercial 
arbitration, it shall be presumed to be subject to the commercial arbitration rules 
of the incorporated association  designated by the Minister of Trade, Industry and 
Energy, notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph. 
                                                             
199 The law limits the intervention of the courts into arbitration and the purpose of the courts’ intervention is to conduct 
arbitration without barriers that can cause delay. 
200 The better title would be “The procedure for Arbitration.” 
201 It is better to say “contracting parties.” 
202 A singular form should be used. 
203 It is better to say “contracting parties.” 
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The applicable principle is that the parties can agree on whatever procedure of arbitration they 
want;204 however, when there is no agreement regarding the procedure of arbitration between parties, two 
different rules apply that are similar to Article 4.205  First, in the absence of agreement on arbitral procedure, 
the KAA (1997) applies; also, for the matters not specifically prescribed in the KAA (1997), the arbitral 
tribunal determines the procedure of arbitration.  According to Article 7(3), however, if a dispute arises 
out of commercial transactions, the rules of the KCAB will apply (as with Article 4).  Again, these rules 
fill intrinsic gaps therein and prevail over Article 7(2).  Thus, when there is no agreement on the procedure 
of arbitration between parties under commercial arbitration, the arbitration will be conducted according 
to the rules of KCAB.206  
The KSC207 generally interprets Article 7 broadly; however, this is based on the circumstances of 
each case.  The Court has rejected the nullification of arbitral awards rendered by arbitrators who were 
selected by an arbitral institution (i.e., the KCAB), regardless of party agreement.208  Indeed, the court has 
held that an arbitral award could not be nullified under Article 13 (1) 1 if neither party objected to the 
                                                             
204 Because arbitration is a private agreement between parties, they can agree on whatever they want as long as it is not against 
a law. 
205 There are two rules.  These rules apply depending on whether the dispute arises out of commercial transactions or not. 
206 As previously mentioned, the rules of the KCAB are incorporated with the KAA (1997) when a dispute arises out of 
commercial transactions because there is a desire to encourage merchants to use arbitration for their dispute settlement.  The 
benefits include the efficiency and quickness of arbitration and freedom of contract. Arbitration will not be, however, delayed 
even if there is no agreement on the procedure of arbitration.  The rules of the KCAB will fill the gaps to help the arbitration 
proceed without delay. 
207 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da29264, Nov. 27, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
208 The facts of this case are: The arbitration agreement said that “both contracting parties shall select an arbitrator among a list 
of arbitrators provided by the KCAB.”  After parties received the list of arbitrators, each party selected one arbitrator from 
the list.  The KCAB, however, appointed arbitrators who neither party selected.  After the arbitral tribunal was formed, at 
the first hearing, both parties attended without objecting to the selection of arbitrators or the formation of arbitral tribunal.  
After the arbitral award was rendered, this case was submitted before the court for nullification of the arbitral award rendered. 
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formation of an arbitral tribunal until the arbitral award was rendered—even though there was an 
opportunity (i.e., earlier in the process) for both parties to make an objection to the selection of 
arbitrators.209  The court added that since neither party has objected to the selection of an arbitral tribunal 
during the first hearing in such circumstances, they have impliedly agreed to a new method of selecting 
arbitrators—and the original agreement thus becomes invalid.210  In this case, the court considered that 
party silence constituted acquiescence to a new agreement; both parties accepted the procedure of 
arbitration even though it conflicted with what was originally expressly agreed upon therein.211  Therefore, 
the Court decided that the arbitral award could not be nullified because arbitration was conducted in 
accordance with the parties’ new agreement according to Article 7 (1) and there was no reason for the 
arbitral award to be nullified under Article 13 (1) 1.212  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
209 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da29264, Nov. 27, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
210 Arbitration should be conducted in accordance with the parties’ agreement, regardless of when the agreement is made.  Also, 
if parties make a new agreement against the previous one, generally the latter one is valid.  Therefore, arbitration should be 
conducted according to the new agreement made by both parties after the commencement of arbitration.  Supreme Court 
[S. Ct.], 2000Da29264, Nov. 27, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
211 Interpretation of silence can vary depending on legal systems. 
212 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da29264, Nov. 27, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
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4.2. Examination of Parties and Witnesses 
Article 8 is about examination of parties and witnesses: 
 
Article 8 (Examination of Parties,  
Witnesses and Expert Witnesses) 
(1) The arbitrator shall examine the parties concerned[213] prior to an arbitration 
award. 
(2) The arbitrator may examine any witness or witness expert[214] who attends 
voluntarily: Provided, That he shall not order such witness or witness expert to 
take an oath.215  
 
Article 8 includes two different tenses: it (i) uses the imperative “shall” for parties’ examination in 
Article 8 (1) and (ii) uses the conditional “may” for the examination of witnesses or expert witnesses in 
Article 8 (2).  This means that the examination of parties is compulsory, whereas the examination of 
witnesses (or expert witnesses) is discretionary.  The key issue herein is that parties will have at least one 
chance to be examined by arbitrators before an arbitral award is rendered.  In other words, this provision 
clarifies that no arbitral award should be rendered unless arbitrators examine the parties.  The purpose of 
this provision is to guarantee the fairness of the procedure.  Indeed, it is against Article 8(1) for the 
arbitrators to examine only one party, regardless of intention.  Moreover, the arbitral award (i.e., rendered 
                                                             
213 “The contracting parties” is better. 
214 It is better to say “expert witness”. 
215 The meaning of this sentence is not clear.  Having interpreted the Korean version, it should be translated to “on the condition 
that an arbitral tribunal shall not order such witness or expert witness to take an oath”. 
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pursuant to this approach) can be nullified under Article 13(1) 5, which provides such a basis for 
nullification.216  
Regarding the application of the obligation to examine the parties, the KSC217 has stated that the 
phrase, “the arbitrator shall examine the parties” under Article 8 (1) should be interpreted as requiring the 
arbitrators to get statements or evidence from both parties before an arbitral award is rendered.218  Indeed, 
this does not mean that an arbitrator must actually examine both parties or make them testify.219  Moreover, 
if there are representatives for parties, such as lawyers, who act on behalf of the parties, an examination 
of these representatives fulfills the obligation of the arbitrators under Article 8 (1).220   Thus, if the 
representatives of both parties attend the hearings and submit all statements or evidence on behalf of the 
parties, an arbitral award (i.e., rendered without examining the parties directly or actually) will not violate 
Article 8 and should not be nullified under on Article 13 (1) 4.221 
Conversely, the KAA (1997) does not (i) impose an obligation to examine witnesses or expert 
witnesses or (ii) give arbitrators any authority to order that a witnesses or expert witnesses attend the 
                                                             
216 Article 13 (1) 4 : Any party concerned may bring an action for the nullification of an arbitration award in the cases falling 
under any of the following subparagraphs: 4. In the arbitration procedures, when either of the parties concerned is not 
examined without any justifiable reason, or no reason is attached to the arbitration award. 
217 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da47200, Nov. 24, 2000 (S. Kor.). 
218 The facts of this case are: Contracting parties entered into a contract (there is neither a record on what kind of contract it 
was nor other details about the contract) and a dispute arose out of the contract.  The dispute was submitted to arbitration 
because there was an arbitration agreement.  During the procedure of arbitration, the parties’ lawyers attended the hearings 
and submitted all documents required by the arbitrators.  Later, an arbitral award was rendered.  After the arbitral award 
was rendered, one of parties brought the arbitral award before the court for its cancellation claiming that the arbitral award 
had to be cancelled under Article 13 (1) 4.  This party asserted that the arbitral tribunal did not examine the parties during 
the procedure of arbitration and no examination of parties was against Article 8.  Consequently, the arbitral award rendered 
without examination of parties should be cancelled under Article 13 (1) 4.   
219 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da47200, Nov. 24, 2000 (S. Kor.). 
220 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da47200, Nov. 24, 2000 (S. Kor.). 
221 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da47200, Nov. 24, 2000 (S. Kor.). 
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arbitration.222  Thus, even though arbitrators may want to examine witnesses or expert witnesses, they 
cannot order any witness or expert witness to be examined.  Indeed, according to Article 8, it is purely the 
will of witnesses to participate in an arbitration that controls.  When the witnesses decide to participate 
voluntarily, the arbitrators may determine whether the witnesses are going to be examined.223  
This is a clear difference between arbitration and litigation proceedings; indeed, the parties should 
be aware of this before they agree to arbitrate.  Conversely, in the context of the judicial system, arbitration 
is an autonomous and private dispute resolution process that is initiated by party agreement.  The 
agreement to arbitrate binds only the contracting parties who agree to arbitrate; thus, witnesses (or expert 
witnesses) should not be forced to participate in arbitration because they have not agreed to arbitrate. 
Furthermore, in the context of arbitration, witnesses and expert witnesses should not be required to 
take an oath.224  In the judicial system, witnesses are required to take an oath before they are examined or 
testify;225 this (i.e., taking an oath) means that witnesses can be charged with and receive a criminal penalty 
for perjury if they do not tell the truth during the examination or testimony.226  In arbitration, however, a 
witness or expert witness does not bear any consequential liability for his or her examination or testimony 
when he or she agrees to participate in a proceeding.  
                                                             
222 Arbitration is an agreement between two contracting parties, not between anybody else and an arbitrators’ authority to 
conduct the arbitration is given by this agreement of contracting parties.  Therefore, arbitrator authority is limited to just 
the parties who agree to arbitrate.  Witnesses or expert witnesses are beyond an arbitrators’ authority. 
223 There is no obligation on arbitrators to examine witnesses or expert witnesses when witnesses or expert witnesses decide to 
participate in arbitration.  Arbitrators can decide at their discretion.   
224 Article 8 (2) says that, “the arbitrator shall not order such witness or witness expert to take an oath.” 
225 Article 319 of the Civil Procedure Act (Obligation to Take Oath) The presiding judge shall have a witness take oath prior 
to an examination: Provided, That he may administer it subsequent to an examination, when there exists a special reason. 
226 Article 320 of the Civil Procedure Act (Warning of Punishment for Perjury) The presiding judge shall, prior to administering 
an oath, clarify the purport of oath, and give a warning of the penalty for perjury. 
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Since witnesses or expert witnesses can be examined only if they agree to participate, there could 
be occasions wherein arbitrators have difficulty conducting arbitrations.  For example, when an arbitrator 
must determine the veracity of an important piece of evidence or witness testimony, there must be a way 
to force a witness to testify or be examined—even when he or she does not wish to do so.  The courts must 
indeed intervene in such circumstances to ensure the smooth operation of the arbitration proceedings.227  
Consequently, most arbitration laws allow courts to intervene in arbitration under certain circumstances.  
Thus, the next article is about judicial assistance in arbitration.  Article 9 expressly states that the court 
can intervene in arbitration proceedings.  
 
4.3. Judicial Assistance 
The title of Article 9 is cooperation of courts:  
 
Article 9 (Cooperation of Court)[228] 
Upon request of an arbitrator or a party concerned, the court shall carry out the 
duties concerning any action deemed necessary by an arbitrator for an arbitration 
award which the arbitrator himself cannot take. In this case, the Civil Procedure 
Act shall be applicable mutatis mutandis.  
 
                                                             
227 The only purpose of intervention of the court is to aid arbitration. 
228 The title should be “Judicial Assistance.” 
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There are some arbitration proceedings that require judicial assistance.  Article 9 permits courts to 
intervene in arbitration anytime there is a request by arbitrators or arbitrating parties.  Since arbitrators do 
not have public authority on a par with judges, Article 9 allows arbitrators to borrow some of this authority 
from the courts.229  For example, when a dispute arises and the aggrieved party submits the dispute to 
arbitration, sometimes the breaching party tries to shield assets before the arbitral award is rendered.  In 
order to prevent the breaching party from hiding assets, the aggrieved party has two options under Article 
9.  First, the aggrieved party can request that the arbitral tribunal order interim measures to freeze the 
assets of the breaching party; however, because the arbitral tribunal does not have express authority to do 
so, it must request a court to take interim measures.230  Second, he aggrieved party can file a case directly 
before the court for an interim order.231  The relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act apply when 
either the arbitrator or the parties concerned request the court to order an interim order.  For example, 
when the court needs to order the preservation of evidence during the arbitral proceeding, the court has to 
do so in accordance with Article 350 of the Civil Procedure Act (1995).232 
 
                                                             
229 Arbitration is a private agreement between parties concerned, and arbitrators are also private persons who are appointed by 
agreement of contracting parties.  Therefore, the power of arbitrators cannot go beyond the contracting parties and there are 
certain limitations on arbitrators’ authority for public interest. 
230 The KAA (1997) did not have any provision regarding interim measures, but when the KAA was amended in 1999, one 
provision about interim measure was enacted.  Article 18 of the KAA (1999) allows the arbitral tribunal, upon request of a 
party, to order any party to take such interim measure of protection if the arbitral tribunal considers necessary in respect of 
the subject-matter of the dispute. 
231 When this is the case, the party who requests the court to order an interim measure has to use the judiciary system although 
s/he agreed on arbitration in order to avoid the judiciary system.  Unlike the KAA (1997), the KAA (1999) has a provision 
of interim measure, but there is still heated debate over this matter. 
232 Article 350 of Civil Procedure Act (1995) (ex officio Preservation of Evidence): The court may, if it deems it necessary, 
render a ruling ex officio for the preservation of evidence during the pendency of a lawsuit. This article was amended as 
Article 379 of Civil Procedure Act (2011). 
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4.4. Claim of Illegality of Arbitration Procedures 
Article 10 concerns the circumstances wherein a party can claim that arbitration should not be 
conducted—and whether arbitrators can rule on such claims:  
 
Article 10 (Claim of Illegality of Arbitration Procedures  
and Powers of Arbitrator to Decide) 
Even though the parties concerned claim that there exists no legally effective 
arbitration agreement, that the arbitration agreement has no relation to the 
disputes referred to arbitration, that the arbitrator has no authority to perform 
such duties, or that the arbitration procedures[ 233 ] not permissible for other 
reasons, the arbitrator may continue with the arbitration procedures and make an 
arbitration award thereon.[234]   
 
Article 10 outlines four cases wherein a party may object to arbitration: (i) when there is no legally 
valid arbitration agreement, (ii) when the dispute is beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement, (iii) 
when arbitrators do not have jurisdiction over the dispute, and (iv) when arbitration is not permitted by 
law.235  The emphasis on the power of the arbitrator is the critical issue therein.  According to Article 10, 
when there is a claim against conducting the arbitration, it is the arbitral tribunal that has the power to rule 
on the claim.  Indeed, the provision states that “the arbitrator may continue with the arbitration procedure.”  
Thus, the arbitral tribunal can make a decision on a claim at its discretion—namely, whether (i) the 
                                                             
233 The word, ‘procedures’ should be changed as “proceeding is.” 
234 It would be better if this part is changed to “the arbitration and render an award.” 
235 The KAA (1997) used the phrase, “illegality of arbitration procedures” for the circumstances where the arbitration should 
not be conducted.  These reasons are the grounds for cancellation of arbitral awards under the KAA (1999), which is the 
next version of the KAA (1997).  
 ５１ 
 
arbitration should be halted, (ii) the claim should be disregarded, or (iii) the arbitration should continue—
and an arbitral award should be rendered.  
After arbitration has commenced, one party could claim that there is no legally valid arbitration 
agreement and the arbitral tribunal could decide to address this claim.  In this situation, the arbitral 
proceeding would be stopped—and the arbitral tribunal would examine the claim.  If the arbitral tribunal 
determines (i.e., after examining the claim) that the arbitration should not be conducted because of an 
invalid arbitration agreement, the arbitral tribunal would delay or terminate the arbitration procedure 
immediately.  In this case, the dispute would not be settled by arbitration because there is no valid 
arbitration agreement.  The parties would thus have to find other ways to resolve their dispute.   
Conversely, if the arbitral tribunal determined that the arbitration agreement is valid, the arbitral 
tribunal would reconvene the arbitral proceeding.  In the latter case, because of the claim lacks merit, 
irrespective of whether or not it is intended, the arbitral proceeding is delayed.  It is a waste of time for 
both the arbitral tribunal and the other party.  This is why this provision allows the arbitral tribunal to 
make its own decision on the claim by using the word “may.”  Should the arbitral tribunal decide to ignore 
the claim and continue with the arbitration procedure, it is allowed to do so and can render an arbitral 
award.  If the provision requires an arbitrator to examine a claim (i.e., made by one party) by using the 
mandatory language “shall,” this provision would be abused by a breaching party who (i) does not want 
to resolve a dispute by arbitration or (ii) intends to delay the arbitral proceeding on purpose.  This is why 
Article 10 uses permissive (vs. mandatory) language and allows arbitrators to rule on the claim; indeed, it 
avoids purposeful delay.  Thus, it is clear that the ultimate purpose of Article 10 is to give arbitrators an 
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absolute authority to decide on a claim made by a party in order to prevent the party from purposefully 
delaying an arbitral proceeding.236  
Regarding arbitrator authority to rule on a claim of illegality of arbitration procedures, the KSC237 
has clarified that a claiming party cannot apply for an injunction to stop an arbitration procedure when he 
or she believes that the proceeding of arbitration is against the arbitration agreement or applicable law;238 
however, there are two options for the party herein.  (1) When one party strongly believes that the 
proceeding of arbitration does not comply with the arbitration agreement or is illegal, he or she should 
bring the claim to the arbitral tribunal first.  If, however, in spite of the claim, the arbitral tribunal decides 
to continue arbitration, the claiming party can (i) bring the case before the court and (ii) ask the court to 
determine whether the arbitration is against the arbitration agreement—or applicable law.  The court can 
thus examine the case and make a decision.  This indeed differs from ordering an injunction to stop the 
arbitration.239  While the court is examining the claim, arbitrators can continue the arbitration and render 
an arbitral award if they so choose.  (2) The claiming party can bring the case before the court for 
nullification of the arbitral award based on Article 13 (1) 1 after the arbitral award is finally rendered.240  
Indeed, whichever option the claiming party chooses, arbitrators can continue the arbitration (i.e., 
notwithstanding the claim) and thus prevent delay of the arbitral proceeding. Thus, this strengthens the 
                                                             
236 As far as Article 10 is concerned, the key point is the power of arbitrator. 
237 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], Ja96Ma149, Jun. 11, 1996 (S. Kor.). 
238 There is no factual record on this case.  There was a dispute between two contracting parties and the dispute was submitted 
to arbitration because there was a valid arbitration agreement.  After the arbitration was commenced, one of parties brought 
the case before the court and claimed that the procedure of arbitration was against the law.  Consequently, this claiming 
party requested the court to order an injunction to stop the arbitration procedure immediately.     
239 If the law allows the court to have authority issue and injunction to stop the arbitration upon the request of party, it would 
weaken the arbitrators’ authority. 
240 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], Ja96Ma149, Jun. 11, 1996 (S. Kor.). 
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efficiency and speed of arbitration, which is one of the most valuable features of arbitration; however, it 
is devious that the resolution of merits should be secondary to the efficiency of the process.  
The unlawfulness of arbitration procedures may be based on one of four reasons in Article 10; once 
there is a claim for any of these reasons, it must be addressed.  For example, assume that one party makes 
a claim for the invalidity of an arbitration agreement in the middle of an arbitral proceeding; however, the 
arbitral tribunal decides to continue the arbitral proceeding without examining the claim—and renders an 
arbitral award.  What if the claim is true?  What if there is no legally valid arbitration agreement?  Indeed, 
this means that the arbitral tribunal rendered an arbitral award under an invalid arbitration agreement.  
The question becomes whether there is any chance to force an arbitral tribunal to examine the 
invalidity of an arbitration agreement—or the inarbitrability of a dispute under the KAA (1997).  Indeed, 
there is no provision that addresses these matters in the KAA (1997).  The result is that there is no way to 
nullify an arbitral award rendered pursuant to an invalid arbitration agreement (or when a dispute is simply 
inarbitrable) because Article 13 (i.e., the nullification of the arbitral award) does not include such grounds.  
Another issue involves an arbitral tribunal continuing arbitration after a claim by a party about the 
illegality of the arbitration based on an invalid arbitration agreement or inarbitrability.  What if a court 
finds the agreement to be invalid or inarbitrable?  Is there any provision that can stop the arbitration 
procedure based on the court’s decision?  Which decision is controlling: the finding of the arbitrators or 
the courts?  Are there any legal grounds under the KAA (1997) for the court to order an arbitrator to stop 
the arbitration procedure?241 
                                                             
241 If the purpose of Article 10 is to prevent any of parties from disturbing and delaying the arbitration procedure purposefully, 
there should be other provisions that can give a clear answer to any questions raised. 
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Interestingly, two reasons for nullification of an arbitral award under Article 10 reappear in Article 
13.  The first ground is lack of arbitrator authority 242  and the second is impermissible arbitral 
procedures.243  Indeed, if an arbitral tribunal continues with an arbitration proceeding and renders an 
arbitral award without examining a claim that an arbitrator has no authority to conduct arbitration, the 
claiming party can bring an action before the court for the nullification of the arbitral award under Article 
13.  By doing so, the claiming party gets one more chance to have the claim be examined (i.e., after 
arbitration has ended).  
 
5. An Arbitral Award 
5.1. Rendering and Effect of an Arbitral Award 
Article 11 is about arbitral award:244 
 
Article 11 (Arbitration Award) 
(1) If there are a number of arbitrators, any arbitration award shall be made by a 
concurrent vote of the majority of all arbitrators, except as otherwise provided in 
the arbitration agreement. 
                                                             
242 When an arbitral award is rendered, even though there is a claim that the arbitrator has no authority to perform such duties, 
the award can be cancelled under Article 13 (1) 1, “when the designation of arbitrator or arbitration procedures do not 
conform to this Act or the arbitration agreement.” 
243 An arbitral award rendered, even though there is a claim that the arbitration procedure is not permissible, can be cancelled 
on the grounds of Article 13 (1) 1. 
244 Although the KAA (1997) uses the term, ‘arbitration award’ for a final decision, in this dissertation, the term, ‘arbitral award’ 
will be used for unification of terms. 
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(2) Except as otherwise stipulated in the arbitration agreement, if there are a 
number of arbitrators,[245] and in the event of an equality of opinions on the award, 
the arbitration agreement concerned shall lose its effect.  
(3) The arbitration award shall be prepared in writing, be signed and sealed by 
the arbitrator or arbitrators, and include the text of the arbitration award, 
summary of the reasons therefor, and the date of preparation. [Amended by Act 
No. 2537, Feb. 17,1973.] 
(4) The arbitrator shall serve a certified copy of the award on the parties concerned 
and transfer the original copy thereof together with a certificate of service into the 
custody of the competent court. 
(5) The arbitration award shall be made within the period stipulated in the 
arbitration agreement or three months after the arbitration commences.  
 
Article 11 (1) states that an arbitral award should be made by a vote of the majority of all arbitrators 
unless an arbitration agreement is otherwise achieved.  If the number of arbitrators is an odd number, the 
decision will be made by a majority vote.  If, however, the number of arbitrators is an even number (e.g., 
two or four), there is a possibility that a decision cannot be reached in the event of a tie and Article 11(2) 
provides the consequential effect on this matter.  According to Article 11(2), if there is a tie between the 
arbitrators, the arbitration agreement will be invalidated.  Thus, if two arbitrators compose an arbitral 
tribunal and the arbitral tribunal cannot reach the decision by a unanimous vote, the arbitration agreement 
                                                             
245 It should be translated as “if there is an even number of arbitrators.” 
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will be invalidated according to Article 11 (2).246  Indeed, this issue was raised previously when Article 4 
(2)247 was discussed.248  
Such a disagreement on a decision (i.e., by even number of arbitrators) results in the invalidation of 
the arbitration agreement under Article 11 (2).  Indeed, there are two ways to interpret “invalidation of 
arbitration agreement.”249  First, it can be interpreted that once an arbitration agreement becomes invalid 
(i.e., because arbitrators cannot reach a decision), the arbitration will be terminated and new arbitration 
will commence with a different arbitral tribunal; however, the efficiency and quickness of arbitration may 
subsequently be damaged because the arbitration has to be started all over again.  The obligation to 
arbitrate, in such circumstances, however, would remain intact.250  Second, invalidation (i.e., losing the 
effect of the arbitration agreement as stipulated in Article 11(2)) means that there would be no arbitration 
agreement anymore and the dispute could not be settled by arbitration unless the parties again agree to 
arbitrate their existing dispute via a submission.251  
                                                             
246 Each arbitrator who is appointed by each party tends to be on the side of party who appoints him/her as an arbitrator.  
Because the number of arbitrators is an even number, there is a big possibility for the arbitration agreement to lose its effect. 
247 Article 4 (2): If the designation of the arbitrators is not stipulated in an arbitration agreement, each party concerned shall 
designate one arbitrator.  
248 The question discussed under Article 4 (2) was what happens if each party selects one arbitrator and the selected two 
arbitrators cannot agree on the decision. 
249 Article 11 (2) states that in the event of an equality of opinions on the award, the arbitration agreement concerned shall lose 
its effect.  Here, the phrase, “losing its effect” is interpreted as invalidation of arbitral agreement.  Because the provision 
does not state any consequential effect after invalidation of arbitration agreement, it is not clear what the parties can do 
after arbitrators cannot agree on the final decision. 
250 Although new arbitration starts again because the arbitrators in the former arbitration failed to reach a decision, there is no 
guarantee that the arbitrators in the new arbitration will reach a decision on arbitral award.  Also, the contracting parties 
cannot bring their dispute to the court because of arbitration agreement, so the dispute cannot be resolved in any way until 
arbitrators agree on their decision.  
251 In practice, it is almost impossible for contracting parties to make another arbitration agreement for their existing dispute 
after their first arbitration failed.  So, if it is the case, the existing dispute will be settled by any other ways. 
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Indeed, the second interpretation is more convincing.  The issue under the second interpretation, 
however, is whether it is justifiable to force any such party (i.e., seeking to avoid the judicial system) to 
depend on the judicial system, due entirely to arbitrator performance.  Also, if the arbitration agreement 
becomes invalid because the arbitrators cannot reach a decision, both parties must generate another 
arbitration agreement for their present dispute; if they cannot succeed in doing so, they will have to resolve 
their dispute by other methods (e.g., judicial litigation, in all likelihood).252  This means that parties who 
want to settle their disputes via arbitration must nevertheless resort to judicial litigation.253  
Next, Article 11 (3) is about the form and content of an arbitral award.  The KAA (1997) requires 
an arbitral award to be (i) in writing, (ii) signed, and (iii) sealed (i.e., by arbitrators) to be effective.  Also, 
it specifies what the arbitral award should contain—namely, the (i) text of the award, (ii) summary of the 
reasons for the award,254 and (iii) date of issuance.255  Article 11 (3) uses an imperative word (i.e., “shall”); 
thus, if the arbitral award does not contain what is specified therein, it will become ineffective.  
                                                             
252 Among other dispute resolution systems, litigation is the only system that does not require the consent from the parties.  For 
all alternative dispute resolution systems, there has to be an agreement between parties to settle their dispute by ADR like 
mediation or arbitration. 
253 Although the parties’ will is to settle their dispute by arbitration because of all advantages of arbitration, they cannot enjoy 
these advantages because the law makes so.  Here, the fundamental problem is not Article 11 (2).  The law should have 
made sure that the arbitral tribunal should not be formed with an even number under Article 4 (2). 
254 Stating the reasons for an arbitral award can cause some troubles in practice.  If the reasons are not well-drafted, the losing 
party will claim that the award is wrong and s/he will try to file a case for nullification of the arbitral award.  It is not 
possible to redo arbitration on the same issue or vacate the arbitral award only because the reasons are not well-drafted or 
the arbitral award is not right.  But, it leaves at least some chances for the losing party not to follow the arbitral award 
voluntarily or to delay in execution of arbitral award. 
255 The issuing date of arbitral award is important because this date is a starting date for several different occasions.  For 
example, when the arbitral award orders one party to pay interest to another party because payment of interest was claimed 
in the case, arbitrators often specify the different interest rate before and after the issuing date of arbitral award.  Thus, the 
issuing date of arbitral award should be clearly written. 
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Furthermore, not providing a summary of the reasons is a ground for nullification of the arbitral award 
under Article 13 (1) 4.256  
Several cases have been brought to the KSC for the nullification of arbitral awards, alleging therein 
that the arbitral award was not clear257 and the reasons for the arbitral awards were not detailed enough.258  
The list of requirements in Article 11 (3) become clearer via examinations of some of the courts’ 
associated decisions.  The KSC259 has indeed made clear the standard of interpretation required by Article 
11 (3).260  (i) The Court has held that if an arbitral award contains some parts that are not clear or completed, 
these parts should be interpreted by reasonable supplementary methods.261  (ii) The arbitral award should 
not be vacated simply because some parts are vague therein.262  (iii) The Court has also noted that 
analogical interpretation should be strictly prohibited when the arbitral award is complete and clear 
enough.263  (iv) Furthermore, the KSC264 has established the scope of reasons for an arbitral award.265  The 
                                                             
256  Article 13 (1) 4 (Action for Cancellation of Arbitration Award): Any party concerned may bring an action for the 
cancellation of an arbitration award in the cases falling under any of the following subparagraphs:….or no reason is attached 
to the arbitration award.  Whether the reasons for arbitral award are correct does not constitute a ground for cancellation 
under Article 13 (1) 4.  An omission of reasons for arbitral award constitutes a ground for cancellation. 
257 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da13577, 13584, April 10, 2001 (S. Kor.) 
258 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98Da901, July 10, 1998 (S. Kor.) 
259 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da13577, 13584, April 10, 2001 (S. Kor.) 
260 The facts of this case are: two parties entered into a joint venture agreement.  The dispute arose and the issue of dispute was 
if the joint venture agreement was terminated.  After the arbitral award was rendered, one party brought the arbitral award 
for its cancellation claiming that there was no reason stated in the arbitral award.   The Court held that the arbitral award 
could not be cancelled because the arbitral award stated the reason why one party’s claim was right by stating the 
circumstances that proved termination of contract. 
261 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da13577, 13584, April 10, 2001 (S. Kor.) 
262 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da13577, 13584, April 10, 2001 (S. Kor.) 
263 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da13577, 13584, April 10, 2001 (S. Kor.) 
264 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98Da901, July 10, 1998 (S. Kor.) 
265 There is no record for detailed facts of the case.  The facts known are: Two parties entered into a contract which involved 
providing service and sale of goods.  During the performance of contract, one party breached the contract and the other 
party submitted a case for arbitration.  After an arbitral award was rendered against one party, this party brought the arbitral 
award for cancellation claiming the lack of reasons stated.  The arbitral award stated the amount of damages that one party 
should pay and the standard for calculating the amount.  With this arbitral award, one party claimed that the standard for 
calculating the damage amount was based on the circumstances of transaction and commercial customs, not on legal ground. 
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Court has held that the reasons do not need to necessarily state a clear and detailed determination about 
the legal relationship of the matters within the disputes.266  (v) The Court has stated that the arbitral award 
simply needs to show how the arbitrators have reached a decision—and that it can be rendered on the basis 
of commercial customs and equity.267  
Next, Article 11 (4) details what the arbitrators must do with the arbitral award—namely, deliver a 
certified copy of the award to the parties, transfer the original copy to the competent court, and thereby 
get an execution judgment from the court.  The KAA (1997) imposes an obligation to submit an arbitral 
award to the competent court on arbitrators.268  Thus, parties do not need to submit an arbitral award to 
the court for execution or execution judgment under the KAA (1997).269  
Lastly, Article 11 (5) concerns the time limit for rendering an arbitral award.  Indeed, if an arbitration 
agreement states when an arbitral award must be rendered, the arbitral tribunal must render the arbitral 
award within that time frame;270 an action to the contrary will result in non-compliance (i.e., with the 
arbitration agreement) and become a basis for nullification of the arbitral award under Article 13 (1).271  
If there is no agreement about the time limit (i.e., for rendering an arbitral award), the arbitral award should 
be rendered within three months after the commencement of arbitration, according to Article 11 (5).272  
                                                             
266 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98Da901, July 10, 1998 (S. Kor.) 
267 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98Da901, July 10, 1998 (S. Kor.) 
268 Regarding this matter the KAA (1999) states that the original of arbitral award should be transferred to the competent court.  
Although it does not clearly stipulate who has to transfer the arbitral award to the court, it is obvious that it does not impose 
any obligation to do so on arbitrators. 
269 Because there is no time frame set for transferring the arbitral award, it could be an issue when arbitrators delay in 
transferring the arbitral award to the court for execution. 
270 Failing to render an arbitral award within the time that both contracting parties agreed constitutes a breach of contract. 
271  Article 13 (1) 1 (Action for Cancellation of Arbitration Award): Any party concerned may bring an action for the 
cancellation of an arbitration award in the cases falling under any of the following subparagraphs: when…..arbitration 
procedures do not conform to this Act or the arbitration agreement. 
272 The KAA (1999) does not set the time-limit for an arbitral award.  Instead, the International Arbitration Rules of the KCAB 
sets the time-limit, but it is flexible.  The International Arbitration Rules of the KCAB, Article 33 (Time Limit for the Final 
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This provision also aims to promote the speed of arbitration.  As discussed previously, the KAA (1997) 
emphasizes the efficiency and speed of arbitration in several provisions; however, it is still unclear whether 
other aspects of the process should be disregarded to achieve these features of arbitration.273  Nevertheless, 
the stipulation of three months for rendering an arbitral award, without any consideration of circumstance 
(i.e., associated with an individual case) is not necessarily efficient—and could be impracticable.  
Next, Article 12 emphasizes the effect of the arbitral award:  
 
Article 12 (Effect of Arbitration Award) 
The arbitration award shall have, for the parties concerned,[274] the same effect as 
that of a final and conclusive judgment of the court. 
 
Article 12 confirms that an arbitral award has the same effect as a court judgment.  In fact, the 
characteristics of arbitration enable an arbitral award to have a stronger effect than a court judgment.275  
Once an arbitral tribunal renders an award, the award is final and binding, while judicial litigation allows 
appeals.  Thus, an arbitral award has the same effect as a court’s final judgment, such as one from the 
Court of Appeal or Supreme Court.  This is why Article 12 states “final and conclusive judgment of the 
                                                             
Award): 1. Unless all parties agree otherwise, the Arbitral Tribunal shall make its Award within forty-five (45) days from 
the date on which final submissions are made or the hearings are closed whichever comes later. 2. The Secretariat may extend 
this time limit pursuant to a reasoned request from the Arbitral Tribunal or on its own initiative if it decides it is necessary 
to do so. 
273 Three months for rendering an arbitral award after the arbitration commences is practically too short period. Submission of 
the case, answering to the request, presenting evidence, examining both parties, conducting hearing, and other procedural 
actions should be done within three months.  It would have been more practical and realistic if it sets time limit of three 
months after the final hearing is closed. 
274 “The contracting parties” would be better.  
275 Once an arbitral award is rendered, it is final.  The same issue cannot be dealt with again and this character of arbitration 
strengthens the efficiency and quickness of arbitration.  
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court” (vs. merely “judgment of the court”); the implication therein is that neither party can ask the arbitral 
tribunal to reconsider the case—even when there is a doubt about the decision.276  The only exception (i.e., 
to the validity of the arbitral award) is the grounds for nullification within Article 13.  For example, when 
there is unfairness or a flaw in the conduct of the arbitral proceedings277 (e.g., when the arbitral tribunal 
does not treat the parties equally or conduct the arbitration in a manner that conforms with the provisions 
of the arbitration agreement), either party can bring a nullification action before the court,278 which will 
determine whether the arbitral award should be nullified on the grounds stated in Article 13.  
 
5.2. Compulsory Execution of an Arbitral Award 
   Article 14 is about the compulsory execution of an arbitral award. Compulsory execution means 
that a losing party does not voluntarily satisfy what an arbitral award orders; thus, the award is enforced 
compulsorily by law.279  This article emphasizes the lawful and binding effect of an arbitral award.280  
 
Article 14 (Compulsory Execution by Arbitration Award)[281] 
                                                             
276 If either party has a doubt in an arbitral award and tries to vacate it s/he has to bring the case before the court not to the 
arbitral tribunal.  Once the arbitral tribunal renders an arbitral award, it finishes its job as an arbitrator.  
277 It is not possible to reconsider the case again and to change the arbitral award once the arbitral award is rendered.  Only 
making the arbitral award invalid is possible. 
278 The court will reject the case if it is brought for reconsideration and review of the arbitral award.  However, the court will 
take the case if it is brought for nullification of arbitral award.  
279 Most arbitral awards are executed voluntarily. 
280 In a case of an international arbitral award, it can be executed compulsorily by the New York Convention (1958) if the 
award is rendered in a contracting state to the New York Convention.  
281 “Compulsory Execution of an Arbitration Award” is a better translation.  
 ６２ 
 
(1) Any compulsory execution under[282] an arbitration award may be allowed 
only[283] when it is declared lawful by an execution[284] judgment of the court.285 
(2) When there is any reason to institute an action for cancellation[286] of an 
arbitration award, the execution[287] judgment under the preceding paragraph 
shall not be rendered. 
(3) The execution judgment under paragraph (1) shall declare that a provisional 
execution[288] may be allowed with or without a reasonable security placed.  
   
Article 14 (1) clearly states that when an arbitral award must be enforced compulsorily, an executory 
judgment from a court is required.289  Indeed, it is far better when a losing party satisfies an arbitral award 
voluntarily; however, there must be a compulsory means for providing enforcement when voluntary 
compliance is not possible.  Article 14 guarantees compulsory enforcement; the intent therein is to ensure 
that arbitration is a binding dispute resolution system.290  Indeed, the support of the judicial system is 
                                                             
282 Using a preposition “Of” gives a right meaning in this sentence.   
283 “May only be allowed” would be a better translation.  
284 Using the word “executory” is better in this context.   
285 Here, the language used in the provision is not clear enough to describe what it intends to mean.  The provision uses the 
phrase, “may be allowed only when.”  Literally speaking, it means that the law does not guarantee the compulsory execution 
of arbitral award even if the arbitral award gets declaration of lawfulness by a court.  Because the provision says ‘may be 
allowed’, it means that there can be some other occasions in which compulsory execution ‘may not be allowed’.  To find out 
what this provision intends, the Korean version has to be considered because if there is a conflict between the English 
translation and Korean original version, the latter prevails.  Having considered the Korean version, this provision should be 
translated as “Any compulsory execution of an arbitral award rendered shall be done only if the court declares that the arbitral 
award is legal to be executed.”  It means that legality or lawfulness of arbitral award is a prerequisite requirement for the  
compulsory execution and also compulsory execution judgment of arbitral award should be done as long as the court declares 
lawfulness of the arbitral award.  Although this English version which was translated by the Korean Legislation Research 
Institute is an official one, it is true that there were some provisions that are not translated with the exactly same meaning as 
ones in the Korean version. 
286 The word “nullification” is better and a definite article “the” should be also added.  
287 Using the word “executory” is better in this context. 
288 It should be changed to “executory.” 
289 Because an arbitral award is a decision made by a private person who is selected through a private agreement, it has to be 
confirmed by a court to become binding decision just like a court decision.   
290 For ICA, there are some countries where the court is not hospitable to a foreign arbitral award.  In these countries, it is hard 
to get confirmation for compulsory execution. 
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sometimes necessary.  Furthermore, because Article 14 (1) uses the words, “only when” in the provision, 
it clearly shows that acquiring confirmation from the court is an essential requirement (i.e., for compulsory 
enforcement of the arbitral award).291  
Next, Article 14 (2) specifies one set of circumstances wherein an executor judgment should not be 
rendered.292  Indeed, if there is any ground for the nullification of an arbitral award under Article 13, the 
executory judgment will not be rendered under Article 14 (2).293  This provision, however, does not clarify 
the meaning of “when there is any reason to institute an action for nullification of an arbitration award.”  
For example, it is not clear who determines a reason for nullification.  Indeed, it could be interpreted that 
the judge should determine if there is any reason for the nullification of the arbitral award before he or she 
renders the executory judgment; however, this would (i) mean the judge would have to review the arbitral 
award and (ii) cause serious damage to arbitration because this provision invites the courts to undertake a 
merits review.294  
Arbitration is based on the principle that the courts should be discouraged from intruding upon the 
arbitral process.  This provision could also be interpreted as “when either party initiates an action for 
                                                             
291 When an arbitral award is submitted to the court for confirmation, the court confirms the award without reviewing it. 
292 The KAA (1999) does not have any provision stating when the arbitral award should not be confirmed.  It just stipulates 
that recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards should be made by a court unless any ground referred to in Article 36 (2) 
exists in a case of domestic arbitral award.  Also, the KAA (1999) says in a case of foreign arbitral award, recognition or 
enforcement of arbitral award should be governed by the New York Convention (1958).  Both Article 36 (2) of the KAA 
(1999) and the New York Convention (1958) state that the arbitral award should not be recognized or enforced when, first, 
the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of Republic of Korea, and second, 
the award is in conflict with the good morals and other forms of social order of the Republic of Korea.    
293 This provision makes the grounds for cancellation of arbitral award to be examined twice.  The first time is when the case 
is submitted for cancellation and the second time is when the court confirms execution. 
294 If this occurs, this provision imposes an obligation to review the arbitral award on the court all the time whenever the award 
is submitted for confirmation of execution. 
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nullification.”295  Once an arbitral award is rendered, either party could bring an action for nullification of 
an arbitral award.  At this stage, the court would be invited to intervene by party request; however, a judge 
would have to wait until the judgment (i.e., on the nullification of the arbitral award) is rendered.296  Later, 
if the action for nullification is dismissed, an executor judgment would be rendered as long as other 
requirements are fulfilled.  Conversely, if the arbitral award is vacated under the grounds stated in Article 
13, the request for an enforcement judgment would be also dismissed.297  
The next article focuses on provisional enforcement.298  According to Article 14 (3), when the 
enforcement judgment is rendered, provisional enforcement should also be permitted, irrespective of 
whether reasonable security is provided.  Although the English version uses permissive words like “may 
be allowed” in Article 14 (3), the Korean version uses an imperative word; indeed, the Korean version 
implies that a provisional enforcement should be rendered, regardless of whether reasonable security is 
provided.299  Thus, the KAA (1997) secures the enforcement of provisional awards.  
 
 
                                                             
295 Because there is no clear subject for the phrase, “when there is any reason to institute an action for cancellation”, in this 
provision, its interpretation is not clear.  
296 This means that the judge, who has to confirm an arbitral award, is different from the one who has to determine whether the 
arbitral award should be vacated or not.  
297 In this case, the court does not bear any obligation to review an arbitral award whenever the award is submitted for 
confirmation of execution.  The court only reserves the decision for confirmation until the decision for nullification is 
determined. 
298  Having understood what it says, declaration of compulsory execution includes a provisional execution regardless of 
existence of security. 
299 As mentioned previously, if there is any conflict in meaning between the English and Korean version, the Korean version 
prevails over the English one. 
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5.3. Nullification of Arbitral Award 
Provisions about the nullification of an arbitral award are included in Articles 13, 15, and 16.  Also, 
Article 14(2) is about the enforceability of an arbitral award that is nullified.  
 
Article 13 (Action for Cancellation of Arbitration Award) 
(1) Any party concerned[300] may bring an action for the cancellation[301] of an 
arbitration award in the cases falling under any of the following subparagraphs: 
1. When the designation of arbitrator or arbitration procedures do not conform to 
this Act or the arbitration agreement; 
2. In the designation of arbitrators or arbitration procedures, when either of the 
parties concerned[302] does not the[303] legal capacity for action,[304] or either of 
their representatives has not been designated legally; 
3. When the arbitration award included a provision ordering any act prohibited by 
law; 
4. In the arbitration procedures, when either of the parties concerned[305] is not 
examined without any justifiable reason, or no reason is attached to the arbitration 
award; and  
5. Where there exist causes falling under subparagraphs 4 through 9 of Article 422 
of the Civil Procedure Act. 
(2) When the parties concerned306 have reached an agreement separately with 
regard to the cause referred to in subparagraph 4 of the preceding paragraph, no 
action for cancellation of the arbitration may be instituted. 
                                                             
300 “Any contracting party” is a better word.  
301 “Nullification” is a right word.  
302 “The contracting parties” is a better expression. 
303 The translation is completely wrong.  There is no verb in a sentence.  It should be written as “does not have.” 
304 These words are not necessary.  
305 “The contracting parties” is a better expression. 
306 “The contracting parties” is better translation. 
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Article 13 states five grounds for the nullification of an arbitral award; according to Article 13, any 
party (i.e., seeking to bring an action for nullification) may do so as long as the action is based on one of 
the reasons stipulated in Article 13.  Article 13 (1) 1 details the (i) formation of the arbitral tribunal and 
(ii) conduct of the arbitral procedure.  According to the KAA (1997), arbitration must be conducted 
according to the agreement or the governing law; thus, if there is an agreement on arbitral procedure 
between the parties, the arbitration should be conducted according to their agreement.307  Consequently, 
if an arbitral tribunal is not formed or conducted pursuant to such an agreement, either party can bring an 
action for the nullification of the arbitral award (e.g., any selection of arbitrators that differs from such 
agreements is sufficient reason for the nullification of an arbitral award).  
The KSC308 has confirmed that conducting arbitration against this type of agreement was a basis for 
the nullification of an award.309  In this case, an arbitral award was rendered by two arbitrators (in spite of 
an agreement of the contracting parties to have three arbitrators).310  Upon the request of one party who 
wanted to vacate the arbitral award, the Court stated that agreement to attend the hearing without one 
arbitrator did not mean that the contracting parties had allowed two arbitrators to render an arbitral award 
                                                             
307 Arbitration is an agreement between parties, so arbitrators or parties should follow what they agreed as well as the law.  If 
they do not, it constitutes a breach of contract. 
308 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 91Da17146, 91Da17153, April 14, 1992 (S. Kor.) 
309 The facts of this case are: Both contracting parties agreed to have three arbitrators for an arbitral tribunal. One of arbitrators, 
however, did not attend the hearing and contracting parties agreed to conduct the hearing without this absent arbitrator.  
After the hearing, two arbitrators agreed on the settlement of dispute and finally rendered an arbitral award.  After the 
arbitral award was rendered, one of parties brought a case for cancellation of arbitral award claiming that the arbitration 
was conducted against parties’ agreement.  
310 In this case, the agreement of two parties required three arbitrators for the arbitral tribunal.  If, however, arbitration was 
conducted by two arbitrators, it was definitely against the contract and it constituted a breach of contract. 
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without the absent arbitrator.311  The Court stressed that (i) such an intent (i.e., conducting a hearing 
without one arbitrator) should not have been interpreted broadly312 and (ii) the arbitral award should have 
been vacated if the arbitral tribunal was not able to prove that contracting parties had agreed on having 
two arbitrators for rendering the arbitral award.313  
Conversely, there was a case wherein a decision was made differently (vs. the one discussed above).  
The KSC314 held that if both parties attended the first hearing without objecting to the formation of an 
arbitral tribunal (i.e., formed against their agreement), this should have been interpreted as (i) both parties 
agreeing impliedly on a new method of selecting arbitrators315 and (ii) that the arbitral award should not 
have been vacated.316  The Court adopted herein a broad interpretation of parties’ intent. 
                                                             
311 When the contracting parties agreed to attend a hearing in which only two arbitrators were present, the parties’ intent should 
have been interpreted as it was.  When they agreed, their understanding was that one arbitrator was not able to attend one 
specific hearing for whatever the reason was, not that the award would have been rendered without that arbitrator.  Because 
the contracting parties agreed to have three arbitrators for their arbitration, they would have expected the arbitral award 
rendered by three arbitrators, not two. 
312 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 91Da17146, 91Da17153, April 14, 1992 (S. Kor.) 
313 In this case, because the arbitral tribunal asserted that they rendered the arbitral award under the agreement of contracting 
parties, the court said that the arbitral tribunal bore the burden of proof. 
314 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da29264, Nov. 27, 2001 (S. Kor.) 
315 Parties’ action, attending the hearings without any objection, should have been interpreted as that they agreed to accept the 
new method of selecting arbitrators.  By doing so, their original agreement regarding the method of selecting arbitrators 
became invalid. 
316 The facts of this case are: There was an agreement between parties regarding selection of arbitrators.  The contracting parties 
agreed that they selected arbitrators by themselves.  In spite of this agreement, the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board, 
which was chosen as an arbitral institute, disregarded the choice of both parties and nominated arbitrators on its discretion.  
After the arbitral tribunal was formed, both parties attended the first hearing without making any objection to the way of 
forming this arbitral tribunal.  When the arbitral award was rendered, one of parties brought a case claiming that this arbitral 
award had to be cancelled because the selection of arbitrators was against parties’ agreement. 
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Regarding Article 13 (1) 1, there is one more issue to be considered.  The KSC317 held that Article 
13 (1) 1 was also related to the impartiality and independence of arbitrators.318  In this case, one person 
played two roles in two different cases—namely, as an arbitrator in one case and a lawyer in another 
case.319  The Court stated that (i) arbitrators should have tried to avoid any personal contact with any of 
the parties during arbitration, unless it was necessary to hold an official arbitral procedure (e.g., a hearing 
or examination); (ii) arbitrators should not have taken any case related to any party in the present 
arbitration;320 and (iii) even if an arbitrator took a case as a lawyer (vs. an arbitrator) and even if the case 
had a different legal issue (vs. the present arbitration), the arbitral award (i.e., rendered by this arbitrator) 
should have been vacated because of the lack of impartiality and independence.321  
Although Article 13 (1) 1 does not mention impartiality or independence of the arbitrators, the Court 
has held that the arbitrators’ impartiality or independence was one of the procedural factors that should 
have been protected under Article 13 (1) 1.322  Also, if an arbitrator is selected by a party who lacks legal 
                                                             
317 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da21995, March 12, 2004 (S. Kor.).  The facts of this case are: arbitrators were selected for a 
dispute.  During the arbitral procedure, one of the selected arbitrators took, as a lawyer not as an arbitrator, another case 
which involved one of parties who were also parties in the present dispute.  In other words, one person was involved in 
arbitration as an arbitrator and also involved in another case as a lawyer of one party who was also one party of the 
arbitration.  As a result, after the arbitral award was rendered, the other party brought a case for nullification of arbitral 
award claiming that the selection of arbitrator was against the law under Article 13 (1) 1. 
318 In this case, impartiality or independence was raised while the arbitration was being conducted.  Generally, arbitrators’ 
impartiality or independence is examined when the arbitrators are selected.  That is why the arbitrators’ impartiality or 
independence is discussed mostly under arbitrators’ qualification.  This case is, however, different.  There was no doubt in 
the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence when the arbitral tribunal was initially formed, but one party became suspicious 
of arbitrator’s impartiality when this arbitrator took a case from the other party as a lawyer.  In this sense, the Court said 
that the issue of arbitrator’s impartiality could be also raised during the arbitral procedure and after the arbitral award was 
rendered. 
319 Although two different cases have totally different issues, the arbitrator cannot be considered totally independent from the 
party who is also his/her client and who is going to pay to the arbitrator. 
320 Once the arbitral tribunal is formed, regarding the matters of arbitrators taking a case, it has to rely on professional ethics of 
arbitrator because it is not possible practically to check up every single case that the arbitrator takes. 
321 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da21995, March 12, 2004 (S. Kor.) 
322 The issue, here, is whether there is any way to challenge arbitrators during the procedure of arbitration if either party has a 
doubt in impartiality or independence of arbitrators.  According to Article 6 of the KAA (1997), there is one chance to 
challenge arbitrators when the arbitrators are selected.  However, once parties make a statement before the arbitrator, they 
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capacity (e.g., due to diminished mental capacity)323, the arbitral award rendered by this arbitrator can be 
vacated under Article 13 (1) 2.324  Furthermore, if an arbitral award orders one party to do something that 
is against the national law or executing the arbitral award is illegal, it should be vacated;325 for example, 
if the arbitral award includes punitive damages, this award can be vacated because punitive damages are 
prohibited under the Korean national law.326  
Article 13 (1) 4 stipulates two cases wherein an arbitral award may be vacated.327  The first case is 
related to Article 8 of the KAA (1997).328  According to Article 8 (1), an arbitral tribunal should examine 
both parties before they render an arbitral award.329  Article 8 (1) uses an imperative word “shall” and 
states that an arbitral tribunal bears an obligation to examine parties.  Thus, not examining parties is a 
ground for the nullification of an arbitral award under Article 13 (1) 4.  Article 13 (1) 4, however, adds 
one more condition (i.e., “not examined without any justifiable reason”), which means that if there is a 
justifiable reason for not examining either party, the arbitral award cannot be nullified under Article 13 
                                                             
will lose their opportunity to challenge the arbitrator.  So, the parties should cooperate with arbitrators for conduction of 
arbitration even when either party is suspicious of impartiality or independence of arbitrators.  The party who is not satisfied 
with arbitrators’ impartiality or independence should wait until the arbitral award is rendered and then file a case for 
cancellation of arbitral award. 
323 This is about the validity of contract.  The contract is invalid if the contract is concluded by parties who do not have the 
legal capacity under the law.  So, if an arbitral award is rendered under the invalid agreement, the arbitral award should 
also become invalid. 
324 This case has nothing to do with arbitrators. This is about qualification of parties. If either of the parties does not have the 
legal capacity for action or either representative does not have qualification for their position, the arbitral award rendered 
can be cancelled. 
325 It is what Article 13 (1) 3 of the KAA specifies.  The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) (1958) also has this ground.  Article V. 2 (b) of New York Convention: 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country. 
326 This ground also appears in Article 36 (Action for Setting Aside Arbitral Award to Court) of KAA (1999).  Article 36 (2) 2 
(b) states that the award can be cancelled if the award is in conflict with the good morals and other forms of social order of 
the Republic of Korea. 
327 Two reasons are non-examination of parties and no reasons attached to the arbitral award. 
328 Article 8 is about examination of parties, witnesses and expert witnesses.  
329 Article 8 (1) : The arbitrator shall examine the parties concerned prior to an arbitration award. 
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(1) 4.330  The aim of this additional condition is to prevent any party from attempting to vacate an arbitral 
award on purpose. 
Another case for nullification under Article 13 (1) 4 is the omission of reasons in an arbitral award.  
As discussed previously, a summary of the reasons for an arbitral award is a requirement for an effective 
arbitral award under Article 11 (3).331  Consequently, an arbitral award that does not have reason(s) can 
be vacated under Article 13 (1) 4.  However, if the agreement of contracting parties differs from the 
stipulation in Article 13 (1) 4, the parties cannot nullify the arbitral award based on Article 13 (1) 4332—
even with the presence of a non-conforming summary of reasons and non-examination of parties.333  For 
example, if the parties make an arbitration agreement that contains a provision stating “parties will be 
examined at discretion of the arbitral tribunal” or “reason(s) for the arbitral award is (are) not necessary 
to be written,” this agreement prevails over Article 13 (1) 4, according to Article 13 (2).    
The last ground for nullification is related to parts of the Civil Procedure Act (1995).334  Article 422 
of the Civil Procedure Act (1995) states the grounds for retrial; however, it also clarifies that if a case falls 
                                                             
330 One example of justifiable reason is when arbitrators cannot examine a party because the party does not respond to arbitrators’ 
request in spite of repeated request.  In this case, the law should allow arbitrators to continue the arbitral procedure without 
examination of that party.  Otherwise, the arbitration will be stopped by that party who might be doing so on purpose. 
331 Article 11 (3) : The arbitration award shall be prepared ….. and include the text of the arbitration award, summary of the 
reasons therefor, and the date of preparation. 
332 Article 13 (2) states if parties agree separately with regard to the cause stated in Article 13 (1) 4, none of parties can initiate 
an action for cancellation of arbitral award. 
333 Among the grounds for nullification of arbitral award stipulated in Article 13, only two grounds under Article 13 (1) 4 can 
become ineffective by parties’ agreement.  For the rest, there is no way to invalidate them. 
334 Article 13 (1) 5 says when there are causes falling under subparagraphs 4 through 9 of Article 422 of the Civil Procedure 
Act.  So, Article 1, 2 and 3 of the Civil Procedure Act (1995) are excluded.  The reason for this is that Article 1, 2 and 3 of 
the Civil Procedure Act (1995) are the same as the provisions under Article 13 (1) 1 and 2 of the KAA (1997). 422 of the 
Civil Procedure Act (1995) : (1) A petition for a new trial against a final judgment which has become conclusive may be 
made in the following cases: Provided, That this shall not apply to a case where a party has asserted the facts in an appeal 
or has not asserted them even if he had the knowledge thereof: 1. If the adjudicating court was not constituted in accordance 
with the Act; 2. If a judge who was precluded by the Act from participating in the decision participated therein; 3. If there 
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under subparagraphs 4 through 9 of Article 422,335 the arbitral award will be vacated.336  Specifically, 
subparagraph 4 is about the disqualification of judges and subparagraphs 5 through 9 focus on procedural 
fault.337   
Article 15 provides yet another chance for nullification of the arbitral award;338 it allows either party 
to bring an action for nullification of an arbitral award even after the enforcement judgment has been 
rendered.  
 
Article 15 (Action for Cancellation[339] of Arbitration Awards  
after Execution[340] Judgment) 
Once an execution[ 341 ] judgment is given, any action for cancellation of an 
arbitration award may be instituted only if the reason therefor is the cause under 
Article 13 (1) 5: Provided, That it shall be limited to only when either of the parties 
                                                             
was a defect in the powers of the legal representative or an attorney or in the authority of the representative conducting the 
procedural acts: Provided, That this shall not apply if the ratification mentioned in Article 56 or 88 has been made; 
335 Article 422 of the Civil Procedure Act (1995) : (1) A petition for a new trial against a final judgment which has become 
conclusive may be made in the following cases: ….. 4. If the judge who participated in the decision committed a crime in 
connection with the official duty relating to the case. 5. If a party was led to make a confession or was prevented from 
producing a means of averment or defense which may affect the decision, due to criminally punishable acts of another 
person. 6. If a document or any other Article used as evidence for the judgment was forged or fraudulently altered. 7. If the 
false statement of the witness or expert witness, an interpreter or sworn party, or legal representative was adopted as the 
evidence for the judgment. 8. If a civil or criminal judgment or any other decision or an administrative disposition on which 
the judgment based has been altered by a different judgment or administrative disposition. 9. If adjudication was omitted 
regarding a material point which may affect the judgment.  
336 The question is if it is appropriate for the Civil Procedure Act to incorporate into the Arbitration Act.  Because arbitration 
is a totally different dispute resolution system from litigation, independent provisions should be regulated in the Arbitration 
Act.  
337 According to Article 422 (1) 8 of the Civil Procedure Act, an arbitral award can be cancelled if the arbitral award is rendered 
based on a certain decision, but the decision is altered by a different judgment.  If this occurs, independence of arbitration 
cannot be guaranteed.  It gives an impression that the arbitral award is affected by a judiciary decision, and a judiciary 
decision has precedence over an arbitral award.   
338 The KAA (1997) provides chances to cancel an arbitral award twice: first, after the arbitral award is rendered, but before 
the judgment of execution is rendered, and second, after the judgment of execution is rendered. 
339 The word “cancellation” should be changed as “nullification.” 
340 The word “execution” should be changed as “enforcement.” 
341 “Enforcement” is a right word. 
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concerned[342] explains clearly that he[343] could not claim the cause for such 
cancellation during the procedure of the execution[344] judgment for no fault of his.  
 
If there is any reason that is specified in subparagraphs 4 through 9 of Article 422 of the Civil 
Procedure Act, this provision will let either party bring an action for the nullification of an arbitral award 
that has already been granted an enforcement judgment.345  As discussed earlier (i.e., under Article 13), 
the reasons must be related to a judge’s disqualification and the procedural flaws in the conduct of the 
proceeding.  For example, if either party identifies a material issue that was omitted during the arbitral 
procedure and could affect the arbitral award, this party can bring an action for nullification.  This action 
can be brought even after the enforcement judgment is rendered if this party can prove that he or she could 
not claim the cause for nullification during the enforcement judgment procedure.346  Although this article 
was clearly written to be as fair as possible to both parties, it weakens the finality of the arbitral award to 
some degree347 since nullification is quite possible after an enforcement judgment is rendered.  Thus, to 
minimize this problem, Article 16 sets a time limit for the action of nullification as follows: 
 
 
                                                             
342 “Either contracting party” is a better expression. 
343 It does not make sense.  The word “it” should be used. 
344 The word “enforcement” is better. 
345 Article 15 mentions Article 13 (1) 5 for grounds of nullification after the execution judgment is rendered, and Article 13 (1) 
5 mentions subparagraphs 4 through 9 of Article 422 of the Civil Procedure Act for grounds of nullification. 
346 When it occurs, the party who brings an action for nullification bears the burden of proof. 
347 Giving a chance to bring an action for nullification of arbitral award does not mean that an appeal is allowed in arbitration.  
The consequence, however, is that the arbitral award is not final yet even after the judgment of execution is rendered. 
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Article 16 (Period for Institution of Action) 
(1) Any action for cancellation[348] of an arbitration award shall be instituted 
within thirty days after the reason for such cancellation is known or within five 
years after the execution[349] judgment becomes finalized. 
(2) The day on which the reason for cancellation[ 350 ] under the preceding 
paragraph is known shall not commence until the execution plan becomes finalized. 
(3) The period under paragraph (1) shall be a peremptory period. 
 
Article 16 sets a time limit for nullification action, which is closely related to the time when the 
enforcement judgment is rendered.351  If either party realizes that he or she can bring an action for the 
nullification of an arbitral award based on the provisions under Article 13, he or she has to do so within 
30 days after determining the reason. According to Article 16 (2), this time limit takes effect only after 
the enforcement judgment is rendered.352  Three hypothetical examples will be discussed below to clarify 
this provision.  
(1) Assume an arbitral award is rendered on March 1, 2014.  After the arbitral award is rendered, 
the losing party realizes, on April 1, 2014, that a basis for nullification exists.  One month later, on May 
1, 2014, the arbitral award is transferred to the court for the enforcement judgment.  A few months later, 
                                                             
348 The word “nullification” is better.  The word “cancellation” in this article has been all underlined to indicate that it should 
be changed to “nullification.” 
349 The word “executory” should be used.  
350 The word “executory” is a right one. 
351 The period for nullification action under Article 16 is not limited to the action brought after the execution judgment is 
rendered.  But the period commences from the day when the execution judgment is rendered. 
352 Although Article 16 (1) states that either party should bring an action for nullification of the arbitral award within thirty 
days after s/he finds out the reason, the thirty-day time limit does not start counting until the award gets confirmation for 
execution according to Article 16 (2).  
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on August 1, 2014, the enforcement judgment is rendered.  In this case, the action for the nullification of 
the arbitral award should be initiated by August 30, 2014.353  In effect, although the losing party identifies 
a reason for nullification on April 1, 2014, the last day to bring a case for nullification is August 30, 2014, 
which is almost five months later.  
(2) Assume the circumstances remain the same (as in the first example), except that the losing party 
identifies a reason for nullification on December 1, 2014.354  In this case, the losing party can initiate an 
action for nullification even after the enforcement judgment is rendered if he or she submits an action for 
nullification by December 31, 2014, which is within 30 days after he or she recognizes the reason for 
nullification.355  
(3) Again, under the same circumstances (as in the first example), assume that the losing party 
identifies the existence of a reason for nullification much later—on August 15, 2019.  In this case, he or 
she cannot initiate an action for nullification of the arbitral award because the maximum time frame, 
wherein either party can bring an action for nullification, concludes on August 1, 2019 (i.e., five years 
from when the enforcement judgment was rendered).356  
                                                             
353 Although the losing party realizes that a reason for nullification exists on April 1, 2014, “the day on which the reason for 
cancellation under the preceding paragraph is known shall not commence until the execution plan becomes finalized” 
according to Article 16 (2).  So, the day will be counted from August 1, 2014 when the execution judgment is finalized, 
and August 30, 2014 becomes the last day of thirty days. 
354 In this case, a party finds out the reason for cancellation after the execution judgment is finalized. 
355 According to Article 16 (1), the losing party can bring an action for nullification within thirty days after s/he realizes the 
reason for nullification or within five years after the execution judgment is finalized.  In this case, the last date for this is 
August 1, 2019, but, s/he finds out the reason for nullification on December 1, 2014, so s/he has to bring an action for 
cancellation until December 30, 2014, which is the thirtieth day from December 1, 2014. 
356 Article 16 (3) states that the period under paragraph (1) is a peremptory period.  It means that this maximum period cannot 
be extended by parties’ agreement.   
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This article does not specifically state that the action for the nullification of an arbitral award should 
be submitted only after the enforcement judgment is rendered.  Indeed, any party can initiate an action for 
nullification after the arbitral award is rendered—and also before the enforcement judgment is rendered.357  
This article specifically emphasizes that the starting point for counting 30 days is the day whereon the 
enforcement judgment is rendered.358  
Among the provisions of the KAA (1997), Articles 13, 14, 15, and 16 are about the nullification of 
the arbitral award; considering that there are only 18 articles in the KAA (1997), four articles related to 
nullification may indeed be a disproportionate number.359  As far as nullification is concerned, Article 13 
states five grounds for it and Article 14 (2) states that an enforcement judgment should not be rendered 
when there is any reason for nullification.  Furthermore, Article 15 regulates the action for nullification 
after an enforcement judgment is finalized, 360  and Article 16 (1) establishes a five-year period for 
nullification after an enforcement judgment is finalized.  The KAA (1997) provides an opportunity to 
vacate an arbitral award again after the enforcement judgment is rendered to ensure that arbitration is 
conducted under a fair procedure.361  
                                                             
357 Either party can bring an action for cancellation of arbitral award at any time from when the arbitral award is rendered to 
when the execution judgment is rendered.  In this case, there is no time-limit for this action under the KAA (1997). 
358 This starting date for counting matters when there is a claim that the action for nullification of arbitral award is brought too 
late after the reason for nullification is realized.  In this case, according to Article 16 (1) and (2), the action for nullification 
will be accepted as long as the action is brought within thirty days after the execution judgment is finalized. 
359 The KAA (1997) is generous about nullification of arbitral award.  Although it emphasizes the efficiency and quickness of 
arbitration in various ways, it seems to neglect the finality of arbitration by providing several chances to vacate the arbitral 
award rendered. 
360 Article 15 provides a chance to bring an action for nullification after execution judgment.  Strictly speaking, however, 
Article 15 tries to limit action for nullification by adding a condition for it.  It adds two conditions stating that an action for 
nullification can be brought, first, only when it is based on Article 13 (1) 5 and second, only when the party can prove that 
s/he did not have a chance to bring an action before the execution judgment is finalized. 
361 The grounds to bring an action for nullification after the execution judgment is finalized under Article 15 are mostly related 
to the fairness of arbitral procedure. 
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These provisions help make arbitration fair for both contracting parties; thus, two points should be 
made clear herein.  (1) Although Article 13 stipulates five grounds for nullification, there is no provision 
regarding the time limit for the nullification action.362  Only Article 16 (1) regulates the time limit; 
however, it is only applicable to the action after an enforcement judgment is finalized.363  Consequently, 
the KAA (1997) does not provide a clear time limit for nullification action when it is brought before an 
enforcement judgment is finalized.  (2) If an action for nullification is submitted before an enforcement 
judgment, the enforcement judgment will be pending.  For example, assume that the arbitral award is 
rendered on March 1, 2014, and one party files a case for the nullification of the arbitral award on March 
15, 2014.  In this case, the court (i.e., rendering the enforcement judgment) must wait until the prior court 
makes a decision on its case: the action for nullification.364  Conversely, if the arbitral award is rendered 
on March 1, 2014 and the enforcement judgment is finalized on August 15, 2014, the party who 
discourages a reason for nullification after August 15, 2014 has to bring an action within 30 days (i.e., 
from August 15, 2014).365  In this case, the action for nullification has to be brought based on the grounds 
under Article 13 (1) 5.  
Thus, the KAA (1997) is generous about the provisions regarding the nullification of an arbitral 
award.  Under the KAA (1997), there are three chances for the arbitral award to be vacated: (i) after it is 
                                                             
362 It just stipulates that “any party concerned may bring an action for the cancellation of an arbitral award in the cases falling 
under any of the following subparagraphs.” 
363 Having applied Article 16 (1) to the case in which one party finds out that the arbitral award can be vacated under Article 
13 before the execution judgment, s/he has to bring an action for nullification within thirty days after s/he realized the 
reason.  Having applied Article 16 (2) to this case, however, the thirty days does not commence until the execution judgment 
is finalized, so it results in the fact that Article 16 regulates a time-limit for action for nullification after the execution 
judgment is finalized.  
364 Article 14 (2) 
365 Article 16 (1) 
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rendered but before the enforcement judgment, (ii) during the procedure of enforcement judgment,366 and 
(iii) after the enforcement judgment.  The ultimate purpose of these provisions is the fairness of arbitration.  
Since arbitration does not allow appeals and an arbitral award is final, fairness during the arbitral 
procedure has to be guaranteed; thus, if there is any doubt about this, it should be summarily resolved.367  
The question, however, is whether it is justifiable to give a five-year time period for an action for 
nullification after the enforcement judgment is rendered.368  
 
5.4. Competent Court 
 
Article 17 is about the court, which is involved in arbitration: 
 
Article 17 (Competent Court) 
(1) In the event that an arbitrator is designated or challenged, an arbitration 
agreement is extinguished, the arbitration procedures are not allowable, or an 
agreement has been made in the arbitration agreement regarding the action for 
cancellation of arbitration award or the action concerning the execution 
judgment,[369] the district court or a branch court thereof shall have jurisdiction 
over it; when it is not so, Article 1 through 22 of the Civil Procedure Act shall 
apply.370 
                                                             
366 Article 15 states that any action for cancellation of an arbitral award can be filed “only when either party explains clearly 
that s/he could not claim the cause for such cancellation during the procedure of the execution judgment for no fault of 
his/her.”  By interpreting this part, there is a chance for any party to make a claim for nullification of arbitral award during 
the procedure of the execution judgment. 
367 Although the KAA (1997) limits the grounds for nullification after the execution judgment, allowing parties to file an action 
for nullification after the execution judgment still damages not only the finality and the quickness of arbitration but also 
reliability of arbitration: it leads the parties to think that they can make the arbitral award invalid because it is rendered by 
arbitrators, who are private person. 
368 A five-year time is a long period of time considering the characteristics of arbitration.  
369 This terminology should be changed as “enforcement judgment” or “enforcement order.” 
370 Article 1 through 22 of the Civil Procedure Act (1995), No. 05002 is about jurisdiction. The latest version of this act is the 
Civil Procedure Act (2010), No. 10373. 
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(2) When there are number of courts having jurisdiction under the preceding 
paragraph, the court with which the parties concerned371 or arbitrators had the 
initial relation shall have the jurisdiction. 
 
Article 17 is about the court that is involved in arbitration; the principle herein is that contracting 
parties can agree on the competent court if they wish.  In this case, the competent court will be a district 
court or a branch court.  However, if there is no agreement on this matter, Articles 1 through 22 of the 
Civil Procedure Act apply.372  Also, if there is more than one competent court, the court wherewith the 
parties or arbitrators had the initial relation will be the competent court therein, according to Article 17 
(2), which follows the application of Article 17 (1). 
The main purpose of this article is to (i) summarize when a court needs to be involved under the 
KAA (1997) and (ii) clarify the court that should be involved (i.e., as a competent court).  Article 17 (1) 
provides a list of circumstances wherein the competent court should be involved: (i) when arbitrators are 
selected, (ii) when arbitrators are challenged, (iii) when an arbitration agreement becomes invalid, (iv) 
when an arbitration procedure is not allowable, and (v) when there is an agreement between parties 
regarding the action (a) for the nullification of an arbitral award or (b) related to the enforcement judgment.  
Under these circumstances, the competent court will be a district court (or a branch of the district court), 
according to Article 17.  In other circumstances, the competent court will be determined based on Articles 
1 through 22 of the Civil Procedure Act.  
                                                             
371 “The contracting parties” is better translation.  
372 Article 1 through 22 of the Civil Procedure Act is regulations regarding jurisdiction under civil procedure. 
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The role of a competent court differs based on differing circumstances; the first circumstance is 
when the arbitrators are selected. This is related to Article 4 (5).  Usually, the parties select arbitrators 
according to their agreement—or the arbitral institution nominates arbitrators (if the parties have selected 
an arbitral institution).  There is, however, a case wherein the court must be involved in the selection of 
arbitrators.  When one of the parties refuses to select an arbitrator or when its selected arbitrator is not 
able to conduct arbitration for a reason stated in Article 4 (4), this party will be requested to select an 
arbitrator, substitute, or a replacement; if the party fails to do so within seven days after the demand is 
made, the court will do so upon request of the other party, under Article 4 (5).  
The second circumstance is when the arbitrators are challenged.  This is related to Article 6.  
According to Article 6, if either party brings an action to the court for the challenge of an arbitrator, the 
court should decide the matter.  
The third circumstance is when an arbitration agreement becomes invalid.  This case is related to 
Article 11 (2), which states that “the arbitration agreement will lose its effect when arbitrators cannot 
reach an agreement for an arbitral award.”  What is not clear herein is what the competent court will do 
under Article 17 when the arbitration agreement loses its effect under Article 11 (2).  Article 17 states that 
“the district court or a branch court shall have jurisdiction over it.”  Thus, having interpreted what it states, 
the court will take over jurisdiction if arbitrators cannot agree on the decision associated with the dispute.  
This means that the contracting parties have to settle their dispute by judicial litigation even though this 
was not their original intent.373  
                                                             
373 It has been discussed under Article 9.  The issue here is if it is reasonable to force parties who have a clear intent to avoid 
the judicial system to settle their dispute by litigation when they do not want to do so.  
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The fourth circumstance is when the arbitration procedures are not allowable.  This is related to 
Article 9, which is about judicial assistance.  Arbitration (vs. judicial litigation) is merely a private 
agreement between parties; thus, there are some limits on the power of arbitrators.  When an arbitrator 
needs to take an action that is outside the scope of his or her jurisdiction, the court can cooperate and 
perform what the arbitrator requests.      
The last circumstance is when there is an agreement between the parties regarding an action (i) for 
the nullification of an arbitral award or (ii) related to an enforcement judgment.  Under the last case, the 
role of court is clear.  The issue herein is what “in the event that an agreement has been made in the 
arbitration agreement” means;374 indeed, the reason for the addition of this phrase is not clear.  Generally, 
the action for the nullification of an arbitral award is submitted to a court and the enforcement judgment 
is subsequently rendered by a court; an agreement is not necessary between the parties herein (i.e., to bring 
an action for nullification of an arbitral award to a court or to get the enforcement judgment from a court).  
Regardless of the existence of an agreement, it is a court (i) whereto an action for nullification is submitted 
and (ii) that renders the enforcement judgment. Thus, although it is clear what the role of court is under 
this article, the unnecessary phrase creates confusion. 
 
 
 
                                                             
374 It does not need to state “when there is an agreement between parties.”  By saying so, it gives an impression that having an 
agreement between parties is a requirement to bring an action for nullification of arbitral award to the court. 
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Chapter Three: The UNCITRAL Model Law  
1. General 
1.1. The Objectives of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
Significant improvements in communications and advancements in transportation and logistics this 
century have accelerated the pace of globalization, especially in international trade;375  however, differing 
legal systems and laws worldwide have been hindering international trade and generating legal risks and 
uncertainties for merchants and legal practitioners alike.376  For this reason, the UNCITRAL (United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law) has been drafting and promoting a number of texts via 
a focus on formulating modern, fair, and harmonized rules in the context of international commercial 
transactions 377 —and several have already been recognized as a success. 378   Indeed, in the area of 
arbitration, the UNCITRAL has already attained two notable achievements: a treaty known as the United 
                                                             
375 There is no clear and exact definition of globalization, but in this paper, it means the process of international integration.  
This globalization has shown more progress in international trade than in any other area; it started from a FTA (Free Trade 
Area) between two countries and gets bigger involving more countries.  The TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the RCEP 
(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) are big economic blocs.  Twelve countries (Singapore, Brunei, New 
Zealand, Chile, United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada and Japan) signed on the TPP and sixteen 
countries (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, 
China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand) are taking part in negotiation. Jan H. Dalhuisen, DALHUISEN ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW, Oxford Hart Publishing, 2000, at 2. 
376 Larry Cata Backer, HARMONIZING LAW IN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, Durham Carolina Academic Press, 2007, at 10. 
377 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html (accessed on November 20, 2017). 
378 They are the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (1980), the Convention on the 
Limitation Period in the International Sales of Goods (1974), the United Nations Convention on Independent Guaranteed 
and Stand-by Letters of Credit (1995), the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts (2005), and so on.  More information can be found on 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts.html (accessed on September 17, 2015). 
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Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) (hereinafter, 
the New York Convention)—and the UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial arbitration.379  
The objectives of the Model Law are the harmonization and improvement of national laws (since 
different laws can cause practical concerns in the context of international business).380  Indeed, when two 
different parties make a contract, they have to determine the law that they are going to choose as a 
governing law.  (1) When they execute the contract, they will often have two different laws that (a) they 
are relying on and (b) are protecting the needs of each of the parties.  (2) Thus, when they have a dispute 
and try to settle it, they will encounter a situation wherein they need two governing laws: a substantive 
law and a procedural law.  (3) In such situations, at least one party will experience foreign laws (or rules 
that differ from its national laws) if the opposing party’s national law becomes a governing law—or a 
third country’s law is selected as a governing law.  Furthermore, if they do not determine a governing law 
before they execute a contract, they could experience an unpredictable and frustrating result since they 
will not be able to anticipate applicable laws until a dispute arises therein.381  Moreover, when an agreed-
upon governing law does not address an issue that has arisen, a different law may take effect, which could 
again lead to an unpredictable result.382  Furthermore, if this applicable law (which is determined outside 
                                                             
379 The New York Convention is a treaty while the Model Law is not. With a number of different methods for harmonization 
of international trade law, there are two most prevalent methods.  One is to use formal instruments like multilateral 
conventions and the other is to use soft law instruments such as model laws.  The formal legal harmonization like the New 
York Convention has an internationally binding effect whereas harmonizing by soft law instruments like the Model Law 
does not have any binding effect.  Sieg Eiselen, The Adoption of UNCITRAL Instruments to Fast Track Regional Integration 
of Commercial Law, Kluwer Law International, 2015, Vol. XII, Issue 46, at 85. 
380 The objectives of the Model Law are clearly specified in its resolution 40/72 of 11 December 1985.  Here, the General 
Assembly recommended “that all States give due consideration to the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international commercial 
arbitration practice”. 
381 Gerold Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law – its background, salient features and purposes, 1 Arb. Int’l 6 1985, at. 8. 
382 Id. at 8. 
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of the parties’ agreement) does not share the same principle with the agreed-upon governing law, the 
contracting parties will experience risk and uncertainty.383  
The UNCITRAL, a legal body of the United Nations (UN) systems in the field of international trade 
law, has tried to reduce the uncertainty (or unfamiliarity) of law in international business by harmonizing 
local laws—and drafting a unified law.  The Model Law is (i) one outcome of the harmonization of local 
laws in the area of ICA, (ii) a procedural law for the arbitration proceedings, and (iii) intended to reduce 
(or eliminate) uncertainty or unfamiliarity of local laws to make the process (or result) of arbitration more 
acceptable to parties with different legal systems.  The Model Law tries to harmonize arbitration laws by 
providing a standardized text in order to enable individual national laws to share the same principles.  Thus, 
the UNCITRAL has tried to reduce the uncertainty and unfamiliarity of law in international business by 
harmonizing local laws—and drafting a unified law.  In sum, the Model Law is (i) one outcome of the 
harmonization of local laws in the area of ICA, (ii) a procedural law for arbitration proceedings, and (iii) 
intended to reduce (or eliminate) uncertainty or unfamiliarity associated with local laws, to make the 
process (or result) of arbitration more acceptable to parties with different legal systems.384  
Another objective of the Model Law is to improve national laws.  Although countries have their 
own national arbitration laws, these laws often have problems; some laws are enacted to focus primarily 
on domestic arbitration and some have provisions that equate the arbitral process with judicial litigation.  
Furthermore, some laws cannot address all relevant issues that are necessary for arbitration. 385  
                                                             
383 If the applicable law is not in favor of arbitration or if it allows courts’ intervention in various ways, the parties’ intention 
of wishing to settle their dispute by arbitration will be damaged and the dispute will be settled in a totally different way. 
384 Part Two; Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as Adopted 
in 2006, 21 2006. at 25. 
385 Id. 
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Consequently, these inadequate national laws cause parties to reconsider the submission of disputes to 
arbitration (e.g., when they are concerned about confronting frustration, difficulties, and surprises during 
the arbitration process).  The Model Law aims to reduce these problems by (i) providing standardized text 
with the implied principles of arbitration and (ii) recommending that individual countries adopt it.  
The Model Law enables a more flexible approach to the process of harmonization in order to interest 
more countries or jurisdictions in adopting it; due to this flexibility, countries can take their own 
circumstances into consideration and make some changes in the provisions accordingly.386  This flexible 
approach can indeed bring about positive results by having more countries or jurisdictions adopt the Model 
Law; however, it can also endanger the harmonization process.  For example, when a country adopts the 
Model Law with some changes, there is a risk that these changes will not incorporate all of the underlying 
principles of the Model Law.387  
 
1.2. The Achievement of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
The Model Law was drafted in 1985 and amended once in 2006; it (i) is not a convention but a 
flexible model framework (as the name indicates),388 (ii) provides standardized text that allows individual 
                                                             
386 Although the Model Law allows adopting countries to change the text of Model Law, States are encouraged to make as few 
changes as possible when they adopt it for the purpose of achieving a satisfactory degree of harmonization.  Part Two; 
Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as 
amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as Adopted 
in 2006, 21 2006. at 23. 
387 Sieg Eiselen, op. cit., at 88. 
388 In a case of Convention, once a State ratifies it, the whole Convention becomes one of its national laws.  For example, when 
the seller and the buyer under the international business, agree on ‘Korean Law’ for their governing law in their agreement 
for the sales of goods, the CISG becomes an applicable law because Korea is a Contracting State and the CISG is a Korean 
national law.  If the contracting parties want to apply the Korean national commercial law, they have to specify the exact 
official name for it writing ‘the Commercial Act’.  Otherwise, because the transaction is an international business, the CISG 
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countries to adopt and modify it in order to incorporate it into their national laws,389 (iii) aims to harmonize 
the laws in an indirect (vs. a direct) way by sharing basic principles,390 and (iv) tries to implement two 
basic principles in ICA.  The first principle is to guarantee the freedom of the parties in the context of 
arbitration.391  Indeed, this means recognizing the freedom of contract, which gives the parties a right to 
decide how the arbitration should be conducted; for example, the parties can (i) choose a set of standard 
arbitration rules, (ii) tailor arbitration rules to correspond to their needs, or (iii) make their own rules 
through negotiations associated with arbitration agreements.  Moreover, if there is anything that the parties 
do not agree on, the discretion of the arbitrators should be guaranteed.392  By doing so, the parties who 
want to settle their disputes via arbitration can be kept away from the power of judicial litigation.  Thus, 
the Model Law has been designed, via the provision of standardized text, to (i) operate largely 
independently from the courts of any country, (ii) reduce any possibility of delay in producing a final 
award,393 and (iii) lead individual countries to reflect certain principles in their national laws.394  
The second principle is to guarantee the fairness of the arbitral process.395  Although the Model Law 
has been designed to maximize the parties’ freedom of contract, this freedom should not be absolute;396 
instead, it must be somewhat restricted in order to prevent (i) defects in the procedure, (ii) the violation of 
                                                             
will become a governing law.  The judge or arbitral tribunal will interpret ‘Korean Law’ as any Korean law that is more 
appropriate for international transactions. 
389 In a case of Model Law, individual state can either adopt the whole model law or draft a new law or change their existing 
laws based on the Model Law.  The Model Law can be understood as a guideline or frame.  
390 Sieg Eiselen, op. cit., at 87. 
391 Gerold Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law – its background, salient features and purposes, 1 Arb. Int’l 6 1985, at. 8. 
392 Id. 
393 Brian Davenport, The UNCITRLA Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: the Users’ Choice, 4 Arb. Int’l 69 
(1988), at 70. 
394 Although national arbitration laws of individual countries do not have the same provisions, sharing the same principle can 
reduce the parties’ frustration.  
395 Gerold Herrmann, op. cit., at. 12. 
396 Id. 
 ８６ 
 
due process, and (iii) harming fairness and equality in the arbitral procedure. (Sometimes the intervention 
of judicial courts is necessary to ensure these rights.)397  Consequently, the parties’ freedom, the arbitrators’ 
discretionary powers, and the courts’ interventions should be balanced—and the Model Law provides 
standardardized text that reflects a good balance. 
The Model Law is considered a successful initiative as 72 States (in a total of 102 jurisdictions) have 
adopted it;398 however, each State has its own reason for adopting or rejecting the Model Law.399 (1) For 
countries that have not yet developed arbitration laws, the Model Law provides arbitration law with basic 
principles that are internationally recognized.400 (Although there is criticism about some provisions within 
the Model Law, it is utilized in many countries and jurisdictions.)  (2) The adoption of the Model Law has 
even been a practical consideration in countries with their own arbitration laws; under the guidelines of 
the Model Law, these countries can amend their own arbitration laws (e.g., if the rules of national 
arbitration law are obsolete, incomplete, or partial). Indeed, local arbitration will be underutilized if it is 
not completely guaranteed with fair and impartial proceedings.401 (3) Furthermore, the Model Law is a 
key consideration within countries wherein there is a strong desire to attract ICA.402  
Countries typically adopt the Model Law entirely so that they can show that they provide a 
standardized law for potential users.  For example, a case in Korea in 1999 involved the utilization of the 
Model Law almost entirely because arbitration law therein was not well developed at the time (e.g., it had 
                                                             
397 Id. 
398  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (accessed on November 
20, 2017). 
399 Although four categories are made up, most countries fit into more than two categories.  Brian Davenport, op. cit., at 70. 
400 Id. 
401 Id. 
402 Id. 
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deficiencies and was unsatisfactory for international use).  Thus, the Model Law was initially adopted in 
order to comply with international arbitration standards.  Interestingly, Koreans now frequently promote 
that Korea is the most appropriate place for ICA (especially within Asia) with the standardized arbitration 
laws therein—and seek to invite more ICA.403       
While the Model Law may be regarded as a burden within countries that have longstanding and well-
developed arbitration laws (e.g., England, the United States,404 and France), UNCITRAL has clearly 
achieved its goal (i.e., harmonization) when the Model Law is considered from the perspective of the 
number of States and jurisdictions that have adopted it.  Nevertheless, England, for example, believes that 
its own national arbitration law is much more comprehensive (vs. the Model Law);405 the assertions, in 
such countries, is that they do not need to adopt the Model Law as long as they share the principles within 
the Model Law.406  In the United States, there is recognition that the arbitration law therein must be 
amended; however, because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enacting legislation in a highly 
divided and partisan Congress.  As a result, US arbitration law is modernized and updated by court 
decisions from the US Supreme Court.407  
                                                             
403 Korea is the UNCITRAL regional center for Asia and Pacific. http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/tac/rcap.html (accessed on 
September 29, 2015) 
404 Only 8 States of the USA have adopted the Model Law for international commercial arbitration.  They are California (1988), 
Connecticut (1989), Florida (2010), Georgia (2012), Illinois (1998), Louisiana (2006), Oregon (1991) and Texas (1989). 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (accessed on September 
18, 2015) 
405 English arbitration law is developed through three hundred year experience.  J. Gillis Wetter, The Mustill Committee Report 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law, 6 Arb. Int’l 268 1990, at 270. 
406 John Saxby, A user’s perspective of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 2 Arb. Int’l 164 1986, at 166. 
407 The UAA was adopted in 1955 and has been widely enacted in 35 jurisdictions.  It closely tracks the provisions of the FAA 
which was adopted in 1925.  Since each was enacted, neither the UAA nor the FAA has been amended. As American 
arbitration statutes have not been revised over the past 90 years, many scholars and practitioners contend that these statutes 
need to be revised. 
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1.3.  2006 Amendments of the UNCITRAL Model Law  
After the Model Law was adopted by the UN General Assembly, in its resolution on 15 December 
1985, the UNCITRAL embarked on a revision of the Model Law and established a working group to 
prepare the revision in 2000; 13 topics were considered therein and a few of them (i.e., conciliation, 
interim measures of protection, and the written form requirement of the arbitration agreement) were given 
significant attention.408  A quick result was reached on conciliation and a new Model Law on International 
Commercial Conciliation was drafted.409  The remaining two topics were discussed further, amended, and 
are included in the 2006 revision; they are Article 7, which focuses on ‘arbitration agreement,’ and Article 
17, which focuses on ‘interim measure.’ 
 
2. The Commencement of Arbitration 
2.1. Scope of Arbitration 
Article 1 specifies the scope of application of the Model Law.  
Article 1 (Scope of Application) 
(1) This Law applies to international commercial arbitration, subject to any 
agreement in force between this State and any other State or States.  
                                                             
408 Pieter Sanders, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International and Commercial Arbitration: Present Situation and Future, 21 
Arb. Int’l 443 2005, at 443. 
409 It was adopted by UNCITRAL on 24 June 2002.  The purpose of this Model Law is that “this Model Law provides uniform 
rules in respect of the conciliation process to encourage the use of conciliation and ensure greater predictability and certainty 
in its use” http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2002Model_conciliation.html (accessed on 
November 20, 2017) 
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(2) The provisions of this Law, except article 8, 9, 17H, 17I, 17J, 35 and 36, apply 
only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of this State.  
(3) An arbitration is international if:  
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of 
that agreement, their places of business in different States; or  
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties 
have their places of business: (i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or 
pursuant to, the arbitration agreement; (ii) any place where a substantial part of 
the obligations of the commercial relationship is to be performed or the place with 
which the subject-matter of the dispute is most closely connected; or  
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration 
agreement relates to more than one country.  
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (3) of this article:  
(a) if a party has more than one place of business, the place of business is that 
which has the closest relationship to the arbitration agreement;  
(b) if a party does not have a place of business, reference is to be made to his 
habitual residence.  
(5) This Law shall not affect any other law of this State by virtue of which certain 
disputes may not be submitted to arbitration or may be submitted to arbitration 
only according to provisions other than those of this Law. 
 
Paragraph (1) limits the substantive scope of application and paragraph (2) clarifies the territorial 
scope.  As to the substantive scope, the text therein expressly states that the Model Law applies to 
‘international commercial’ arbitration and paragraph (3) clarifies the definition of international herein.410  
                                                             
410 When the Working Group addressed its application of the Model Law, they discussed, at some length, about how they 
defined the terms, ‘international’ and ‘commercial’, in the Model Law.  After the long discussion, they concluded that it was 
better not to insert a fix definition of ‘commercial’ in the provision.  As an alternative, they inserted the footnote in order to 
define the meaning of ‘commercial’. 
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However, although the meaning of international is defined, there is a doubt about the effectiveness of 
paragraph (3) (c),411 which states that the arbitration is international if the parties agree that the subject 
matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country. (In practice, however, how often 
does this actually occur?)412 
Also, the word, ‘international,’ in this provision, has been criticized as hindering adoption because 
countries do not want to have two separate laws for arbitration (i.e., the adopted Model Law, which is 
designated for international arbitration, and an existing arbitration law for other domestic matters).  While 
flexibility may be appropriate herein, the Model Law—although drafted with ICA in mind—“has basic 
rules that are suitable to any other type of arbitration”; also, because the Model Law allows flexibility in 
adoption, countries may consider modifying it to cover domestic disputes as well when they adopt it.413  
Indeed, it is advisable to modify the Model Law to address both domestic and international 
arbitration—particularly since the international arbitration bar has advocated that there should be a 
distinction between international and domestic arbitration—namely, to provide better service to parties or 
arbitrators who are involved in international business.414  This assertion is based on the rationale that less 
protection, more expediency, more flexibility, and faster procedures are preferred in international 
arbitration. 415   Also, the appointment of countries as places of arbitration generally generates little 
                                                             
411 Pieter Sanders, op. cit., at 445. 
412 Who can ever anticipate whether the subject-matter of their future dispute will be related to more than one country? 
413 Part Two; Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as Adopted 
in 2006, 21 2006. at 25. 
414 Pierre-Yves Tschanz, International Arbitration in the United States: the Need for a New Act, 3 Arb. Int’l 309 1987, at 309. 
415 Id. 
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associated interest in strictly regulating the international arbitration therein.416  Thus, two different laws 
may sometimes be a better option: one for international arbitration and one for domestic arbitration.417  
The word, ‘commercial’ in paragraph (1) is not strictly defined in the provision; however, the 
footnote states that a wide interpretation should be given—and provides examples of commercial 
transaction activities that the Commission had in mind. 418   According to the Working Group, the 
avoidance of confusion is the reason for the absence of the definition of ‘commercial’ within the provision, 
as it could lead to problems with domestic legislation wherein the term ‘commercial’ is utilized in a myriad 
of contexts. 419   When the Commissioners drafted the Model Law, they did anticipate the broad 
interpretation of ‘commercial’ to include any commercial relationships regardless of whether the parties 
are commercial parties or merchants.420  For example, one case involved a home that was sold and 
purchased via a real estate listing agreement with a provision to arbitrate any claim about the physical 
condition of the property; the court, inter alia, regarded this transaction as a commercial one because it 
was conducted in a businesslike manner—even though this sale was unrelated to the regular business 
activity of either party.421 
                                                             
416 Id. 
417 Id. 
418 There is little problem or difficulty in interpretation and application of term, ‘commercial’, in practice. Pieter Sanders, Unity 
and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, 11 Arb. Int’l 1 1995, at 11. 
419 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter 1, Article 1 [Scope of application] in Loukas 
A. Mistelis(ed), CONCISE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, Kluwer Law International, 2010, at 585. 
420 Id. 
421 The facts of this case are as follows; the defendant moved to Ontario and sold their home in Minnesota to the applicant.  
The transaction was undertaken through a real estate listing agreement which included a provision to arbitrate any claim 
about the physical condition of the property.  A claim arose and an arbitral award was subsequently made granting the 
applicant $9,049.50 for the cost of replacing the septic system servicing the property.  The defendant refused to pay and 
the applicant brought an application to enforce the award in Ontario.  The only issue was whether the arbitration agreement 
and the award were "commercial" within the meaning of the Model Law.  The Court concluded that the arbitration 
agreement between the parties and the resulting award were commercial within the meaning of the Model Law.  While the 
sale of the home was unconnected to the regular business activity of either party, it was done in a business-like way, with 
the assistance of professional realtors.  So, the application for enforcement was granted.  CLOUT Case No. 390, Ontario 
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Although the Model Law defines the substantive scope of application under paragraph (1), this law 
will not be applicable if a certain dispute (i) is inarbitrable according to any other law of the Model Law 
country (i.e., the State adopting the Model Law)422 or (ii) must be submitted to arbitration according to 
any other law.423  Paragraph (5) helps limit this issue by stipulating the need for arbitrability provisions 
from each State (since the absence of a list of non-arbitrable issues leaves matters of arbitrability to the 
individual States and thus minimizes uniformity and predictability).424  Some scholars have responded to 
this criticism by asserting that the topic of arbitrability is better left to individual, national arbitration laws 
due to doubts, in the arbitration community, about (i) ultimately attaining the global unification of 
arbitration and (ii) the usefulness of creating a list of non-arbitrable issues.425  Indeed, the assignment of 
non-arbitrable issues to individual national laws indicates that international arbitration practitioners are 
expected to be familiar with the intricate aspects of arbitration law (governing each arbitrational venue); 
however, this is not realistic or possible.426   
As to the territorial scope regulated under paragraph (2), this Model Law is applicable only if the 
place of arbitration is in a territory of the Model Law country.427  In most legal systems, the place of 
                                                             
Court, Canada, 1 February 1996. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V01/847/23/PDF/V0184723.pdf?OpenElement  (accessed on October 3, 2015). 
422 The Model Law country means the country which has a national arbitration law inspired by the Model Law or the country 
which enacts a new law based on the Model Law or the country which uses a considerable number of Model Law provisions 
in their national law.  Although there is an assertion that these three categories of countries should be recognized differently, 
distinction will not be made in this paper.  See Pieter Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, 11 
Arb. Int’l 1 1995, at 1. 
423 This is the case in which parties determine other laws as their governing law. 
424 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, op. cit., at. 588. 
425 Pieter Sanders, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International and Commercial Arbitration: Present Situation and Future, 21 
Arb. Int’l 443 2005, at 475-6. 
426 Femando Mantilla & John Adam, UNCITRAL Model Law: Missed Opportunities for Enhanced Uniformity, 31 UNSW Law 
Journal 309, 2008, at 314. 
427 A German company and a U.S.A. company concluded a contract for design, manufacture, deliver and operation of transfer 
system.  The contract contained an arbitration clause.  After the conclusion of contract, the U.S.A. company assigned the 
contract to a Canadian company.  During the performance of contract, the Canadian company had disputes with a German 
company and brought the case to the court in Canada for damages.  In response to the action, a German company moved to 
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arbitration becomes a criterion for determining the applicability of national law; thus, when the Model 
Law country is appointed as a place of arbitration, the national law (in the place of arbitration) becomes a 
governing law—and its provisions are applicable to the arbitration.428  Nevertheless, the law of the place 
of arbitration does not always become the governing law.  Indeed, national law allows the parties to choose 
the procedural law of the other country; however, this rarely occurs in practice because the involvement 
of two different jurisdictions (for arbitration) does not generate much benefit to the parties.429  
The territorial criterion has further practical significance because the court, at the place of arbitration, 
provides supervision and assistance therein.430  Nevertheless, the Model Law has some exceptions for 
territorial application that are mostly related to the court’s assistance—namely, in the context of (i) 
arbitration agreements (Article 8), (ii) court actions (Article 9), (iii) the 2006 amendments regarding 
interim measures (Articles 17 H, 17 I, 17 J), and (iv) the context of the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards (Articles 35 and 36).  However, they are also applicable to arbitration that takes place 
outside of a Model Law country.  Generally, State courts abide by this territorial principle. 
 
 
                                                             
have the action stayed.  The Canadian court dismissed the motion and refused to wait for a tribunal to render its decision on 
jurisdiction on the basis that neither article 5 nor article 16 were applicable to a case in which the place of arbitration was 
outside Canada.  See CLOUT Case No.13, Ontario District Court, Canada 27 October 1988. (http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/855/96/IMG/V9385596.pdf?OpenElement); CLOUT Case No. 383, Ontario District 
Court, Canada, 27 October 1989 (http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V01/847/23/PDF/V0184723.pdf?OpenElement) (accessed on September 21, 2015). 
428 Part Two; Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as Adopted 
in 2006, 21 2006. at 26. 
429 Id. 
430 Id. 
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2.2 Court Intervention 
In more recent times, court intervention in ICA has been strictly restricted, clearly defined, and 
divided into two major components: the supervision of the arbitral process and judicial assistance therein 
(i.e.,to the arbitral process).431  The typical roles of the courts are to (i) keep arbitration separate from the 
courts, (ii) refer the parties to arbitration, (iii) enjoin or compel the arbitration, (iv) review arbitral awards, 
and (v) recognize and enforce arbitral awards.432  Article 5 of the Model Law also limits court intervention 
as a principle; national courts should intervene only in exceptional circumstances and these are 
exhaustively provided in the Model Law.  Indeed the limitation of court intervention as a principle (i.e., 
the concept that national courts should intervene only in exceptional circumstances that are delineated in 
the Model Law) is to prevent any unpredictable or disruptive interference from the court during the arbitral 
process.  This prevention is indeed essential to the parties—particularly foreign parties who choose 
arbitration.433  
 
Article 5 (Extent of Court Intervention) 
In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided 
in this Law.  
 
                                                             
431 W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 
Tex. Int. L. J. 1, 1995, at 48. 
432 Matthew B. Cobb, Domestic Courts’ Obligation to Refer Parties to Arbitration, 17 Arb. Int’l 313 2001, at 313. 
433 Part Two; Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as Adopted 
in 2006, 21 2006. at 27. 
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Although the text in Article 5 limits court intervention, it also indicates a possible area of court 
control; for this reason, this provision has been criticized for not taking a position on the appropriate role 
of the courts in the context of assisting or supervising arbitration.434  While there is no doubt that court 
intervention is sometimes necessary within the context of arbitration, arbitration is first and foremost a 
private system.  Furthermore, while Article 6 specifies areas wherein the court can interfere for the purpose 
of assistance and supervision, these areas are seemingly broader than necessary.  Specifically, Article 6 
expresses that (i) the court can interfere in areas that are not governed by the Model Law435 and (ii) the 
scope of exclusion of the court intervention, regulated under Article 5, is narrower (vs. the substantive 
scope of application of the Model Law regulated under Article 1).436 
The courts generally abide by Articles 5 and 6 (e.g., by not interfering with matters that are not 
associated with court intervention in the Model Law).  In International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
v. Tripal Systems Pty. Ltd., the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requested immunity to 
contest the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.  However, the Superior Court refused to intervene on the 
basis of Article 5 of the Model Law and noted that the court would not intervene and review the decision 
of the arbitral tribunal once it had declared its competence.437  
                                                             
434 Gerold Herrmann, op. cit., at 15. 
435 These areas are the issues which the Working Group decided not to regulate in the Model Law: the arbitrability of the 
subject-matter of the dispute, the capacity of parties to conclude the arbitration agreement, the impact of state immunity, 
consolidation of substantially related arbitration proceedings, the competence of the arbitral tribunal to adapt contracts, the 
contractual relations between arbitrators and parties or arbitration bodies, the professional liability of arbitrators, fixation of 
fees or request for deposit, and the time-limit for enforcement, for example.   See. Gerold Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model 
Law – its background, salient features and purposes, 1 Arb. Int’l 6 1985, at 15. 
436 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter 1, Article 5 [Extent of court intervention] in 
Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. cit., at 594. 
437 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concluded a contract with Tripal for the conception, construction and 
installation of an airport in Vietnam.  The contract included an arbitration clause as well as a clause that preserved any 
immunity that might accrue to the ICAO.  When Tripal tried to commence the arbitration to resolve a dispute between the 
parties, the ICAO raised its immunity contesting the arbitral tribunal’s competence.  In order to rule on the objection, the 
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2.3. Arbitration Agreement 
The text in Articles 7, 8, and 9 helps to regulate arbitration agreements.  Article 7 was amended 
via a 2006 amendment and provides two options; the original 1985 version closely followed Article II of 
the New York Convention (which permits only written arbitration agreements).  However, critics have 
noted that drafting written arbitration agreements could become impractical and impossible in 
international business contexts.438  Indeed, most practitioners assert that, in the absence of any doubt about 
the willingness of parties to arbitrate, the validity of arbitration agreements should be recognized—
regardless of whether there is an existing written arbitration agreement or not.439  As a result, Article 7 
was revised (in the 2006 amendments) in order to meet practical needs within international business 
contexts. 
 
 
                                                             
arbitral tribunal decided to hear all evidence, but the ICAO asked the Superior Court of Quebec to declare that it enjoyed an 
absolute immunity from the judicial process of any kind.  Tripal responded with its own motion for dismissal on the grounds 
that only the arbitral tribunal was competent at that stage of the proceedings.  The Superior Court decided that the arbitral 
tribunal alone was competent to decide the immunity issue and granted the motion for dismissal of the declaratory motion.  
Also, the Superior Court refused to intervene on the basis of article 5 of the Model Law after examining the conditions 
regulating the judiciary intervention in the arbitral process (articles 16 and 34 of the Model Law) and concluded that these 
were not met.  The court, however, noted that once the arbitral tribunal had declared itself competent, the court would be 
competent to review the decision in accordance with article 16(3) of the Model Law upon a party’s request.  CLOUT Case 
No.182, Superior Court of Quebec, 9 September 1994, Canada (http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V97/274/84/PDF/V9727484.pdf?OpenElement) (accessed on September 21, 2015) 
438 There are many jurisdictions which recognize an oral contract valid and it is common for merchants to conclude a contract 
without an actual written contract.   
439 Part Two; Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as Adopted 
in 2006, 21 2006. at 28. 
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2.3.1. Definition and Form of Arbitration Agreement 
Article 7 has included two options since the 2006 amendment.  Option I of Article 7 is more 
comprehensive; it (i) is based on the 1985 version, (ii) includes more rules, and (iii) specifies the meaning 
of “arbitration agreement” and the formal requirements therein.  Option II of Article 7440 is simple; while 
it defines the meaning of the arbitration agreement, it does not regulate how the arbitration agreement 
should be made and there are no formal requirements for arbitration agreements.  
 
Article 7 [Option I] (Definition of arbitration agreement) 
(1) “Arbitration agreement” is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration 
all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in 
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. An arbitration 
agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form 
of a separate agreement.  
(2) The arbitration agreement shall be in writing.  
(3) An arbitration agreement is in writing if its content is recorded in any form, 
whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, 
by conduct, or by other means.  
(4) The requirement that an arbitration agreement be in writing is met by an 
electronic communication if the information contained therein is accessible so as 
to be useable for subsequent reference; “electronic communication” means any 
communication that the parties make by means of data messages; “data message” 
means information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, magnetic, 
optical or similar means, including but not limited to, electronic data interchange 
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.  
                                                             
440 Article 7 (option II) of the Model Law : “Arbitration agreement” is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all 
or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether 
contractual or not. 
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(5) Furthermore, an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in an 
exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of an agreement 
is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.  
(6) The reference in a contract to any document containing an arbitration clause 
constitutes an arbitration agreement in writing, provided that the reference is such 
as to make that clause part of the contract. 
 
The definition of an arbitration agreement follows Article II(1) of the New York Convention.  An 
arbitration agreement can be concluded for any dispute—irrespective of whether it is a contractual or non-
contractual (and present or future) dispute.  An interpretation of paragraph (1) indicates that an agreement 
between two parties is more important than what is written in the arbitration agreement.  This means that 
the true intention of both parties matters.  (1) For example, when one party unilaterally adds an arbitration 
clause into an existing agreement after both parties have signed it, this arbitration agreement is not valid 
even though it is in a written form because there is no consent to arbitrate between two parties.441  (2) In 
a certain case, there was an agreement that contained both an arbitration clause and a clause providing a 
right to sue. The court qualified this as a valid arbitration agreement and thus the arbitral tribunal had the 
initial right to decide its jurisdiction.442  (3) In another case, an arbitration agreement contained drafting 
                                                             
441 The plaintiff is a member of the registered association for the breeding of German Shepherd dogs, and the Association is 
the defendant in the proceeding.  After the plaintiff joined the association, it introduced an arbitration clause into its rules 
through a majority vote by its members without Plaintiff’s assent.  When the Association imposed a penalty on the Plaintiff, 
the Plaintiff filed a claim in the Regional Court and the Court declined jurisdiction because of the arbitration clause contained 
in the rules.  On appeal, however, the Federal Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the Higher Regional Court.  
The Court held that while an arbitration clause could generally be introduced into the rules of an association, this did not 
necessarily mean that a member of the Association would automatically be subject to the clause if it was later added without 
its assent.  CLOUT Case No. 406, Bundesgerichtshof, Germany. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V01/879/59/PDF/V0187959.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on September 29, 2015). 
442 Mine Star was a licensee and sub-licensed to Samsung.  The sub-licensed agreement contained an arbitration clause and a 
clause which provides Mind Star with the right to sue if Samsung failed to perform its obligations.  Mind Star brought a case 
to the court claiming the fundamental breach of agreement by Samsung and the damaged entitled to it.  The court concluded 
that the right to sue did not disqualify the duty to arbitrate.  The court held that this clause was consistent with the requirement 
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errors associated with the scope of the subject matter in the arbitration; the court rejected the claim, 
asserting the invalidity of the arbitration clause based on the errors.  Nevertheless, the court held that the 
drafting errors did not actually reflect the intention of the parties.443 
There has been concern within some countries that Article 7 does not deal with States or 
governmental agencies that enter into arbitration agreements (and thus have any rule regarding the issue 
of State immunity therein);444 indeed, in most cases, the agreement to arbitrate constitutes waiver of 
immunity.445  Also, Article 7 provides more detailed and practical rules about the form of arbitration 
agreements.  For example, while it requires written arbitration agreements, it will recognize such 
agreements with the content therein recorded in any form 446  (e.g., oral agreements or agreements 
concluded by conduct).447  Thus, if any party can prove that they have agreed on arbitration via the 
                                                             
that the arbitrators determined its own jurisdiction and the scope of its authority. Therefore, the arbitrational clause was 
operative and the parties should be referred to arbitration.  CLOUT Case No.32, Ontario Court, Canada, 30 April 1992. 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/899/70/IMG/V9389970.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on September 29, 
2015). 
443 The plaintiff and defendant concluded a joint venture agreement containing an arbitration clause.  When a dispute arose, the 
plaintiff brought a case requiring the court to rectify a provision of arbitration clause and to declare the invalidity of 
arbitration clause based on a drafting mistake.  The defendant, however, sought a stay of proceedings and submission of the 
whole dispute to arbitration.  The arbitration clause contained the expression of “arising under” or “in relation to the 
construction of the agreement” and the plaintiff claimed that this expression was not broad enough to cover the rectification 
of the agreement by the arbitral tribunal.  The court, however, this expression was sufficient enough to cover this matter and 
the arbitration clause in doubt should be interpreted in a matter which would be conductive to arbitration.  Consequently, the 
court granted a stay of the proceedings and referred the matter to arbitration.  CLOUT Case No. 69, Ontario Court, Canada, 
24 January, 1994.  http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V94/257/97/IMG/V9425797.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed on September 25, 2015) 
444 Some countries like Bulgaria, Peru, Egypt, Tunisia, Canada, Hong Kong and Bermuda have rules regarding State immunity 
in relation to arbitration.  Pieter Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, 11 Arb. Int’l 1 1995, at 
11~12. 
445 See Hazel Fox, State Immunity and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Do We Need an UNCITRAL Model Law Mark II for 
Execution Against State Property? 12 Arb. Int'l 89 1996; Carlo de Stefano, Arbitration Agreements as Waivers to Sovereign 
Immunity, 30 Arb. Int’l 59 2014; George Rosenberg, State as a Party to Arbitration, 20 Arb. Int’l 387 2004. 
446 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter II, Article 7 [Definition and form of arbitration 
agreement] in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. cit., at 596. 
447 Article 7(3) of the Model Law. 
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fulfillment of the associated requirements, the agreement should be recognized as written.448  This change 
results from two factors.  One is the development of telecommunication.  When the Model Law was 
drafted for the first time in 1985, electronic communications were not commonplace.  Nowadays, however, 
the most common method of communication in international business is electronic communication via 
email.  Thus, this form of electronic communication has to be considered.  The other factor is common 
practice since merchants often conclude contracts orally or by conduct.  
Consequently, some national courts have tried to adopt a less strict approach to the interpretation of 
Article 7.  In one case, a charter party did not have the signatures for both contracting parties; however, 
the court upheld the arbitration agreement therein (i.e., as valid and in compliance with the requirement 
of Article 7) because the charter party was concluded regardless of the non-existence of the signature.449  
The actions of both parties and pre-voyage communications proved the existence of a contract.450  In 
another case, the contract was concluded via the conduct of a seller who sent a sample of goods and 
promised the delivery; the arbitration clause, included in the associated contract, was binding even though 
the seller never returned a signed document.451  
                                                             
448 If the law requires an arbitration agreement in writing interpreting in a narrow way, consent to arbitrate will be proved very 
easily and also it will be unlikely to be challenged. 
449  CLOUT Case No. 40, High Court of Hong Kong, 30 July, 1992. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/899/70/IMG/V9389970.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on September 29, 2015). 
450 The plaintiff chartered the vessel to the defendant and sought payment of damages for breach of the charter-party by the 
defendant.  The plaintiff appointed an arbitrator according to an arbitration clause contained in the charter-party, but the 
defendant failed to appoint a second arbitrator.  As a result, the plaintiff brought the case to the court applying for the court 
to appoint a second arbitrator in accordance with article 11(4) of the Model Law.  Although the charter-party was not signed 
by both parties, the court found through the pre-voyage communications that there was a charter-party between the plaintiff 
and the defendant because there was no doubt from the facts that the defendant had chartered the vessel to the plaintiff and 
the plaintiff had paid certain amount of money in accordance with the charter-party.  Therefore, the court concluded that the 
arbitration clause had been complied with the requirement of article 7 of the Model Law and the defendant was given seven 
days to appoint a second arbitrator, otherwise the court was to appoint him/her.  CLOUT Case No. 40, High Court of Hong 
Kong, 30 July, 1992. 
451 The purchaser sent a written offer to the seller to buy oregano.  The seller never returned a signed copy of the offer, but s/he 
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2.3.2. Arbitration Agreement and the Courts 
Article 8 focuses on the recognition of an arbitration agreement by a court and deals with some 
important issues regarding the relationship between the arbitration agreement and the resort to the court.452  
 
Article 8 (Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court) 
(1) A court before which an action is brought in a manner which is the subject of 
an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so request not later than when submitting 
his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration 
unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.  
(2) Where an action referred to in paragraph (1) of this article has been brought, 
arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award 
may be made, while the issue is pending before the court. 
 
According to paragraph (1), a court is obliged to refer the parties to arbitration if the claim on the 
same subject matter is brought—unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative, or 
incapable of being performed.  This means that the courts, in the presence of valid arbitration agreements, 
should reject cases that are brought by parties who claim invalidities therein (i.e., of arbitration agreements) 
                                                             
responded to the offer by submitting a sample and promising delivery.  The seller, however, did not deliver oregano and 
the purchaser sought to arbitrate the alleged breach of contract.  During the arbitration, the seller did not participate in the 
arbitration and the award was rendered against the seller.  When the purchaser tried to enforce the award, the seller objected 
on two grounds that there was no contract bound the parties and the arbitration agreement was not in writing.  The court 
allowed the application for enforcement holding that the seller was bound and the contract was concluded validly because 
of his/her conduct-sending samples and promising delivery.  Therefore, for the dispute, the parties should arbitrate because 
having interpreted article 7 of the Model Law, it did not expressly require a signature, so the arbitration agreement was 
also valid and binding.  CLOUT Case No. 365, Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, Canada, 1 October, 1996. 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/602/96/PDF/V0060296.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on September 
29, 2015). 
452 Gerold Herrmann, op. cit., at 16. 
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and seek judicial litigation.  Furthermore, when a court rejects a case and refers the parties to arbitration, 
there are some issues to be addressed.  First, when a party brings a case to the court claiming the invalidity 
of an arbitration agreement, the validity of the arbitration agreement should be determined before the court 
refers the parties to arbitration.  The question herein is who determines the validity of an arbitration 
agreement.  The court?  Or should the court wait until the arbitration tribunal makes a decision on the 
validity of the arbitration agreement?453   
Second, when the court determines the validity of an arbitration agreement, what if the court’s 
decision is against the arbitral tribunal’s decision?  For example, which decision should be given priority 
if the court determines the invalidity of an arbitration agreement while the arbitral tribunal finds that the 
arbitration agreement is valid?  Conversely, where should the parties bring their case when the court 
determines the validity of an arbitration agreement and refers the parties to arbitration while the arbitral 
tribunal determines that the arbitration agreement is not valid and rejects the case?  
Third, if a court makes a positive ruling on the validity of an arbitration agreement, what is the next 
step?  The provision says that “the court shall refer the parties to arbitration.”  Does this mean that the 
court will compel the parties to undertake an arbitration?  Or does this mean that the court simply rejects 
the case?  Or is it possible for a party to appeal to a court above?  
 
 
                                                             
453 According to the phrase in Article 8(1), it states that “unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed”, and the demonstrative pronoun, “it”, indicates the court.  So, it appears that the court is the 
one who determines the invalidity of arbitration agreement. 
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2.3.2.1. Who Decides First? 
Article 8 tries to delimit national court intervention in arbitration by clarifying that a court should 
refer the parties to arbitration unless an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable 
of being performed.  However, it does not mention who decides the validity of an arbitration agreement 
first when (i) one party brings a case to the national court claiming invalidity of the arbitration agreement 
and (ii) the other party pleads the arbitration agreement, requesting that the court to compel them to do 
arbitration.  This issue was raised when the Model Law was drafted; it was suggested that the Model Law 
should expressly specify the priority herein (i.e., to refer this issue to arbitrators) because by doing so, it 
became consistent with Article 16.454  
Nevertheless, the Model Law does not indicate who has priority over the claim of whether an 
arbitration agreement is valid or not—and this is what many national courts have attempted to sort out.455  
Two approaches have been discussed in response to this issue; the prima facie test and the full review 
test.456  First, according to the prima facie test (a longstanding rule endorsed by the French courts), unless 
there is a proof of the manifest nullity or inapplicability of the arbitration clause, the parties shall be 
referred to arbitration.  Thus, if the claim over the invalidity of an arbitration agreement is brought before 
the national court after the arbitration is in motion, the constituted arbitral tribunal will decide on this 
claim by applying the prima facie approach.457  Thus, once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, it has a 
                                                             
454 Pieter Sanders, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International and Commercial Arbitration: Present Situation and Future, 21 
Arb. Int’l 443 2005, at 443. 
455 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter II, Article 8 [Arbitration agreement and 
substantive claim before court] in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. cit., at 602. 
456 Giacomo Marchisio, Jurisdictional Matters in International Arbitration: Why Arbitrators Stand on an Equal Footing with 
State Courts, 31 J. Int’l Arb. 455 2014, at 457. 
457 Id. 
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priority to decide the validity of an arbitration agreement.458  The courts are consequently prevented from 
deciding on the existence, validity, or scope of the arbitration agreement before the arbitral tribunal makes 
a decision on this matter unless the agreement is manifestly null or inapplicable.459  Indeed, this approach 
applies even before the arbitral tribunal is constituted.  When a case is brought to the court and one party 
pleads an arbitration agreement, the court makes a prima facie determination on whether there is any 
potential basis for validity and refers the parties to arbitration if it finds the arbitration agreement valid.  
After that, an arbitral tribunal is constituted according to the alleged agreement and makes a final decision 
on the issue.  
The second approach is the full review test.460  Under this approach, the court does a more detailed 
review of the substantive validity of arbitration agreement in question and if the court finds that an 
arbitration agreement is valid, it refers the parties to arbitration.461  On the other hand, if the court finds 
the invalidity of arbitration agreement, the court has jurisdiction and makes a decision over the dispute 
without giving arbitrators any chance to decide over the dispute.462 
                                                             
458 William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks between Court and Arbitrators, 8 Am. Rev. Intl. 
Arb. 133, (1997), at 138. 
459 Giacomo Marchisio, op. cit., at 458. 
460 This one has been preferred in England under the traditional position although recent decisions give the impression that the 
prima facie test is more applicable.  See. Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v. Privalov, [2008] 1 Loyd’s Rep 254 HL. 
461  CLOUT Case No 178, British Columbia Supreme Court, Canada, 31 January, 1996, http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V97/274/84/PDF/V9727484.pdf?OpenElement , CLOUT Case No 43, High Court of Hong 
Kong, 8 September, 1992, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/899/70/IMG/V9389970.pdf?OpenElement, CLOUT Case No 44 High Court of Hong 
Kong, 17 February 1993, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/899/70/IMG/V9389970.pdf?OpenElement, 
CLOUT Case No 78 High Court of Hong Kong, 18 August 1994, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V94/270/11/IMG/V9427011.pdf?OpenElement, CLOUT Case No 87 High Court of Hong 
Kong, 17 November 1994, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V95/529/10/IMG/V9552910.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on September 30, 2015). 
462 In Sweden, parallel proceedings are allowed in a jurisdictional matter.  Upon the request of one party, the arbitral tribunal 
assesses over the validity of arbitration agreement, but its assessment does not prevent a state court from examining the 
validity of arbitration agreement at the same time.  In this situation, the court’s judgment is a final settlement over the issue 
relating to the validity of agreement and this decision binds the arbitrators as well. Giacomo Marchisio, op. cit., at 458~9.  
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However, with the full review test, two problems arise.  First, assume a case wherein the arbitral 
tribunal makes a negative decision over a jurisdictional matter (i.e., finds an arbitration agreement invalid 
when the parties are referred to arbitration after the court’s full review, which finds the validity of 
arbitration agreement).  In this case, what should the parties do next?  They cannot bring the case before 
the court because the court (i) found the arbitration agreement valid after the full review and (ii) referred 
the parties to arbitration according to Article 8 (1). Also, the parties cannot ask the arbitral tribunal to 
settle their dispute because the arbitral tribunal has declared the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.  
Second, assume another case wherein the arbitral tribunal finds the arbitration agreement valid and 
proceeds with the arbitration.  However, at the same time, the court makes a final decision over the 
substantive dispute; after the court’s full review, the arbitration agreement is determined to be invalid.  
The full review test brings out unnecessary intervention by the court, which provides a means of escape 
to a party who does not want to do arbitration.  Also, it could lead to a wrong interpretation that the court 
has a right to (i) make a final decision regarding the jurisdictional matter and (ii) ignore the parties’ 
intention of giving the jurisdiction over their dispute to arbitrators—by concluding an arbitration 
agreement.463  What is more, the full review test could encourage ill-founded applications by a party who 
simply wants to delay arbitration proceedings.464    
 
 
                                                             
463 In this case, it results in that the court encourages the parties to breach a contract, which is an arbitration agreement.  
464 Giacomo Marchisio, op. cit., at 461. 
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2.3.2.2. Global Scope of Article 8 
As stated in Article 1 (2) of the Model Law, Article 8 is not limited to arbitration agreements that 
provide for arbitrations in States with courts that examine arbitration agreements.  Indeed, the national 
courts should refer the parties to arbitration under a valid arbitration agreement even if the place of 
arbitration is a different State.  For example, when the place of arbitration is State A and one party brings 
the case to a court in State B (which is a Model Law country), the court in State B should reject the case 
and refer the parties to arbitration—even if the place of arbitration is not State B.465  By doing so, the 
Model Law can pursue uniformity (i.e., a legal framework for enforceability based on a valid arbitration 
agreement).466  
 
2.3.2.3. Conditions of Application of Article 8 
The interpretation and application of Article 8 involves two conditions.  First, either party must 
invoke an arbitration agreement within the time limits therein.467  There is no ex officio reference provided 
to the national courts.468  This means that the court will not determine the validity of an arbitration 
agreement in the absence of a request by one of parties to do so.469  Also, the rules of Article 8 should not 
                                                             
465 If one party wants to bring the case to the court denying the validity or the existence of arbitration agreement, s/he has two 
options.  First, the party can bring the case to the court in State A, which is the place of arbitration.  Second, s/he can ask the  
court in State B, which is usually his/her country because of the practical convenience. 
466 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter II, Article 8 [Arbitration agreement and 
substantive claim before court] in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. cit., at 602. 
467 According to article 8 (1), the time limit is ‘not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute’. 
468 Isaak I. Dore, THE UNCITRAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, Graham & Trotman, 
1993, at 106. 
469  CLOUT Case No.508, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Canada, 8 October, 2002. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V04/600/35/PDF/V0460035.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on September 30, 2015). 
 １０７ 
 
be understood that Article 8 authorizes the parties to bring a case to the court for an order to compel 
arbitration;470 it should be interpreted that the court must dismiss the case—or stay an action if the dispute 
is within the scope of the valid arbitration agreement.  The court’s role does not go further and direct the 
parties to arbitrate;471 if the court does so (i.e., go further and order the parties to do an arbitration), it is 
inconsistent with Article 5.472 
In United Laboratories, Inc. v Abraham case, the parties had contractual disputes that led to 
lawsuits in Illinois and Ontario.473  The defendant resisted the enforcement of the default Illinois judgment, 
claiming that they were bound by the arbitration agreement.474  The court, however, held that Article 8 of 
the Model Law (which was applicable in Ontario) did not impose on courts the obligation (or the power) 
to refer the parties to arbitration when there was no request by any party to do so.475  Also, because the 
defendant had failed to appear before the Illinois courts to contest its jurisdiction, the defendant could no 
longer invoke the arbitration agreement. 476   Thus, in this case, the defendant should have either 
commenced the arbitration or brought the case before the court to request that it refer the parties to 
arbitration.  In order to commence the arbitration, a party simply needs to submit the claim according to 
                                                             
470 Like the Model Law, other modern statutes do not have provisions for such purpose, authorizing courts to order the parties 
to compel arbitration unless the court finds that the arbitration agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.  Markham Ball, The Essential Judge: the Role of the Courts in a System of National and International 
Commercial Arbitration, 22 Arb. Int’l 73 2006, at 76. 
471 Markham Ball, op. cit., at 76. 
472 According to article 5, the court should not intervene except where so provided in the Model Law. 
473  COULT Case No. 508, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Canada, 8 October 2002. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V04/600/35/PDF/V0460035.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on September 30, 2015). 
474 COULT Case No. 508. 
475 COULT Case No. 508. 
476 COULT Case No. 508. 
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the manner provided in the rules (i.e., the agreements of both parties in their arbitration agreement).477  
The court’s involvement is not necessary for the commencement of arbitration.478  
Second, the arbitration agreement must not be null, void, inoperative, or incapable of being 
performed.  Although the meaning of this phrase, ‘null, void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed’ 
is not defined in the Model Law, it clearly limits the power of the court before which an action is brought 
for the decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement.479  Thus, under Article 8, the courts cannot 
deal with any related arbitration dispute (i.e., associated with the interpretation of this clause and the merits 
of the case).480  The meaning of this phrase should be interpreted, case by case, depending on precedents; 
in Jean Charbonneau vs. Les Industries A. C. Davie. Inc. et. al., the court held that the arbitration clause 
was inoperative on the ground that the Minister of Agriculture could not act as an impartial arbitrator, as 
a party to the contract.481  In Lucky-Goldstar International (H.K.) Limited v Ng Moo Kee Engineering 
Limited, the court held that the reference to an unspecified third country, a non-existent organization, and 
                                                             
477 Unlike the Model Law, the FAA section 4 authorizes the court to compel arbitration.  At that time when this statute was 
enacted in 1925, the court’s assistance to direct parties to proceed to arbitration was necessary because arbitration rules 
were not much developed.  Now, however, under the modern, well-developed arbitration rules, parties do not need such 
judicial assistance on this matter. Markham Ball, The Essential Judge: the Role of the Courts in a System of National and 
International Commercial Arbitration, 22 Arb. Int’l 73 2006, at 76. 
478 The purpose of Article 8 is to make sure that the parties cannot settle their dispute by judicial litigation if there is      a valid 
arbitration agreement.  
479 Jean-Paul Beraudo, Case Law on Articles 5, 8, and 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, 23 J. Int’l Arb. 101 2006, 
at 104. 
480 This wording is from the New York Convention (1958) and many states have tried to construe the words.  As no definition 
is provided neither in the Model Law nor the New York Convention, its meaning can vary depending on cases.  One thing 
clear is that, however, it should be understood to be a restrictive rule in relation with the jurisdiction of courts. Jean-Paul 
Beraudo, op. cit., at 104. 
481 The plaintiff sued for damages which were caused by the delay in the delivery of a fish boat against the defendants who 
were to construct and the Minister of Agriculture who was to finance.  The defendants sought a stay of proceedings 
according to article 8 of the Model Law on the ground that the construction contract had an arbitration clause.  The court, 
however, held that an arbitration clause providing that one of the parties to the arbitration agreement would also act as an 
arbitrator in case a dispute would arise was held to be inoperative finding that under the arbitration agreement the Minister 
of Agriculture was to arbitrate any dispute arising between the parties. CLOUT Case No. 66, Superior Court of Quebec, 
Canada, 14 March 1989. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V94/257/97/IMG/V9425797.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed on September 30, 2015).  
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non-existent rules did not render the arbitration agreement inoperative or incapable of being performed 
because arbitration could not be held in any country other than the countries wherein the parties had their 
places of business (under the law of the place of arbitration).482   
 
3. Composition of Arbitral Tribunal 
3.1. Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal 
Chapter IV focuses on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and has only one provision.  Article 
16 is about competence of the arbitral tribunal;483 indeed, the substance therein has important practical 
effects on the evolution of arbitration.484 A great number of arbitration laws, including the Model Law, 
recognize the principle that an arbitral tribunal can decide on its own jurisdiction—and also deal with 
challenges to its jurisdiction.  Despite this general recognition, the effects of the arbitral tribunal’s decision 
on jurisdiction (e.g., its form and the means of recourse against decisions by the arbitral tribunal) should 
be more clearly defined.485  
                                                             
482 The plaintiff, a Hong Kong company and subsidiary of a Korean company, sold sets of elevators to the defendant, a Hong 
Kong company.  The contract had an arbitration clause which stated like “arbitration in a 3rd country, under the rules of the 
3rd country and in accordance with the rules of procedure of the International Commercial Arbitration Association”.  The 
plaintiff sued for damages in the Hong Kong courts and the defendant sought a stay of the proceedings under article 8 of 
the Model Law.  The plaintiff argued that the arbitration agreement should be considered null because it referred by mistake 
to an unspecified third country or inoperative because it referred to a non-existent organization and to non-existent rules.  
CLOUT Case No. 57, High Court of Hong Kong, 5 May 1993. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V94/257/97/IMG/V9425797.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on September 30, 2015). 
483 The system of article 16 has been called ‘an innovative and sensible compromise’, Howard M. Holtzmann & Joseph E. 
Neuhaus, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY AND COMMENTARY, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989, at 486. 
484 Jean-Paul Beraudo, op. cit., at 108. 
485 Dr. Stenfan Kroll, Recourse against Negative Decisions on Jurisdiction, 20 Arb. Int’l 55 2004, at 55. 
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Article 16 (Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction) 
(1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objection 
with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that 
purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as 
an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the 
arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the 
invalidity of the arbitration clause.  
(2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not 
later than the submission of the statement of defence. A party is not precluded from 
raising such a plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the 
appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the 
scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the 
scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. The tribunal may, 
in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified. 
(3) The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this 
article either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merit. If the arbitral 
tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may 
request, within thirty days after having received notice of that ruling, the court 
specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no 
appeal; when such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the 
arbitral proceedings and make an award.  
 
3.1.1. The Doctrines of Competence-competence    
Paragraph (1) adopts two important principles: one is the competence-competence principle and the 
other is the separability principle.  These two crucial arbitration doctrines significantly affect a large 
number of national legislatures.486  The competence-competence means that the arbitral tribunal may (i) 
                                                             
486 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter IV, Article 16 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit, at 613. 
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independently make a decision over the question of whether it has jurisdiction and (ii) deal with any 
objection regarding the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, without having to resort to a 
court.487  
The arbitral tribunal is generally asked to determine its jurisdiction (i) when either party opposes its 
jurisdiction (before the arbitral tribunal) for the first time or (ii) when a court decides to stay proceedings 
on the merits—namely, to make the party (who is alleging the absence of arbitral jurisdiction) take 
corresponding procedural steps before the arbitral tribunal.488  In both situations, the arbitral tribunal 
makes a decision on its jurisdiction; however, there is a substantial difference between the procedural 
approaches of these two situations.489  In the first situation, when one party raises an objection to the 
arbitral jurisdiction (either at the beginning of arbitration or during the arbitral proceedings), the arbitral 
tribunal makes a decision on this claim (which can be about the validity of the arbitration agreement or its 
scope of application to the subject matter in dispute).490  Conversely, in the second situation, when one 
party seeks to settle their dispute via the court, the court (i) determines the existence and validity of an 
arbitration agreement pursuant to Article 8 and (ii) makes an order to stay court proceedings by referring 
the parties to arbitration.491  In this case, there will be no further debate regarding the jurisdictional matter 
because the judgment on jurisdiction has res judicata authority.  Thus, if one party challenges the arbitral 
                                                             
487 Part Two; Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as 
Adopted in 2006, 21 2006, at 30. 
488 Jean-Paul Beraudo, op. cit., at 108. 
489 Id. 
490 Id. 
491 As it is discussed in article 8 part, the court determines the existence and validity of arbitration agreement under prima facie 
approach.  So, the court refers the parties to arbitration ‘unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed’. 
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jurisdiction before the court again, it will be not about the validity of the arbitration agreement but the 
scope of application to the subject matter.492  
 
3.1.2. The Separability Principle  
The separability principle means that an arbitration clause shall be treated as an independent 
agreement, which is not affected by any other terms in the contract.  The effect of separability principle is 
that an arbitral clause will not become invalid even if an arbitral tribunal finds that the associated contract 
is null and void.493  Thus, assume a case wherein one party has commenced arbitral proceedings and there 
is a concurrent dispute over whether the main contract, with the arbitration clause, has been validly 
concluded.  In this case, when there is a finding that the main contract is not validly concluded, it will not 
affect the validity of an arbitration agreement (which has been inserted in the main contract as a clause).494  
Thus, under the separability principle, when the parties conclude a contract with an arbitral clause, they 
enter two separate agreements (vs. one agreement).495  
The purpose of recognizing the separability principle is to prevent a party with a bad faith from 
obstructing the arbitral proceedings by alleging the invalidity of the agreement.496  Thus, this doctrine 
enables (i) an arbitration agreement to remain in effect (even after the voiding of the invalid contract that 
                                                             
492 Jean-Paul Beraudo, op. cit., at 108. 
493 Part Two; Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as 
Adopted in 2006, 21 2006. at 30. 
494 The judgment in Premium Nafta Products gave further guidance on the question of separability holding that the arbitration 
agreement survived an allegation that the entire contract was induced by bribery because even if the allegation was true, it 
would not affect the parties consent to arbitrate.  Premium Nafta Products [2007] UKHL 40, para. 19. 
495 Stephen M. Schwebel, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS, Grotius Publications, 1987, at 5. 
496 Carl Svernlov, What Isn’t, Ain’t : The Current Status of the Doctrine of Separability, 8 J. Int’l Arb. 37 1991, at 38. 
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contains the arbitration agreement) and (ii) an arbitral tribunal to make a decision over the dispute—even 
if it is about the validity of the main contract (in the context of approving the intention of parties to arbitrate 
without any obstruction by any party).  In Harper v. Kvaerner Fjellstrand Shipping A.S., the court held 
that an arbitral tribunal might determine whether an arbitration clause covered the particular dispute 
therein (i.e., referred to arbitration) and thus determine whether the arbitration clause was valid—even 
though the underlying contract was void.497 
 
3.1.3. The Relationship between the Competence-competence and the Separability Principles 
The principle of competence-competence allows an arbitral tribunal to have a chance to decide 
(subject to review by a court) whether it has jurisdiction—even when it decides that it does not have 
jurisdiction ultimately. 498   The separability principle overlaps with the principle of competence-
competence; however, it goes further.  The separability principle works under one pre-condition—namely, 
one assumption is needed that there is a valid arbitration agreement.  Thus, the separability principle means 
that if an arbitral tribunal finds (or assumes) that it has jurisdiction and works to determine whether a 
contract with the arbitration agreement is void, its jurisdiction (to make that finding on the merits) will 
                                                             
497 The facts of the case are as follows; the plaintiff and the defendant entered into joint venture negotiations to establish a ferry 
service and a letter of intent was signed by parties.  The contract contained an arbitration clause and the plaintiff claimed 
the defendant’s breach of contract.  After plaintiff’s various efforts to settle a dispute with the defendant who refused to 
continue to deal with the plaintiff, the plaintiff brought the case to the court.  The issue was whether there was an 
enforceable arbitration agreement or whether the contract including an arbitration clause was terminated.  The court found 
that section 16 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act (MAL, article 16) accepted the principle of severability 
and that the contract being terminated at an end had no effect on the continued validity of the arbitration clause.  CLOUT 
Case No. 349, British Columbia Supreme Court, Canada, September 13, 1991, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/569/59/PDF/V0056959.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 2, 2015). 
498 Mark S. Mcneill & Ben Juratowitch, Agora: Thought on Fiona Trust: The Doctrine of Separability and Consent to Arbitrate, 
24 Arb. Int'l 475 2008, at 477. 
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not be influenced or lost499 (i.e., the principle of competence-competence is not influenced by whether the 
arbitral tribunal finds that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate).500  If the arbitral tribunal finds that 
there is no valid arbitration agreement, it simply needs to decline the jurisdiction in such a case.  
Conversely, the separability principle cannot work if there was no valid agreement to arbitrate (regardless 
of being separable from the main contract).  Due to the presence of a valid arbitration agreement between 
the parties, the arbitral tribunal can make a decision over any dispute arising out of the contract wherein 
an arbitration agreement has been inserted—regardless of the failure of the rest of the contract.501  
 
3.1.4. Deadline for Objection against the Tribunal’s jurisdiction   
Paragraph (2) sets the time limits for an objection against the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal.  
When the claimant submits a dispute to arbitration, the respondent has to object no later than the 
submission of the statement of defense (if he or she wishes to do so).  Although the provision does not 
expressly specify that this rule applies to the case of the counterclaim, it is generally accepted that 
paragraph (2) applies to the counterclaim as well.  Thus, the claimant should also bring a jurisdictional 
objection no later than the time that he or she submits his or her reply to the counterclaim (if he or she 
wishes to do so) and this should be made clear.502  When the objecting party wants to object to the 
                                                             
499 W. Laurence Craig, William W. Park & Jan Paulsson, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION, 3rd ed. 
Oceana Publications, 2000, at 48~49. 
500  Julian D.M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, Stefan M. Kroll, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
Kluwer Law International, 2003, at. 334. 
501 Mark S. Mcneill & Ben Juratowitch, op. cit., at 477. 
502 Commentary, art. 16 para.5. 
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jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, he or she needs to make clear (in his or her statement of defense) that 
he or she objects to the arbitral jurisdiction—vs. just stating the facts upon which an objection is based.503 
The purpose of setting the time limits for objection is quick and smooth arbitral proceedings.504  
Paragraph (2) states that a party should be precluded from bringing an objection if he or she fails to make 
an objection to arbitral jurisdiction within the established time limit.  The exception herein is when the 
arbitral tribunal permits a later plea if it considers the delay justified.  One example for the justified delay 
is the objection that is related to public policy including any arbitrability objection.505  This objection, 
regarding the public policy or arbitrability, may be brought to the court later—at the stage of setting aside 
under Article 34 (2) (b) or the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award under Article 36 (1) 
(b).506  
     
  
                                                             
503 The facts of the case are as follows.  The plaintiff filed an application to set aside an arbitral award made against him/her.  
S/he claimed that no arbitration agreement existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, so the arbitral tribunal had no 
jurisdiction to examine the dispute in question.  The court held that the plaintiff, who was a respondent in the arbitral 
proceedings, made no reference to the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal either in its statement of defense or in the 
subsequent correspondence with the arbitral tribunal, and had not raised any plea regarding the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal during the hearing of the case.  CLOUT Case No. 148, Russian Federation, Moscow City Court, 10 February, 1995. 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V96/853/30/IMG/V9685330.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 2, 
2015) 
504 If there is no time limits set, the arbitral proceedings could be halted when the other party makes a jurisdictional objection 
with an intention just to delay the arbitral proceedings. 
505 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter IV, Article 16 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 614. 
506 According to article 34(2)(b) and 36(1)(b) of the Model Law, the arbitral award may be set aside or refused to be recognized 
and enforced if the court finds that (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
law of the place of arbitration or the place of enforcement; or (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of the place 
of arbitration or the place of enforcement. 
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3.1.5. Form of the Tribunal’s Decision on Jurisdiction 
When either party brings an objection to arbitral jurisdiction, the arbitral tribunal makes a 
decision—either as a preliminary question or in an arbitral award (based on the merits), according to 
Article 16(3).  Although the arbitral tribunal has the competence to rule on its own jurisdiction, it is subject 
to the court control.507  The first case wherein a court intervenes is when the arbitral tribunal rules on its 
own jurisdiction (via a preliminary question confirming that it has jurisdiction); the objecting party can 
ask the court, in the place of arbitration, to decide the matter under paragraph (3).  In this case, the court 
would intervene as soon as a party’s request is made; however, there are three procedural safeguards to 
reduce the risk and effect of dilatory tactics.  (1) The request should be made within 30 days (after the 
party receives the notice of the ruling made by the arbitral tribunal).  (2) The court decision, about the 
jurisdiction, is not appealable.508  (3) The arbitral tribunal can continue the arbitral proceedings and make 
a final award while the matter is pending before the court.509  
A court may also intervene when an arbitral tribunal continues with proceedings in spite of an 
objection to the arbitral jurisdiction—and makes an award (which contains its decision on jurisdiction and 
the merits therein). A court may intervene herein and review the question of jurisdiction—either in the 
setting aside proceedings (under Article 34) or enforcement proceedings (under Article 36).510  Paragraph 
(3) regulates the procedure wherein an arbitral tribunal rules on its jurisdiction therein.  Thus, if the arbitral 
tribunal decides not to rule on a plea that it has no jurisdiction, this omission cannot be subject to the 
                                                             
507 Part Two; Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as 
Adopted in 2006, 21 2006. at 30. 
508 Id. 
509 Id. 
510 Id. 
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review under paragraph (3).511  Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings 
without ruling on a plea; however, the objecting party must, inter alia, wait to challenge the final award—
either in the setting aside proceedings (under Article 34) or in the enforcement proceedings (under Article 
36).  
Paragraph (3) presupposes that the arbitral tribunal will rule in favor of its positive jurisdiction 
(against a party’s objection to the arbitral jurisdiction); however, it does not have any rule regarding 
decisions that deny arbitral jurisdiction.  Indeed, various suggestions and drafts have been made for a 
special procedure to review negative decisions on jurisdictions because only positive decisions can be 
reviewed in the setting-aside proceedings and enforcement proceedings against the final award. 512  
However, the suggested regulation for the negative decisions on jurisdiction was ultimately rejected and 
paragraph (3) only provides an appeal procedure for decisions under the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal 
(which determines the final award).513  Indeed, the majority of Working Group rejected the suggested 
provisions for the review of decisions that deny jurisdiction—namely, they expressed their opinion, i.e., 
                                                             
511 The facts of the case are as follows.  One party objected the arbitral jurisdiction based on the lack of validity of arbitration 
agreement.  Upon the objection, the arbitral tribunal delivered an order without reasons declaring that the “application of 
Applicant was rejected.”  Four month later, the arbitral tribunal delivered a further order which correct the first order and  
stated that it “rejected the application of Applicant to decide the issue of jurisdiction by way of an intermediate decision 
according to para. 3 ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure)” and that “The arbitral tribunal will decide on its jurisdiction 
in the final award.”  Accordingly, the objecting party brought the case to set aside this order. The Court dismissed the 
motion and held that a decision on the jurisdiction would only be made in the final award, and might only be reviewed by 
a court in a motion for setting aside or a motion for recognition and enforcement of the award.  CLOUT Case No. 441, 
Oberlandesgericht Köln, Germany, 20 July 2000, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V03/846/34/PDF/V0384634.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 3, 2015). 
512 Howard M. Holtzmann & Joseph E. Neuhaus, op. cit., at 495. 
513 Regarding the issue that Article 16(3) does not provide the regulation for the arbitral tribunal’s negative ruling on its 
jurisdiction Professor Sanders asserted that the Model Law should ‘extend the possibility for a quick decision of the court 
on the ruling of the arbitral tribunal that it has jurisdiction, to the ruling of the arbitral tribunal that it has no jurisdiction.  
So, his suggestion was to provide a procedural regulation that allows the parties to submit the negative ruling to the court.  
Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter IV, Article 16 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 614. 
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that (i) the decision made by the arbitral tribunal should be final and binding (for the associated arbitration) 
and (ii) the decision denying arbitral jurisdiction did not mean that the substantive claim should be decided 
by judicial litigation.514  The underlying rationale for their view (i.e., the determination to hold the 
tribunal’s decision as binding) was that there was no point in forcing the arbitral tribunal to continue their 
arbitration when they believed that they had no jurisdiction.515  
 
4. Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings 
Chapter V is composed of 10 articles: (i) equal treatment of parties (Article 18), (ii) determination 
of rules of procedure (Article 19), (iii) place of arbitration (Article 20), (iv) commencement of arbitral 
proceedings (Article 21), (v) language of arbitration (Article 22), (vi) statements of claim and defense 
(Article 23), (vii) hearings and written proceedings (Article 24), (viii) default of a party (Article 25), (ix) 
expert appointed by arbitral tribunal (Article 26), (x) and court assistance in taking evidence (Article 27).  
Certain procedural factors must be agreed upon by the parties to ensure the smooth conduct of arbitration; 
in most cases, the parties agree on the rules of arbitral institutions (vs. setting up their own procedural 
rules).  Arbitral institutions have their own well-established and viable procedural rules and the arbitration 
is usually conducted without problems if these rules are appointed by the parties.516  
 
                                                             
514 Dr. Stenfan Kroll, op. cit., at 61. 
515 Commission Report of 21 August 1985, para. 163. 
516 John B. Tieder, JR., Factors to Consider in the Choice of Procedural and Substantive Law in International Arbitration, 20 
J. Int’l Arb. 393 2003, at 393. 
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4.1. Equal Treatment of Parties    
 
Article 18 (Equal treatment of parties) 
The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case.  
 
Arbitration is a private resolution system and party autonomy is thus emphasized therein; Article 
18, however, regulates party autonomy and due process in the context of international procedural public 
policy.517   Indeed, parties and arbitrators, in such contexts, are given wide discretion regarding the 
procedural rules applicable to arbitration unless due process is violated.518  If due process is violated, the 
award will be set aside—or refused for recognition or enforcement.  This provision is (i) a mandatory one 
that is construed by the courts (even though it does not expressly say so)519 and (ii) labeled as the ‘most 
important provision[s] of the Model Law.’520  
Although Article 18 expressly specifies the principle of ‘equality of the parties’ and the ‘giving each 
party a full opportunity of presenting the case,’ these are abstract guidelines for due process.521  An 
interpretation of the phrase ‘equality of the parties’ should not be understood on a simple quantitative 
                                                             
517 The term, ‘due process’ in this paper includes a number of notions with varying names under different national laws like 
natural justice, procedural fairness, the right or the opportunity to be heard.  Renata Brazil-David, Harmonization and 
Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration, 28 J. Int’l Arb. 445 2011, at 453. 
518 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter V, Article 18 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 624. 
519 Michael Pryles, Limits to Party Autonomy in Arbitral Procedure, 24 J. Int’l Arb. 327 2007, at 329. 
520 Commentary, art. 19, para.1. 
521 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter V, Article 18 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 624. 
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basis (e.g., this does not mean that both parties should be given exactly the same amount of time in every 
process).  Furthermore, the phrase, ‘full opportunity of a party to present his case’ should not be abused 
by a party for dilatory tactics.522  In practice, ‘equality’ is often wrongly brought for a ground of setting 
aside.  In CLOUT Case No. 146, one party brought a claim during the arbitral proceedings and the arbitral 
tribunal dismissed the claim.  After the claims’ dismissal, the other party partially acknowledged the 
dismissal of the claim; however, the first party (who brought the original claim) argued that the arbitral 
award should be set aside because the other party was not equally treated.523  The court, however, held 
that the other party’s partial acknowledgement did not amount to a violation of due process.524  Also, the 
rejection of the party’s request (regarding the arbitral proceedings) did not amount to a violation of due 
process under Article 18.525  In another case, one party challenged the award on the basis that the arbitral 
tribunal violated the due process because it did not compel a witness to testify during the arbitral 
                                                             
522 Commentary, art. 19, para.1. 
523 The facts of the case are as follows. The plaintiff brought a claim during the arbitral proceedings.  The arbitral tribunal 
dismissed the claim and the defendant partially acknowledged the dismissal of claim.  After the arbitral tribunal rendered 
an award, the plaintiff filed an application for setting aside of arbitral award on the ground that the parties had not been 
treated with equality-violating article 18- so, the award was in conflict with public policy.  The plaintiff asserted that the 
fact that the arbitral tribunal dismissed the claim and the defendant partially acknowledged the claim dismissed constituted 
unequal treatment of parties.  So, the plaintiff argued that the arbitral award rendered under this situation was in conflict 
with public policy and it should be set aside.  Upon the plaintiff’s application, the court held that such acknowledgement 
did not constitute grounds for setting aside the award because the arbitrators were not bound by acknowledgement of the 
claim.  Also, the court noted that a procedural infringement in the arbitral proceedings had no relevance to the notion of 
public policy.  COULT Case No. 146, Russian Federation, Moscow City Court, 10 November 1994. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V96/853/30/IMG/V9685330.pdf?OpenElement.  (accessed on October 4 2015). 
524 COULT Case No. 146, Russian Federation, Moscow City Court, 10 November 1994. 
525 COULT Case No. 146, Russian Federation, Moscow City Court, 10 November 1994. 
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procedure.526  The court rejected the challenge because the arbitral tribunal had no power to compel the 
witnesses to testify.527       
 
4.2. Determination of Rules  
 
Article 19 (Determination of the rules of procedure) 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this law, the parties are free to agree on the 
procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings.  
(2) Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of 
this Law, conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. The 
power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence. 
 
Article 19 gives the parties considerable freedom to set out the procedural rules for their own 
arbitrations;528 indeed, its fundamental purpose is to allow the parties to select (or tailor) the procedural 
                                                             
526 The facts of the case are as follows.  The plaintiffs filed a case for setting aside of arbitral award based on Article 34(2)(a)(ii) 
and Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law, which are about unequal treatment of parties during arbitral proceedings and 
violation of public policy respectively.  The plaintiffs asserted that the arbitral tribunal did not compel witnesses to testify 
despite their request, so that the arbitral award should be set aside.  The court, however, held that the arbitral tribunal had 
no power to compel witnesses to testify and the parties should have had resorted to national courts to compel testimony.  It 
also added that it was simply failure of the plaintiffs to seek judicial assistance.  CLOUT Case No. 391, Superior Court of 
Justice, Canada, 22 September 1999, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V01/847/23/PDF/V0184723.pdf?OpenElement, (accessed on October 6, 2015). 
527 CLOUT Case No. 391, Superior Court of Justice, Canada, 22 September 1999. 
528 The procedural law is generally understood in its broad sense to encompass the followings, the procedure to be followed by 
the arbitral tribunal, the law regulating the constitution of arbitral tribunal, the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal, arbitrability, 
conditions applicable to the rendering of the award, the intervention of courts of law, and the conditions for the recognition 
and enforcement of the award.  Fabien Gelinas, Peeking Through the Form of Uniform Law: International Arbitration 
Practice and Legal Harmonization, 27 J. Int’l Arb. 317 2010, at 322. 
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rules in accordance with their specific wishes and needs (for efficient conduct in ICA).529  As mentioned 
before, the parties usually agree on the preexisting rules (e.g., the rules of arbitral institution, such as ICC, 
LCIA, and AAA).  Furthermore, the parties can agree to apply the provisions of another national law to 
their arbitral proceedings, even though there is an argument that applying a national law (i.e., legislation 
for domestic arbitration) to international arbitration is not appropriate.  Indeed, many countries have 
separate provisions for domestic and international arbitration; however, when a jurisdiction has adopted 
the Model Law with a minimum alteration, it does not have many problems with applying it to the 
international arbitration.530  Thus, it is acceptable to agree to utilize a national law for arbitration; however, 
this may lead to a complicated situation.  For example, when parties agree to apply the national law of 
another country (i.e., outside the place of arbitration), there could be a conflict between these two laws.531  
 
4.3. Due Process  
Article 18 provides the fundamental principle that each party must be given a fair and reasonable 
opportunity to present their case and to answer the case of the opposing party.  However, if one party does 
                                                             
529 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter V, Article 19 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 625. 
530 John B. Tieder, JR., Factors to Consider in the Choice of Procedural and Substantive Law in International Arbitration, 20 
J. Int’l Arb. 393 2003, at 398. 
531 Although most jurisdictions assume that arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the procedural law of the place of 
arbitration, they do not prohibit the application of national law of the place other than the place of arbitration through the 
parties’ agreement.  When parties agree to apply the national law of the place other than the place of arbitration, there could 
be a conflict between these two laws.  In this case, there is no clear answer for this conflict.  So, in practice, it is advisable 
for the parties not to nominate the national law of the place other than the place of arbitration.  See. Laura M. Murray, 
Domestic Court Implementation of Coordinative Treaties: Formulating Rules for Determining the Seat of Arbitration under 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, 41 Va. J. INT’L L. 859, 2001, at 868; 
Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter V, Article 19 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 625. 
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not participate in arbitration, how should the requirement of due process be ensured during the arbitral 
proceedings?532  This question is crucial because the arbitral award may be set aside or refused for 
recognition or enforcement if the due process is not ensured.  Another initial question is whether the 
arbitral proceedings should be continued in the event of the default of either party.533  
 
Article 26 (Default of a party) 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if, without showing sufficient cause,  
(a) the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim in accordance with 
article 23 (1), the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings; 
(b) the respondent fails to communicate his statement of defence in accordance 
with article 23 (1), the arbitral tribunal shall continue the proceedings without 
treating such failure in itself as an admission of the claimant’s allegations;  
(c) any party fails to appear at a hearing or to produce documentary evidence, the 
arbitral tribunal may continue the proceedings and make the award on the 
evidence before it.  
 
According to paragraph (a), the arbitral tribunal can terminate the arbitral proceedings if the 
claimant fails to submit its statement without a sufficient reason.  While the arbitral tribunal may seek to 
determine whether there is a sufficient reason for not submitting the statement before terminating the 
proceedings, it is not within the duties of the arbitral tribunal to investigate why the claimant is not 
submitting its statement.534  Indeed, if the arbitral tribunal were to thoroughly investigation the claimant’s 
                                                             
532 Judith Butchers & Philip Kimbrough, The Arbitral Tribunal’s Role in Default Proceedings, 22 Arb. Int’l 233 2006, at 234. 
533 Id. 
534 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter V, Article 25 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 632. 
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default, it would risk violating the principle of impartiality or equal treatment of the parties.535  The arbitral 
tribunal only needs to make a minimum effort to find out why a claimant has failed to submit its 
statement.536  
Although paragraph (a) deals with the default of the claimant, it is rare, in practice, for the claimant 
not to submit a full statement of a claim when he or she is requesting the commencement of arbitration.537  
In this sense, paragraph (a) seems a redundant provision; however, it is necessary for cases wherein a 
claimant initially only submits a brief request and plans to submit a full statement of the claim later on, in 
accordance with Article 23.538  If the claimant does not submit the full statement after submitting the brief 
request for the commencement of arbitration, the claimant will be in default and the proceedings will be 
terminated under paragraph (a).     
Paragraph (b)539  is about the default of the respondent.  If the respondent defaults without a 
sufficient reason, the arbitral tribunal will continue the arbitral proceedings and render an arbitral award 
based on the available evidence.  However, there is no default judgment in arbitration.540  Indeed, in such 
circumstances, the claimant has a greater burden when attempting to substantiate a claim; if the claimant 
cannot prove his or her claim, the arbitral tribunal is likely to render an award against the claimant.541  If 
                                                             
535 Id. 
536 Id . 
537 Id. 
538 So, in this case, the arbitral tribunal needs to clarify whether the initial document submitted by the claimant is a request for 
arbitration or a statement of claim. 
539 Article 25 of the Model Law (Default of a party): Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if without showing sufficient cause, 
(b) the respondent fails to communicate his statement of defense in accordance with article 23(1), the arbitral tribunal shall 
continue the proceedings without treating such failure in itself as an admission of the claimant’s allegations. 
540 Judith Butchers & Philip Kimbrough, op. cit., at 237.    
541 In Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. (Letco) v. Government of the Republic of Liberia, (1987) 26 ILM 647 at 656.  The arbitral 
tribunal stated that “the failure of the Government of Liberia to take part in the present arbitral proceedings does not entitle 
the claimant to an award in its favor as a matter of right.  The onus is still upon the claimant to establish the claim which it 
has put forward” 
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the arbitral tribunal has limited information from most likely the claimant (i.e., facts presented by only 
one party), the arbitral tribunal must nevertheless fulfill its duty and render a decision on the dispute.542  
Thus, an arbitral tribunal examines the merits of each dispute independently as its right to invoke ex officio 
to determine the arbitrability and public policy implications of a dispute.543     
As previously discussed, the arbitral proceeding often continues, albeit at the discretion of the 
arbitral tribunal, when one of the parties defaults without sufficient reason;544 indeed, the agreement 
between the parties to arbitrate should not be defeated by a recalcitrant respondent.545  The arbitral tribunal 
is appointed by the parties pursuant to a consensual arbitration agreement between the parties; thus, it has 
a duty to conduct arbitration via (i) inviting the parties to present their cases and (ii) making a decision 
over the claim.546  Consequently, if either party refuses to participate in the arbitration after having been 
duly notified, (i) the defaulting party will be deemed to have deliberately forfeited the opportunity547 and 
(ii) default in arbitration will not be held to bar the enforcement of an arbitral award.548  Thus, even if one 
party does not participate in the arbitration, he or she is still bound by the arbitral award.549  The key to 
due process, in this context, is notification.  (1) The arbitral tribunal should make certain that the 
respondent is routinely updated on the progress of the arbitral proceedings.  (2) The principle of due 
                                                             
542 Judith Butchers & Philip Kimbrough, op. cit., at 238. 
543 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter V, Article 25 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 632. 
544 Judith Butchers & Philip Kimbrough, op. cit., at 234. 
545 On the contrary to the case of non-participation of respondent, if the claimant fails to participate after constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, the arbitration should not be continued.  It is expressly stated in Article 25(a). 
546 Id., at 236. 
547 Albert Jan van den Berg, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION, Kluwer, 1981, 
at 306. 
548 Gary B. Born, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 2nd ed., Transnational Publishers: Kluwer Law International, 
2001, at 847. 
549 Although this provision empower the arbitral tribunal to continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award, a number of 
national laws, particularly the Latin-American region, may hesitate to recognize foreign ex parte awards. Gerold Herrmann, 
op. cit., at. 8. 
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process imposes a duty on the arbitral tribunal to (a) inform the respondent of the arguments and evidence 
of the claimant and (b) allow the respondent to express his or her opinion.550  (3) The claims and statements 
therein must be submitted in writing; furthermore the evidence, submitted by the participating party, 
should be also in writing.551 (4) Although the parties initially agree on a specific manner of communication 
(i.e., of receiving notifications), the arbitral tribunal should attempt to ensure that all routine channels are 
utilized therein, so that (i) there cannot be any objection regarding proper notice and (ii) the defaulting 
party has sufficient time to respond.552  
 
5. An Arbitral Award 
After the arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal has to make an award and terminate the 
proceedings. Chapter VI provides the rules and regulations that are applicable to the (i) substance of a 
dispute (Article 28), (ii) decision making by panel of arbitrators (Article 29), (iii) settlement (Article 30), 
(iv) form and contents of an award (Article 31), (v) termination of proceedings (Article 32), and (vi) 
correction and interpretation of an award (Article 33).  
 
 
                                                             
550 Albert Jan van den Berg, op. cit., at 307. 
551 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 4th ed. Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2004, at 324~5, para. 6-121. 
552 Michael J. Mustill and Stewart C. Boyd, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 2nd ed. Butterworths, 1989, at 537. 
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5.1. Rules Applicable to the Substance of Dispute 
 
Article 28 (Rules applicable to substance of dispute) 
(1)The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of 
law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Any 
designation of the law or legal system of a given State shall be construed, unless 
otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the substantive law of that State and 
not to its conflict of laws rules.  
(2) Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law 
determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. 
(3) The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur 
only if the parties have expressly authorized it to do so. 
(4) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of 
the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the 
transaction.  
 
The text in Article 28 focuses on the substance of a dispute and the applicable rules therein.  The 
parties have the freedom to agree on the procedural rules under Article 19, can determine the substantive 
rules under Article 28,553 and these choices are not limited to particular national laws; furthermore, Article 
28 could be extended to non-national substantive rules because the provision uses the phase, ‘such rules 
of law’ (vs. merely ‘law’).554  Moreover, the substantive rules therein include rules from various sources 
                                                             
553 In arbitration, several laws are involved: the law which is applicable to the arbitral proceedings, the law which determines 
the validity of arbitration agreement, the law which governs arbitrability of the subject-matter, and the law which applies 
to substance of dispute.  Markham Ball, The Essential Judge: the Role of the Courts in a System of National and 
International Commercial Arbitration, 22 Arb. Int’l 73 2006 at.77 
554 Commentary, art. 28, para. 4. 
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(e.g., lex mercatoria, general principles of law, customary trade rules, the UNIDROIT principles, UCP, 
and Incoterms).555  
The term “party autonomy” suggests that the parties can agree on a law (i.e., a set of rules) that is 
not connected to the dispute or the parties at all.556  Also, once the parties choose the law (or a set of rules) 
as their governing law, the arbitral tribunal should render a decision on the dispute in accordance with the 
agreed-upon law or rules, without reviewing whether the choice of law is correct or not.557  If the arbitral 
tribunal does not apply this agreed-upon law or rules, the award will be brought to the court for setting 
aside on the basis that the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties under 
Article 34 (2) (a) (iv).  When a case is brought to the court for this reason, the court reviews only whether 
the arbitral tribunal has applied the agreed-upon law or rules (vs. examining whether the parties’ choice 
of governing law was correct).  Moreover, the court does not examine whether the agreed-upon law or 
rules were applied correctly.  
One case involved a party requesting that the court set aside the arbitral award rendered against it, 
claiming that the arbitral tribunal did not apply the governing law (i.e., the Italian Patent law) correctly 
because it did not have the required knowledge about the law; the court held that the court did not have 
the power to review the merits of an arbitral award and rejected the case thusly.  If a court examines 
                                                             
555 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VI, Article 28 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 636. 
556 So, parties do not need to consider their own national laws, the law of the place where the contract is concluded, or the law 
of the pace where the contract is performed mostly. 
557 Regardless of which law or set of rules are chosen by the parties, the choice of the parties is binding upon the arbitral tribunal. 
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whether the governing law has been correctly applied, this means that the court is reviewing the merits of 
the case; however, this is, in principle, not allowed in most jurisdictions.558      
As to “party autonomy” in the choice of governing law, some key questions arise.  Do the parties 
enjoy the unfettered freedom to agree on the law (or rules) applicable to their contract?  Is their choice 
limited by the application of mandatory laws, e.g., (i) substantive mandatory rules of the seat of the 
arbitration, (ii) the mandatory rules of the State that are most closely connected to the dispute, or (iii) the 
mandatory rules of the State wherein the reviewing court, examining the parties’ choice of applicable law, 
is located.559  Indeed, this question is an ongoing discussion in ICA. 
When there is no agreement between the parties regarding the rules applicable to the substance of 
the dispute, the arbitral tribunal can determine this under paragraph (2).560  While the law (i.e., the rules 
chosen by the parties) directly refers to the substantive law of a certain State, the law nominated by the 
                                                             
558 The facts of the case are as follows.  The defendant and the applicant are manufacturers and distributors of car door locks.  
The parties entered into a license agreement for manufacture and distribution of car door locks.  The defendant was the 
producer of the A-lock and s/he held a patent under Italian law.  The applicant was the producer of the B-lock.  A dispute 
arose between the parties as to the question on whether the B-lock was covered by the defendant’s patent for the A-lock 
and whether any royalties were due.  The parties agreed to submit the dispute to ICC arbitration and the arbitral tribunal 
ruled in favor of the defendant who was the patent holder.  After the award was rendered, the applicant applied to the Court 
for the setting aside of this award.  It argued that the arbitral tribunal did not possess the required knowledge of Italian 
patent law, so the applicant had offered to call for a neutral expert opinion.  In spite of the applicant’s request, however, the 
tribunal had neither ordered one nor given any reasons for its decision.  Therefore, the applicant requested the court to set 
aside the award based on several grounds.  Among these several grounds, the court held that courts did not have the power 
to review an arbitral award on the merits under German law, so it could not review whether the tribunal had applied Italian 
patent law correctly.  CLOUT Case No. 375, Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, Germany, 15 December 1999. 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/602/96/PDF/V0060296.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 8, 
2015). 
559 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VI, Article 28 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 634~5. 
560 If the parties to a dispute do not agree on the substantive law which governs their dispute in their arbitration agreement, this 
issue is left to the arbitral tribunal.  The arbitral tribunal applies the conflicts of law rules which is deemed applicable by 
considering the issues such as the following: where the contract was entered into, where the performance occurred, what 
the intent of the parties was, where the majority or most significant contracts were, what the contract stipulates regarding 
the governing law, and so on.  John B. Tieder, JR., Factors to Consider in the Choice of Procedural and Substantive Law 
in International Arbitration, 20 J. Int’l Arb. 393 2003, at 393. 
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arbitral tribunal is determined by the conflict of laws considered applicable therein.561  Thus, the arbitral 
tribunal may not apply non-national rules of law because the application of conflict of laws (or rules) will 
lead to the application of the specific States’ national law.  While there is discrepancy between the parties’ 
freedom to agree on the application of rules of law and the arbitral tribunal’s obligation to follow the 
conflict of laws, the drafters of the Model Law do not explain the reason for this discrepancy and indeed 
leave this matter to the national legislation.562  Also, the Commentary mentions that the parties can agree 
that the arbitral tribunal may determine the applicable substantive law by identifying the applicable law 
directly (vs. via the conflicts of laws).563  However, when the parties cannot foresee a need to provide for 
substantive applicable law (and would thus not nominate a specific law via their agreement), it is 
unrealistic to assume that they would insert an express term that expands the arbitral tribunal’s power to 
identify the applicable law.564  
According to paragraph (3), the arbitral tribunal can apply non-legal rules to settle a dispute and 
make a decision ex aequo et bono or as amicable compositeur (if there is such an agreement between the 
parties).  However, the Model Law again does not clarify the meaning of ex aequo et bono or amicable 
compositeur.565  Nevertheless, it is clear that when the parties agree to give the arbitral tribunal the power 
to decide ex aequo et bono or as amicable compositeur, the arbitral tribunal has been instructed to decide 
based on the general considerations of fairness and equity (vs. on applications of specific legal rules).566   
                                                             
561 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VI, Article 28 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 635. 
562 Id., at 635~7. 
563 Commentary, art. 28, para.6. 
564 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VI, Article 28 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 637. 
565 Id. 
566 Id., at 638.  
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Lastly, paragraph (4) states the self-evident rules—namely, that the contractual and express terms 
of the agreement prevail over any default national provision; however, any mandatory national provision 
prevails over these terms.567  Thus, it uses the phrase ‘decide in accordance with’ for the contractual and 
express terms of the agreement—and operative language (e.g., ‘take into account’) for the trade usages 
applicable to the transaction.568  In cases wherein the parties agree that the arbitral tribunal can decide ex 
aequo et bono or as amicable compositeur, the arbitral tribunal will have to decide based on the equity or 
fairness—unless its decision is contrary to the contractual and express terms that the parties have agreed 
on.569  
 
5.2. Form and Contents of an Arbitral Award 
The text in Article 31 focuses on the form and contents of the arbitral award.  The arbitral award 
needs to fulfill certain requirements—in terms of form and contents—to be a valid and enforceable. 
 
Article 31 (Form and contents of award) 
(1) The award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the arbitrator or 
arbitrators. In arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, the signatures 
of the majority of all members of the arbitral tribunal shall suffice, provided that 
the reason for any omitted signature is stated.  
                                                             
567 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VI, Article 28 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 638. 
568 Id. 
569 Id. 
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(2) The award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless the parties 
have agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is an award on agreed 
terms under article 30.  
(3) The award shall state its date and the place of arbitration as determined in 
accordance with the article 20(1). The award shall be deemed to have been made 
at that place.  
(4) After the award is made, a copy signed by the arbitrators in accordance with 
the paragraph (1) of this article shall be delivered to each party. 
 
The Model Law requires the award to contain the (i) date, (ii) place of arbitration, (iii) signatures of 
the arbitrators, and (iv) to be in writing.  While the latter two requirements provide certainty, only the 
majority of the arbitrators need to sign an award if the arbitration is conducted with more than one 
arbitrator—as long as the reason for omission of the signature is stated therein (i.e., in the award).570  
Article 29571 may indeed be interpreted as stating that a decision can be made by a majority of all members; 
however, in Article 31, it is understood that if arbitration is processed with more than one arbitrator, the 
arbitral award is made by majority of arbitrators; thus, the award only needs the signature of the majority 
of arbitrators (who have agreed on the decision).  
Indeed, the Commentary says that the omission of signature (under paragraph (1) of Article 31) 
should only be acceptable when there is a serious reason, e.g., when an arbitrator dies or becomes 
physically unable to sign the award.572  Thus, it should not be condoned when an arbitrator refuses to sign 
                                                             
570 Although, in the 2006 amendments, the Model Law provides for options for the written requirement of arbitration agreement 
to adopting States, the arbitral award still requires a strict written requirement. 
571 Article 29 of the Model Law (Decision making by panel of arbitrators): In arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, 
any decision of arbitral tribunal shall be made, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, by a majority of all its members.  
However, questions of procedure may be decided by a presiding arbitrator, if so authorized by the parties or all members 
of the arbitral tribunal. 
572 Commentary, art. 31 para. 2. 
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an award because he or she does not agree with the majority of arbitrators.573  The purpose of paragraph 
(1) is to prevent any recalcitrant arbitrator from having the power to block the issuance of an award (e.g., 
via a unfounded refusal to sign it).574  For instance, in CLOUT Case No. 12, the court refused to set aside 
the arbitral award even though one of arbitrators did not sign it.  There was no reason for the omission of 
the signature.575  The court held that it was sufficient for the president of the tribunal to formally provide 
the reason for the arbitrator’s lack of signature in the court at the annulment proceedings.576    
Paragraph (2) stipulates that the reasoning for the award should be contained within the text therein; 
however, this should not be considered a public policy requirement. 577   Indeed, paragraph (2) also 
stipulates that the reasoning of an award can be waived within the parties’ agreement; however, it helps 
to confirm that the arbitrators have identified and examined all relevant facts and legal issues raised by 
the parties therein before making a decision.578  Thus, the purpose of requiring the reasoning in the award 
is to confirm the arbitral tribunal has decided on the issue after a thorough examination.  The reasoning 
                                                             
573 Commentary, art. 31 para. 2. 
574 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VI, Article 31 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 640. 
575 The facts of the case are as follows.  The claimants and the defendants signed the charter-party which contained an arbitration 
clause, so the dispute arisen between them was settled by arbitration.  After the award was rendered, the claimant requested 
the court to set aside the arbitral award in which only two out of three arbitrators had submitted their opinion.  The 
application to set aside the award was dismissed even though only two arbitrators rendered the award.  The court held that 
under Article 31 of the Model Law, the signatures of the majority of all members of the arbitral tribunal suffice because the 
reason for the omitted signature was formally given by the president of the arbitral tribunal. CLOUT Case No. 12, Federal 
Court of Canada, 7 April 1988.  https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ V93/855/96/IMG/V9385596.pdf?Op 
enElement 
576 CLOUT Case No. 12, Federal Court of Canada, 7 April 1988.  
577 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VI, Article 31 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), 
CONCISE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, Kluwer Law International, 2010, at 640~641. 
578 Commentary, art. 31 para.3; Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VI, Article 31 in 
Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. cit., at 641. 
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does not need to be expressed in strict legal terms because the qualifications of arbitrators are not limited 
to the legal field.  
The remaining formal requirement therein (i.e., of an award) is to specify the date and place of 
arbitration, as stipulated in paragraph (3).  The award date is crucial because it initiates a finite time frame 
wherein the award may be challenged—and the award interest starts calculating from that date.579  The 
place of arbitration is also important because it has significant legal consequences; for example, it would 
be the location where the challenging party would submit its case for setting aside the award—and the law 
therein (i.e., of the place of arbitration) would be the governing law for setting aside the award.580 
 
5.3. Nullification of an Arbitral Award 
The challenging party (i.e., the party with an arbitral award rendered against it) has two ways to 
make the arbitral award invalid: (i) asking the court to set aside the arbitral award (after it is rendered) and 
(ii) refusing recognition (or enforcement) of the arbitral award. Article 34, in Chapter VII, specifies the 
grounds for setting aside an arbitral award (and how to apply for it) and Article 36 regulates the grounds 
for refusing recognition (or enforcement) of an arbitral award under Chapter VIII.  
 
Article 34 of the Model Law (Application for setting aside 
 as exclusive recourse against arbitral award) 
                                                             
579 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VI, Article 31 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 641. 
580 Here, the meaning of place of arbitration is the one that is determined in accordance with art. 20(1).  It does not include the 
place where the actual hearings took place or the place where the arbitrators were when they signed the award. 
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(1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an 
application for setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this 
article.  
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6 only if:  
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that:  
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under some 
incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties 
have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of this State; or   
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case; or   
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that 
part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration 
may be set aside; or   
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in 
conflict with a provision of this Law from which the parties cannot derogate, or, 
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Law;  or   
(b) the court finds that:  
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration 
under the law of this State; or   
(ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State.  
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have 
elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the 
award or, if a request had been made under article 33, from the date on which that 
request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal.  
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(4) The court, when asked to set aside an award, may, where appropriate and so 
requested by a party, suspend the setting aside proceedings for a period of time 
determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the 
arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s 
opinion will eliminate the grounds for setting aside. 
 
This area (i.e., the setting aside of arbitral awards) has impeded the harmonization of national 
arbitration legislation.581  Although there has been a great improvement in harmonization by the Model 
Law (which provides uniform grounds for recourse against an arbitral award), this area is still undermined 
because of national actions or remedies against the award.  There are some jurisdictions wherein appeals 
against decisions of the courts therein (i.e., for setting aside awards) are allowed.  In CLOUT Case No. 
323, an award was submitted to the High Court for setting aside, was subsequently dismissed, and was 
submitted again to the Supreme Court for setting aside.582  
Indeed, setting aside an award is the sole recourse herein and Article 34 provides the grounds for 
setting aside.583  These grounds are the same as those in Article V of the New York Convention (which 
provides the grounds for non-enforcement of an arbitral award).  The only difference between these two 
articles is that the application for setting aside (in Article 34) may only be made to a court in the State 
wherein the award was rendered, while the application for recognition or enforcement may be made to the 
                                                             
581 Explanatory Note at para. 44. 
582 For example, in Zimbabwe, a decision that a national court makes on set aside is open to appeal.  An employer and an 
employee had an arbitration to settle their dispute and the arbitral tribunal made a decision against the employer.  
Consequently, the employer filed a case for setting aside of award and at the same time the employee brought a case for 
enforcement of award.  Upon their claims, the High Court dismissed both claims and the employer appealed to the Supreme 
Court.  After the Supreme Court reviewed the award and found that it had a fundamental error, the Supreme Court set aside 
the award.  CLOUT Case No. 323 Zimbabwe Supreme Court, 21 October and 21 December 1999, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/541/89/PDF/V0054189.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 9, 2015) 
583 A sole recourse means that after the arbitral tribunal makes a decision over the dispute, the parties cannot ask the arbitral 
tribunal to review the decision and decide it again.  Moreover, the parties cannot bring the case to the court for appeal. 
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court in any State.584  The list of the grounds for setting aside is exhaustive; however, it should be narrowly 
construed based on the fact that the scope of judicial intervention into ICA is restricted.585  Furthermore, 
none of these grounds permits a review of the merits of the dispute and the parties cannot contract out of 
this provision because Article 34 is a mandatory one.586  
In order to set aside an award, there are at least three requirements to fulfill under Article 34. (1)  
According to paragraph (3), the application for setting aside should be made within three months from the 
date whereupon the party received the award.  Thus, the Model Law sets a time limit of three months for 
the application of setting aside to support the efficiency of arbitration.  However, if the ground for setting 
aside is, for example, a violation of public policy law and is discovered after three months, should the 
award be enforced?  The Model Law does not mention about this matter and thus leaves it to individual 
State law.587  
The second requirement is that the decision should be an award.  Although the Model Law does not 
define “award,” it requires that a decision must qualify as an arbitral award when determined as such by 
                                                             
584 Explanatory Note at para. 48. 
585 A Canadian company, who was a supplier entered into a contract with a Japanese company for the sales of coal.  They had 
an arbitral clause saying that any contractual dispute would be submitted to binding arbitration.   When dispute concerning 
the interpretation of a contract term arose, the arbitration was conducted.  After the arbitral award was rendered, the 
Canadian company brought the case for setting aside of award based on the ground that the arbitral tribunal had exceeded 
their jurisdiction by dealing with a matter beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.  The court of appeal upheld 
the lower court’s affirmation of the award noting that the word-wide trend toward restricting the scope of judicial 
intervention into commercial arbitration and the award could be justified under the terms of the contract so the court was 
prevented from intervening under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law.  CLOUT Case No. 16, British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, 24 October 1990. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/855/96/IMG/V9385596.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed on October 9 2015). 
586 Reviewing the merits of the dispute is examination of the national court regarding, for example, whether the arbitral tribunal 
assessed the evidence correctly, whether the law was applied correctly, or whether the correct law was applied and so on.  
587 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VII, Article 34 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 648. 
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a tribunal.588  The practical difficulty herein is that the definition (or understanding) of arbitral award 
varies in different jurisdictions.589  For example, some courts qualify a decision as an award if it provides 
for determination on the merits of the case,590 while other courts emphasize the formal characteristics of 
arbitral decisions.591  
The last requirement for setting aside is that when party challenges the arbitral award, he or she 
must furnish proof that one of the grounds in Article 34 exists.  Thus, the Model Law imposes the burden 
of proof on the challenging party; however, this applies only to grounds (i) to (iv) listed in Article 34 (2) 
                                                             
588 Initially, the Working Group had decided to include a definition of arbitral award in the Model Law, but it failed to do so in 
the end because of lack of time. 
589 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VII, Article 34 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 644. 
590 The claimant appealed to the appellate board after the award was rendered, but the appellate board rejected the appeal 
because the claim was not submitted in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties.  Consequently, the claimant 
brought the case to the Higher Regional Court in Hamburg to make this dismissal to be annulled under Section 1059(2)(1d) 
of German Code of Civil Procedure claiming that the procedural rules the parties agreed was not valid and should not have 
been applied.  The court held that the dismissal of the appeal constituted an award in the sense of Section 1059(1) of German 
Code of Civil Procedure.  The court added that, even though the decision made by the arbitral tribunal was not drafted as 
an award, it was declared as an award by the tribunal and also it made a decision on the merits of the case.  Therefore, it 
should be considered as an award.  CLOUT Case No 455, Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Germany, 4 
September 1998. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V03/856/49/PDF /V0385649.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed on October 10, 2015). 
591 During the arbitration proceedings, the claimant requested the arbitral tribunal to declare that it did not have jurisdiction in 
the matter because of the lack of a valid arbitration agreement.  The arbitral tribunal delivered a decision without giving 
any reason for it and later declared that it “rejected the application of Applicant to decide the issue of jurisdiction by way 
of an intermediate decision according to Section 1040 (3) of German Code of Civil Procedure and that “The arbitral tribunal 
will decide on its jurisdiction in the final award”.  Consequently, the claimant brought this case to the court to have this 
order set aside.  The court held that the first decisions made by the arbitral tribunal could not constitute an award because 
the decision without any reason for it did not fulfill the formal requirements for an award.  Moreover, regarding the second 
decision, the court held that the tribunal’s decision was not an interim decision according to Section 1040(3) of German 
Code of Civil Procedure because the arbitral tribunal had not intended to make a decision regarding its jurisdiction, but 
merely rejected the procedural application made by the claimant.  The court made it clear that a decision on the jurisdiction 
would only be made in the final award and might only be reviewed by a court either in a motion for setting aside or a motion 
for recognition and enforcement of the award. CLOUT Case No. 441, Oberlandesgericht Koln, Germany, 20 July 2000. 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V03/846/34/PDF/V0384634.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 10, 
2015). 
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(a).  Conversely, the grounds listed in Article 34 (2) (b) are provided as an ex officio ground of setting 
aside. 
The grounds for setting aside are divided into two groups in paragraph (2): (i) paragraph (2) (a) 
includes the grounds that the challenging party must prove and (ii) paragraph (2) (b) includes the grounds 
that the court determines to be ex officio.  The first group has four grounds for setting aside: (i) incapacity 
or invalidity of an arbitration agreement, (ii) the violation of due process, (iii) the exceeding of jurisdiction 
by an arbitral tribunal, and (iv) irregularity in the constitution of an arbitral tribunal.   Paragraph (2) (a) (i) 
of the Model Law expressly indicates that the law, agreed upon by the parties, determines the invalidity 
of an arbitration agreement (vs. clarifying which law is applicable to determine the incapacity or invalidity 
of an arbitration agreement).592  If there is no such agreed-upon law in certain instances, the invalidity of 
the arbitration agreement is determined by the law of the place of arbitration.593  
The second ground, paragraph (2) (a) (ii) (i.e., the violation of due process) covers both procedural 
and substantive fairness and overlaps with the public policy ground.594  Due process indeed requires strict 
compliance because arbitration is a private system and thus beyond judicial power.  While this is closely 
related to fairness in the arbitral procedure, equality herein should involve the consideration of every 
unique circumstance (e.g., the parties should not necessarily be given the same, exact amount of time for 
the presentations of their claims). 
                                                             
592 The restriction of application for setting aside is that the challenging party can apply the case only to the court in the place 
of arbitration, so the court which the application for setting aside is submitted to has to be aware of the law of some places 
other than the one in the place of arbitration. 
593 As to incapacity, although the New York Convention expressly refers to ‘the law applicable to the parties’ it does not point 
to a specific connecting factor like nationality or domicile. 
594 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VII, Article 34 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 646. 
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The third ground, paragraph (2) (a) (iii), is the exceeding of a jurisdiction by a tribunal; however, 
this is not frequently invoked—and it is even less frequently accepted by national courts (in the context 
of setting aside an award).595  Indeed, the jurisdictional matter is usually determined at the beginning of 
arbitration (during the determination of whether or not there is a valid arbitration agreement); however, 
either party can still claim an objection to the jurisdiction when the arbitral proceeding commences or 
during the proceedings.  In such circumstances, the arbitral tribunal first determines that it has jurisdiction, 
then continues with the arbitration—and the tribunal’s jurisdiction is subsequently examined by the court 
(after the award has been rendered).  An examination of whether a tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction 
would include the claim therein (i.e., of whether or not it has decided over a matter that is beyond the 
scope of the arbitration agreement). 
The last ground, paragraph (2) (a) (iv) is an irregularity in the constitution of an arbitral tribunal (or 
deviation from a procedure agreed upon by the parties).  The constitution of an arbitral tribunal and other 
general proceedings must follow the procedure that is agreed upon by the parties (or any referred rules in 
the arbitration agreement).  As an arbitration agreement is a private contract between the parties, the 
arbitration should be conducted in accordance with the agreements of the parties therein.  If the arbitral 
tribunal conducts the arbitration against the agreements of the parties therein, this would constitute a 
breach of contract—and the award should be set aside.596  
                                                             
595 Id., at 647. 
596 The facts of the first case are as follows.  The claimant, a potato farmer, had initiated arbitral proceedings before the arbitral 
tribunal of the potato industry against the defendant, a potato trader.  The claimant appointed a farmer as his arbitrator, but 
the defendant successfully challenged this arbitrator as well as the substitute nominated by claimant.  Arbitrator C, a trader, 
was finally appointed for the claimant and claimant’s challenge to arbitrator C was dismissed by the Highest Arbitral 
Tribunal composed of three traders.  After an award was rendered in favor of the defendant, the claimant applied to the 
courts for setting aside of this award based on procedural irregularities in the appointment process.  The court granted the 
application and set aside the award on the basis of Section 1059 (2) (1 b, d) of the German Code of Civil Procedure 
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The other group specifies the grounds that do not require the challenging party to furnish the proof.  
This means that the court may ex officio examine the award.  The grounds are inarbitrability under 
paragraph (2) (b) (i) and the violation of public policy under paragraph (2) (b) (ii).  First, as for arbitrability, 
the Model Law does not provide for the scope of arbitrability and leaves this matter to national legislators 
because the scope of arbitrability varies depending on the national laws.597  Second, the public policy 
ground is most unpredictable because this ground relies on the interpretation of basic notions of morality 
and justice (e.g., in relation to corruption, bribery, and fraud); thus, it could be broadly interpreted 
(depending on each nation’s legislation and the interpretations therein).598  
                                                             
[equivalent to Article 34 (2) (a) (iv) of the Model Law].  It held that the procedure employed by the Highest Arbitral 
Tribunal with regard to the appointment and challenge of arbitrator C violated Section 1032 of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure.  According to the applicable arbitration rules it was not mandatory that the party-appointed arbitrator come 
from the list of arbitrators.  The list was only to be used as a recommendation.  CLOUT Case No. 436 Bayerisches Oberstes 
Landesgericht, Germany, 24 February 1999.  http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V03/846/34/PDF/V0384634.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 12, 2015). 
The facts of the second case are as follows.  Both parties are shareholders of a Turkish company incorporated in Istanbul.  
Their shareholders’ agreement contains an arbitration clause.  On May 26, 1994, the applicant brought a dispute before the 
Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, which rendered an award on August 15, 1994.  Before that date, on July 21, 1994, the 
respondent had already applied to an Istanbul court of first instance for a declaration on the inadmissibility of arbitration.  
The application was dismissed on November 18, 1996 by the Court of second instance.  The respondent also made an 
application for the setting aside of the award before a Turkish court on the grounds that the arbitral tribunal had decided the 
case without waiting for the court to rule on the admissibility of arbitration.  This application was successful and the award 
was set aside by the Court of Second Instance on February 6, 1995.  The applicant then filed the dispute for arbitration a 
second time at the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce.  The newly composed tribunal ruled in favor of applicant on May 26, 
1998, without ordering an oral hearing.  A motion for the setting aside of this second award was dismissed by the Court of 
Second Instance on February 2, 1999.  The respondent tried to resist the recognition and a declaration of enforceability of 
the award in the German Court relying on various grounds.  In respect of Section 1061(1) of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure, the equivalent of Article 36 (1) (a) (ii) of the Model Law, the Court stated that the tribunal’s denial of a motion 
to take evidence could not constitute a violation of the right to present one’s case.  The Court further held that the Turkish 
court had rendered a non-appealable decision on the arbitrability of the dispute at hand.  Under Section 328(1) of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure, the German court was bound to recognize this decision without further review, unless 
one of the exceptions under Section 328(1) was met, which was not the case here.  The Court also held that the fact that no 
oral hearing had been ordered by the arbitral tribunal did not in itself constitute a violation of Article 36 (1) (a) (iv) of the 
Model Law.   CLOUT Case No. 371 OLG, Breme, Germany, 30 September 1999. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/602/96/PDF/V0060296.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 12, 2015). 
597 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VII, Article 34 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 646. 
598 The facts of the first case are as follows.  The plaintiffs filed a case for setting aside of arbitral award based on Article 34 
(2) (a) (ii) and Article 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Model Law, which are about unequal treatment of parties during arbitral 
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Although the text in Article 34 focuses on recourse against awards, it is also worded to reduce the 
likelihood that an arbitral award will be set aside.  According to paragraph (4), when the arbitral award is 
brought to the court for setting aside, the court may remit it back to the arbitral tribunal for a period of 
time to eliminate the reasons of setting aside—if there is an appropriate request therein by a party.  When 
a party brings a case to the court for setting aside of the award, the court tries to give the arbitral tribunal 
an opportunity to remove the ground (vs. setting aside the award at once).  In this case, the grounds are 
mostly related to the formality, which could be easily fixed and thus would not affect the contents of the 
award.599  Nevertheless, when interpreting this paragraph, it should not be understood or interpreted that 
the court can order the arbitral tribunal to review the award.  As seen in the CLOUT Case No. 12, this 
                                                             
proceedings and violation of public policy respectively.  The plaintiffs asserted that the arbitral tribunal did not compel 
witnesses to testify despite their request, so that the arbitral award should be set aside.  The court, however, held that the 
power of the arbitral tribunal did not go beyond the contracting parties and it was not violation of public policy.  The court 
also added that the plaintiffs should have sought the judicial assistance.  CLOUT Case No. 391, Superior Court of Justice, 
Canada, 22 September 1999, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V01/847/23/PDF/V0184723.pdf?OpenElement, 
The facts of the second case are as follows. The employer suspended one of its senior employees pending disciplinary 
hearings into alleged misconduct.  Suspension was initially with full pay and subsequently without pay effective 5 February 
1997.  The employment dispute was submitted to arbitration and the arbitral tribunal awarded the employee his salary and 
benefits together with interest from 24 December 1996.  The employer, however, sought to have the award set aside on the 
basis that the arbitral tribunal had made a reviewable factual error in calculating the back-pay, and, under Zimbabwe’s 
Arbitration Act 1996, (Article 34 of the Model Law), the award rendered based on that error was contrary to public policy.  
The court considered that an award which was contrary to public policy would be one that would undermine the integrity 
of the system of international arbitration and that violation of public policy would include cases of fraud, corruption, bribery 
and serious procedural irregularities.  The court held that, as in this case it was not suggested that any moral turpitude 
attached to the arbitrator’s conduct, the award could not be said to be in conflict with public policy (Article 34 of the Model 
law).  It found that the error was clearly one of computation for which the Model Law makes adequate provision; a party 
may request the tribunal to correct such errors and, if necessary, the time limits for making such a request may be extended 
(Article 33 of the Model Law)  CLOUT Case No. 267, Harara High Court of Zimbabwe, 29 March and 9 December 1998, 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V99/892/77/PDF/V9989277.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 12, 
2015): CLOUT Case No. 323, Zimbabwe Supreme Court, 21 October and 21 December 1999. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/541/89/PDF/V0054189.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 12, 2015). 
599 For example, the omission of signature or the date of award can be added. 
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provision does not provide the court with an authority to refer the matter back to the arbitral tribunal and 
request the arbitral tribunal to consider the issue that was not originally considered therein.600  
The text in Article 34 focuses on the setting aside of arbitral awards.  This provision, however, does 
not mention the subsequent step after the arbitral award is set aside.  Once the award is set aside, what 
happens to the arbitration agreement?  Is the arbitration agreement still operative?  Or is it ineffective?  
Indeed, the national arbitration law in some States does have an answer to this question; for example, the 
German Code of Civil Procedure provides that the arbitration agreement becomes operative again after 
the award has been set aside.601  
The grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards are regulated in the last 
article of the Model Law.  The structure and contents therein are quite similar to those in Article 34, which 
focuses on the grounds for setting aside of the arbitral award.602  Although Article 36 is based on the New 
York Convention (1958), the scope of application under the Model Law is broader (vs. under the New 
York Convention)—namely, Article 36 of the Model Law applies to an arbitral award irrespective of the 
                                                             
600 The facts of the case are as follows.  The claimants and the defendants signed the charter-party which contained an arbitration 
clause.  One defendant was personally involved in the charter-party because he signed it in his personal capacity while 
another defendant signed it acting as the president of his company.  Upon the request by the claimants that the court should 
refer the matter, which was related with the defendant who signed in personal capacity, back to the arbitral tribunal and 
request it to consider the question that was not originally considered by the claimants.  The court held that the powers of 
the court were limited to examining the award on the basis of the restrictive provisions of article 34 of the Model Law, so 
the court could not refer the matter back to the arbitral tribunal again.  CLOUT Case No. 12, Federal Court of Canada, 7 
April 1988, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/855/96/IMG/V9385596.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on 
October 12, 2015). 
601 Section 1059 (5) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Application for setting aside) : Setting aside the arbitral award 
shall, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, result in the arbitration agreement becoming operative again with 
respect to the subject-matter of dispute.  
602 Both article 34 and 36 are based on the 1958 New York Convention. 
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State wherein it was made (whereas the New York Convention applies to an award made in the territory 
of a State other than the State wherein the recognition and enforcement of the award have been sought).603  
 
Article 36 (Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement) 
(1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in 
which it was made, may be refused only:  
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party furnishes to 
the competent court where recognition or enforcement is sought proof that:  
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under some 
incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties 
have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country 
where the award was made; or  
(ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of 
the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case; or 
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not failing within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond 
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of 
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be 
recognized and enforced; or  
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not 
in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or  
(v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or 
suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award 
was made; or  
                                                             
603 Article I.1 of the New York Convention regulates the scope of application of the Convention. 
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(b) if the court finds that:  
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration 
under the law of this State; or  
(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of this State.  
(2) if an application for setting aside or suspension of an award has been made to 
a court referred to in paragraph (1)(a)(v) of this article, the court where 
recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn its 
decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming recognition or 
enforcement of the award, order the other party to provide appropriate security. 
 
Article 36 provides for seven grounds; however, while they are listed exhaustively, they should be 
interpreted narrowly.  Just like Article 34, the grounds for non-recognition and non-enforcement are 
divided into two groups.  (1) Paragraph (1) (a) has the grounds that must be invoked by the party who 
resists the award; indeed, the burden of proof stays with the party who resists the recognition or 
enforcement of an award (no matter which ground the claim is based on).604  (2) Paragraph (1) (b) states 
the grounds that the national court may invoke ex officio; when the resisting party brings a case to the 
court for the non-recognition (or non-enforcement) of an arbitral award, it is a principle that a review of 
the merits of the award is not allowed (regardless of which ground is exercised in any case). 
Paragraph (1) (a) specifies five grounds; indeed, while four of them are the same (as those listed in 
Article 34 (2) (a), there is one additional ground.  The first ground addresses the incapacity of parties or 
invalidity of an arbitration agreement under paragraph (1) (a) (i).  The prevailing view, on this ground, is 
                                                             
604 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VIII, Article 36 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 652. 
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that a party has the burden to prove the conclusion of an arbitration agreement when it is relying on the 
award; however, once this is done, the burden shifts to the party who resists the recognition (or 
enforcement) of an award—namely, to prove the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.605  This view, 
however, needs to be updated; following the 2006 amendments, paragraph (2) no longer requires that 
when a party is seeking recognition or enforcement, it must provide an arbitration agreement.606  Also, 
because paragraph (1) (a) (i) does not refer to Article 7, there is no legal ground that the burden of proof 
should be shifted to one party (vs. the other).  As a result, it should be understood that the resisting party 
has to bear the burden of proving that an arbitration agreement is not concluded—as well as that the 
agreement is not valid.607  
The second ground for non-enforcement is the violation of due process under paragraph (1) (a) (ii).  
Whether or not the due process has been violated has to be determined by reference to Article 18 wherein 
due process means an equal treatment of both parties and a full opportunity to present the case.  However, 
the violation of the due process ground is usually invoked via incorrect interpretations; for example, the 
fact that the arbitral tribunal refused to take the evidence (in spite of the party’s request) does not constitute 
                                                             
605 Id. 
606 Before the 2006 amendments, having interpreted Articles 35(recognition and enforcement) and 36(grounds for refusing 
recognition or enforcement), the party who tries to seek recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards has to provide for 
the original arbitration agreement to apply for its recognition or enforcement under Article 35(2).  So, the seeking party has 
a burden to prove that the arbitration agreement was concluded.  At the same time, if the other party wants to apply for non-
recognition or non-enforcement of awards, this party has to prove that the arbitration agreement is not concluded or not 
valid.  In this sense, the burden of proof is said to be shift from the party seeking recognition or enforcement to the party 
who is resisting the recognition or enforcement. 
607 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VIII, Article 36 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 652. 
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a violation of due process.  Also, the enforceability of an award is not affected by the fact that a party did 
not actually make use of an opportunity to present a case.608 
The third ground is the exceeding of jurisdiction by a tribunal under paragraph (1) (a) (iii).  The 
arbitral tribunal’s mandate is given by the arbitration agreement concluded between the parties.  Thus, 
when an associated decision therein (by the arbitral tribunal) is beyond the arbitration agreement, it may 
be unenforceable.  For example, if the parties conclude an arbitration agreement that excludes matters 
related to the termination of contract, the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction over a dispute therein 
(i.e., related to the termination of the contract).609 
Fourth, under paragraph (1) (a) (iv), an irregularity in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal (or 
deviation from the procedure agreed upon by the parties) is a ground for refusing recognition or 
enforcement of arbitral awards.  As mentioned in Article 34, arbitration is an agreement between two 
                                                             
608 The facts of the case are as follows.  The plaintiff obtained an arbitral award from the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) ordering the defendant to pay the purchase price of Peruvian fish meat.  The 
defendant failed to pay and the plaintiff applied the enforcement of award to the court.  The court granted leave for 
enforcement and the defendant requested the court to set aside the leave on the ground of due process violation.  The 
defendant argued that the arbitral tribunal made its opinion regarding the amount of the claim “through independent 
investigation”.  The court found that the defendant had an opportunity to present its own evidence regarding the amount of 
the claim, but failed to do so.  The court held that even if there was ground for setting aside of award, it was at the discretion 
of the court to do so since the Model Law provided that enforcement may be refused.  Therefore, the court dismissed the 
application for setting aside.  CLOUT Case No. 88, High Court of Hong Kong, 16 December 1994. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V95/529/10/IMG/V9552910.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 13 2015). 
609 The facts of the case are as follows.  The appellant terminated a franchise agreement with the respondent because the 
respondent filed to file business reports and to pay fees.  This matter was submitted to arbitration in the U.S. pursuant to an 
arbitration clause.  The arbitration clause contained a provision that excluded from arbitration matters arising from 
“…..termination by AAMCO which is based in whole or in part upon the fraudulent acts of Franchisees or Franchisee’s 
failure to deal with any customer or Franchisees’ failure to report his gross receipts to AAMCO….”.  The arbitral tribunal 
found in favor of the appellant and the appellant sought to have the award recognized and declared enforceable by the courts 
in Canada.  The court of first instance refused to be recognized the arbitral award, and on appeal, the issue was whether the 
award dealt with a matter which was not contemplated by or which was not falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration.  The appellate court found that the failure of the respondent to file business reports was explicitly mentioned in 
the arbitration clause as a non-arbitrable matter and dismissed the appeal upholding the decision of the court of first instance.  
CLOUT Case No. 67, Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, Canada, 17 September 1991. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V94/257/97/IMG/V9425797.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 14, 2015). 
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parties; thus, it has to be conducted in accordance with what the parties have agreed upon—or the rules 
that the parties have appointed.  If one party, however, determines that the arbitral tribunal has been 
constituted in a manner that is incompliant with the parties’ agreement, he or she must object to the 
irregular constitution of the tribunal during the arbitral proceedings (i.e., without waiting until the 
enforcement proceedings commence).610  
The last ground in paragraph (1) (a) is that recognition or enforcement may be refused when an 
award (i) is not binding, (ii) has been set aside, or (iii) has been suspended by the court in the State wherein 
the award was made.  In this provision, the meaning of the term ‘not binding,’ ‘being set aside,’ or ‘being 
suspended’ is that the award has already been cancelled in the place of arbitration.  Although some courts 
hold that a court has discretion to recognize or enforce an award (even if one of the grounds listed under 
Article 36 exists), the prevailing view is that the national courts are obliged to refuse to recognize or 
enforce an award that has been set aside in the State of origin.611   
                                                             
610 The facts of the case are as follows.  The plaintiff sought from the court leave to enforce an arbitral award which was 
rendered by the Shenzhen Subcommission of the CIETAC (THE China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission).  The defendant opposed the enforcement of the award on the grounds that the composition of arbitral tribunal 
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.  The parties agreed on arbitration by CIETAC, Beijing, but the 
arbitration was conducted by CIETAC, Shenzhen.  The court held that CIETAC, Shenzhen did not have jurisdiction to 
decide this dispute because a Chinese court would not allow a Shenzhen arbitrator, who could not arbitrate in Beijing, to 
decide a case that was referred to CIETAC, Beijing.  The court, however, found that the defendant waived its right to raise 
the jurisdictional objection because s/he participated in the Shenzhen arbitration without clearly reserving its right to later 
object to the award on the ground that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction.  Therefore, the court declared the award 
enforceable because it satisfied that the defendant basically obtained what it had agreed to.  CLOUT Case No. 76, High 
Court of Hong Kong, 13 July 1994. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V94/270/11/IMG/V9427011.pdf?OpenElement  (accessed on October 14, 2015). 
611 The facts of the case are as follows.  The applicant, a Russian company, entered into a contract with the respondent for the 
repair of a ship.  The contract contained an arbitration clause and it provided for arbitration before the “Arbitration 
Commission of the City of Moscow”.  When the respondent did not pay, the applicant filed a request for arbitration before 
the Arbitral Commission for Shipping Matters in Moscow.  The Commission declared itself to be competent arguing that 
even though it had not been explicitly named in the arbitration agreement, there was no other arbitral commission for 
shipping law in Moscow.  The Commission rendered an award in favor of the applicant, but it was later set aside by the 
competent court in Moscow holding that the arbitration agreement was not sufficiently certain about the arbitral institution.  
This decision was affirmed by the Highest Russian Court in Civil Matters, but the Vice-President of the Highest Court of 
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The second group for setting aside has two grounds and the court examines these grounds ex 
officio—just like the second group under Article 34 of the Model Law.  One is inarbitrability in paragraph 
(1) (b) (i) and the other is the violation of public policy in paragraph (1) (b) (ii).  If the subject matter of 
the dispute is inarbitrable under the State law of recognizing or enforcing and if this State is a Model Law 
country, the award may be refused in relation to recognition or enforcement.612  Also, if the recognition 
and enforcement of the arbitral award violate public policy within the recognizing or enforcing State (and 
this State is a Model Law country), recognition and enforcement may be refused therein.  
There are some key matters herein in the context of public policy.  First, the court may refuse to 
recognize or enforce the award on a public policy ground only if the recognition and enforcement of 
awards violate the essential morality of the recognizing or enforcing State.613  Second, the public policy 
objection can be related to procedural and substantive issues.614  Indeed, the public policy objection, in 
relation to the procedural issue, is mostly the violation of due process.  For example, when one party does 
not get a proper notice of commencement of arbitration and the award is rendered against him or her by 
default, this award may not be recognized or enforced if the method of communication therein (i.e., of 
                                                             
the Russian Federation challenged this decision, demanding a reappraisal of the case.  While that motion was still pending, 
the applicant moved for a declaration of recognition and enforceability of the award in Germany.  The German Court 
denied a declaration of recognition and enforceability under German law in conjunction with Article V (1) (e) of the New 
York Convention.  CLOUT Case No. 372, Oberlandesgericht Rostock, Germany, 1 Sch 3/99, 28 October 1999. 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/602/96/PDF/V0060296.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 14, 
2015). 
612 The scope of the arbitrability provisions of each model law country varies. 
613 The facts of the case are as follows.  The arbitral award included interest at the rate of 1.5% per month with no annual 
interest rate.  Section 4 of Canada’s Interest Act imposes limits on interest rates which are not expressed annually.  The 
respondent argued that enforcing the award would be contrary to public policy of Canada, so it should be refused under 
article 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law.  The court held that in order to refuse enforcement of the award, the award must be 
contrary to the essential morality of the enforcing State.  CLOUT Case No. 37, Ontario Court, Canada, 12 March 1993. 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/899/70/IMG/V9389970.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 14 
2015).  Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VIII, Article 36 in Loukas A. 
Mistelis(ed), op. cit., at 654. 
614 Id.  
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giving notice) is against the law of the recognizing or enforcing State.615  Conversely, the violation of 
substantive public policy is more related to the misapplication of the law.  For example, when the arbitral 
tribunal misapplies the interest rate associated with the award, the award may not be recognized or 
enforced on the ground of public policy violation.616  Nevertheless, it is possible for the court to examine 
                                                             
615 The facts of the case are as follows.  The decision, arising out of an action to have a foreign award declared enforceable, 
concerns the question of whether the buyer (Respondent) was duly informed about the arbitration, or whether his due 
process rights were violated.  The dispute arose out of a sales contract between a Russian seller (Claimant) and a German 
buyer (Respondent) and the contract contained an arbitral clause for arbitration before the Court of Arbitration of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the Russian Federation.  Because the buyer withheld part of the purchase price and invoked a 
set-off with a claim for damages, the seller initiated an arbitration proceeding.  The buyer did not attend the oral hearing 
and a decision in favor of the seller was rendered by default.  The seller sought enforcement of the award in Germany under 
the bilateral Agreement on Trade and Maritime Shipping between Germany and Russia of 1958. According to this 
Agreement, recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may only be refused if the award is either not considered final 
in the country where it was rendered or violates public policy in the country where enforcement is sought.  The buyer 
requested that enforcement had to be denied because he was not duly summoned to the arbitration proceeding.  The Court 
decided that the award which was final and enforceable in Russia, but it should not be recognized in Germany because the 
arbitral proceeding violated the principle of due process.  The right to be heard is fundamental to public policy and 
encompasses the right to be informed to a hearing in due time. Because the seller did not contest the buyer’s allegation that 
he never received a notice of arbitration, and on the basis of the evidence, the Court concluded that the buyer’s right to be 
heard was violated.  Under German law, the legal fiction of receipt is not sufficient for valid notice. Moreover, the Court 
stated that a duly dispatched notice should have resulted in a successful delivery as the buyer did not change its place of 
business.  As a result, the court held that fictitiously service violated German public policy irrespective of the fact that it 
was considered legal in accordance with the law of Russia.  CLOUT Case No. 402, Highest Regional Court of Bavaria, 
Germany, 16 March 2000. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V01/879/59/PDF/V0187959.pdf?OpenElement  (accessed on October 14, 2015). 
616 The facts of the case are as follows.  A dispute between two parties had been referred to arbitration in 1990.  The arbitrator 
issued his award in the matter in 1991. It was for an amount of some $700.000, plus interest which was to be calculated 
with effect from 1989.  The successful party applied to the High Court under Article 35 of the Model Law for the recognition 
and enforcement of the award.  The application was opposed under Article 36 of the Model Law on the basis that the award 
was contrary to public policy because it contravened the in duplum (the double) rule, which applies in terms of the Common 
Law of Zimbabwe and under which interest ceases to run when it equals the capital sum owing.  The High Court held that 
if the award were to be taken literally, i. e. by calculating interest with effect from 1989 to the date of the award, the sum 
payable in terms of the award would amount to over $17 million.  This result would be in conflict with the in duplum rule 
and would be contrary to public policy.  However, the High Court found that the arbitrator’s award was capable of being 
interpreted as being impliedly subject to the in duplum rule; and it could be recognized and enforced accordingly.  The 
High Court further ruled that interest beyond the double of the capital sum did not run during the arbitration proceedings.  
In the result, the award was recognized and enforced by the High Court with interest calculated on the capital sum until it 
reached the double.  Interest would also run, on the double, from the date of the award to the date of payment provided that 
once again, it did not breach the in duplum rule.  CLOUT Case No. 342, Harare High Court, Zimbabwe 1 March and 5 
April 2000. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/550/47/PDF/V0055047.pdf?OpenElement  (accessed on 
October 14 2015). 
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the substance of the dispute (i.e., the violation of substantive public policy), even when the court is not 
allowed to review the merit of the case.617 
 
5.4. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
The provisions about the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards are regulated in the last 
chapter (i.e., Chapter VIII).  
 
Article 35 (Recognition and enforcement) 
(1) An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, shall be 
recognized as binding and, upon application in writing to the competent court, 
shall be enforced subject to the provisions of this article and of article 36.  
(2) The party relying on an award or applying for its enforcement shall supply the 
original award or a duly certified copy thereof. If the award or arrangement is not 
made in an official language of this State, the court may request the party to supply 
a translation thereof into such language. 
 
The principle herein is that this provision exists to facilitate the automatic recognition of arbitral 
awards, which means that the prior confirmation (namely, on the place of arbitration or any other 
procedure) is not needed for an award to be recognized.618  Furthermore, when a national judgment 
                                                             
617 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VIII, Article 36 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 655. 
618 The facts of the case are as follows.  The Plaintiff sought to enforce in Ontario a final award which was issued in New York.  
The application was made after the right to appeal the award in New York had expired.  The defendant, however, argued 
that the award should not be enforced in Ontario because the plaintiff did not take any step to have the award confirmed 
and to make the award binding under the New York law.  Upon the defendant’s argument, the court held that it was not 
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confirms the award, this should not be considered a representation of any earlier judgment therein (i.e., 
confirming the award).619  Furthermore, via the principle of automatic recognition of arbitral awards, once 
the arbitral award is recognized, it has all the legal consequences of a domestic court judgment.620  As a 
result, the State of recognition determines the boundaries of the res judicata effect (vs. the place of 
arbitration).621   
Paragraph (2) was amended during the 2006 amendments to reflect the amendment in Article 7 on 
the form of the arbitration agreement—namely, a copy of the arbitration agreement is no longer required 
(to be presented) for the recognition of arbitral awards.622  This omission of the presentation of a copy of 
the arbitration agreement is recognized as extremely useful and practical by many arbitration practitioners; 
however, many parties do not keep original contracts containing the original arbitration agreements—
especially if the contracts were concluded a number of years earlier. 623   Moreover, an arbitration 
agreement is considered valid (i.e., as fulfilling a written requirement under Article 7) if its content is 
recorded in any form—regardless of whether it has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by any other 
                                                             
necessary for the foreign arbitral award to be confirmed in order to be enforceable in Ontario.  CLOUT Case No. 117, 
Ontario Court of Justice, 19 December 1994. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V95/604/92/IMG/V9560492.pdf?OpenElement  (accessed on October 12 2016). 
619 The facts of the case are as follows.  The parties, Schreter and Gaswmac, agreed to arbitrate under the law of the state of 
Georgia, U.S.A. and the place of arbitration was determined to be Atlanta.  An arbitral award was rendered in favor of 
Schreter and confirmed by the Georgia court.  Gasmac challenged the enforcement of the award in Ontario on a number of 
procedural grounds and one of them was that the award had merged in the Georgia court judgment so that it should be 
enforced in Ontario only as a foreign judgment, not an arbitral award.  Upon the challenge of Gasmac, the court held that 
there was no indication in article 35 of the Model Law that awards should be considered to merge in judgments which 
confirm them.   CLOUT Case No. 30, Ontario Court, Canada, 13 February 1992. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/899/70/IMG/V9389970.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on October 12 2-15). 
620 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VIII, Article 35 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 650. 
621 Id. 
622 Explanatory Note at para. 53. 
623 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter VIII, Article 35 in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. 
cit., at 650. 
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means.  Thus, if the parties have concluded a contract by conduct (i.e., without an actual written contract) 
and cannot present a copy of the arbitration agreement, they would find it difficult to enforce an arbitral 
award.  For these practical reasons (i.e., to support the effectiveness of arbitration), paragraph (2) is 
amended with Article 7. 
 
Chapter Four. The New Korean Arbitration Act (2016)624   
1. The Background of Amendment 
As noted in the Chapter Two, the Korean government adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law in its 
entirety in 1999; indeed, it utilized it in lieu of establishing a new Korean national arbitration law until 
October 2016 and believed that adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law could best enable a unified legal 
system in ICA.  Thus, although judicial litigation remains a dispute resolution system (DRS) that people 
still frequently utilize, arbitration has become more popular (e.g., due to neutrality, 625  international 
                                                             
624 As discussed in Chapter II, the Korean Arbitration Act (the KAA) has been partially amended three times since it was 
enacted in 1966.  After that, the KAA was wholly amended by adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1999, and has been 
partially amended four times.  The last version of the KAA is the KAA (2013), but because there was no change made 
comparing to the KAA (1999) in terms of contents, the previous version of the KAA is called as the KAA (1999).  So, the 
new revised one, which is the KAA (2016), will be compared with the KAA (1999) in Chapter IV. 
625 As arbitration is an agreement between contracting parties, they can determine the place of arbitration which is a neutral 
place to them.  
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effect,626 promptness,627 and confidentiality628) in business contexts and is thus more frequently used to 
settle commercial disputes.  As a result, the Korean government has recognized the importance of 
arbitration in business—and the necessity of amending the Korean Arbitration Act629 (hereinafter, ‘the 
KAA’).  
The Korean Ministry of Justice established a Committee (i.e., a group of lawyers and scholars who 
are specialized in arbitration) to (i) draft a revision of the KAA (after approximately 20 meetings from 
March 2013 to October 2014)630 and (ii) submit the draft to the National Assembly via the Ministry of 
Justice for approval in 2015.  When the Committee initially started discussing the amendment of the KAA 
(1999) in 2013, the Committee members had some disagreements about the amendment process; the 
suggestions included amending and adapting portions of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 as well as 
establishing a new law—on a par with England, Sweden, and France.631  After considering two different 
                                                             
626  Among the states which ratify the New York Convention (the United Nations Convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 1958), an arbitral award which is rendered in a contracting state has an international 
effect in other contracting states.  
627 Article 33 of International Arbitration Rules by the KCAB states that “1. Unless all parties agree otherwise, the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall make its Award within forty-five (45) days from the date on which final submissions are made or the hearings 
are closed whichever comes later.  2. The Secretariat may extend this time limit pursuant to a reasoned request from the 
Arbitral Tribunal or on its own initiative if it decides it is necessary to do so.”   
628 Article 52 of International Arbitration Rules by the KCAB specifies that “1. Arbitration proceedings, and records thereof, 
shall be closed to the public.  2. The members of the Arbitral Tribunal and the Secretariat, the parties and their 
representatives and assistants shall not disclose facts related to arbitration cases or facts learned through arbitration cases 
except where disclosure is consented to by the parties, required by law or required in court proceedings.” 
629 The Korean Ministry of Justice officially states the purpose of amendment.  The purpose of amendment of the KAA is to 
make Korea to be a favorable place for arbitration by making the Korean Arbitration Act more advanced and corresponding 
to the international standard.  In order to achieve this purpose, it broadens the scope of arbitrability, relaxes the writing 
requirement of arbitration agreement and makes the recognition or enforcement of arbitral award easy.  Cf. 
http://www.lawnb.com/lawinfo/link_view.asp?cid=1C6236B786284A83931D89A98A0DDAB4 
630 The Commentary of legislative history 
631 The members who made the second suggestion believed that when we adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1999, the 
whole Model Law was adopted as a Korean arbitration law because Korea did not have much experience and arbitration 
was very unfamiliar system in Korea.  Now, however, they claimed that Korea is able to draft its own law which can fit 
better in the Korean legal system. 
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suggestions, the majority of the Committee agreed that it was not an appropriate time to draft a brand-new 
arbitration law;632 for example, (i) it would have been difficult to advertise the law internationally at that 
time633 and (ii) unless the Model Law contained serious defects therein (i.e., incompatibilities with the 
national legal system), there would be no reason for changing the entire law.  Consequently, the 
Committee decided to partially amend the KAA via (i) the addition of provisions not otherwise included 
therein (i.e., within the Model Law) or (ii) an agreement to change the present provisions if necessary.634  
Upon the approval by the National Assembly on November 30, 2016, the KAA (2016) became effective. 
(Singapore and Hong Kong have their own provisions even though they adopted the Model Law.)635  
In this chapter, the revised KAA (2016) will be analyzed, based on the commentary in the legislative 
history636  to (i) explore the background of the amendment, (ii) analyze the revised provisions (and 
rationale for amending them), and (iii) clarify the issues, discussed by the Committee—and residual 
concerns therein (e.g., issues that may be addressed via future amendment).637  
 
                                                             
632 England and France are much developed countries in terms of arbitration and they claim that, because the basic principles 
in their laws are the same as those in the UNCITRAL Model Law, it is not necessary to abandon their laws in order to adopt 
the Model Law. Ho Won Lee, Feature: Legal and Practical Issues of International Construction Contracts; Recent 
Discussions on the Revision of Korean Arbitration Act - For the Promotion of the International Arbitration, 22(2) Journal 
of International Commercial Law Studies 1, 3 (2013).  
633 Korea aims to be a hub of international arbitration in Asia and amending the KAA is one of the measures taken to achieve 
this aim.  In this sense, drafting our own arbitration law would not help to make Korea to be a center of arbitration. 
634 Id. 
635 Id.  
636 This commentary was provided to the author by one member of the Committee for the study purpose only.  The original 
document is written in Korean and the KAA (2016) is also written in Korean.  There are no official English version for 
both, the commentary and the KAA (2016)s, yet.  Therefore, the author translated all contents of the documents into English 
considering the meaning of words written in Korean by consulting the member of the Committee if it was necessary in 
order to convey the meaning as accurately as possible. 
637 In fact, several issues were left out for the next amendment. 
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2. The Commencement of Arbitration 
2.1. Definition of Arbitration638 
The meaning of arbitration is defined in Article 3, which clarifies the definition of terms used in the 
Act—namely, arbitration, arbitration agreement, and arbitral tribunal.  There is no change in Articles 3.2 
and 3.3 therein (i.e., from the KAA (1999)); however, the text in Article 3.1 (which focuses on the 
definition of arbitration) has been revised in the KAA (2016).  
Article 3.1 defines arbitration as a procedure to settle a dispute via the decisions of an arbitrator and 
specifies the substantive scope of arbitration in detail.  Article 3.1 of the KAA (1999) states that disputes 
in private laws can be settled by arbitration; indeed, this is on a par with the wording in Article 1.  The 
Committee, however, agreed that the scope of arbitrability should be extended.  When the Korean 
arbitration statute was amended via the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1999, there was no 
thorough discussion about the scope of arbitrability.639  While the UNCITRAL Model Law states both 
territorial and substantive scopes of application in Article 1, the KAA states the territorial scope of 
application in Article 2 (1) under the title of ‘the scope of application’640; the substantial scope of 
                                                             
638 Chapter I of the KAA (2016) has seven provisions: purpose (Article 1), scope of application (Article 2), definitions (Article 
3), written notices (Article 4), forfeiture of right to object (Article 5), court intervention (Article 6) and competent court 
(Article 7). 
639 When Korea adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law as a national arbitration law in 1999, there were not enough human 
resources or experience to discuss the provisions of Model Law and adjust them into our own law.  So, Korea basically 
adopted the whole provisions of the Model Law and changed the order of the provisions so as to prevent them from 
conflicting with other Korean national laws. 
640 Article 2 of the KAA (1999) (Scope of Application) (1) This Act shall apply to cases where the place of arbitration under 
Article 21 is in the Republic of Korea: Provided, That Articles 9 and 10 shall apply even in cases where the place of 
arbitration is not yet determined or is not in the Republic of Korea, and Articles 37 and 39 shall apply even in cases where 
the place of arbitration is not in the Republic of Korea. (2) This Act shall not affect any other Act by virtue of which certain 
disputes may not be referred to arbitration or may be referred to arbitration only according to provisions, other than those 
of this Act, nor those treaties which come into operation in the Republic of Korea. 
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arbitration was determined in Article 3.1 under the title of ‘definition.’  
Both Articles 1 and 3.1 specified the substantive scope of application in the KAA (1999) and there 
was no difference in the two articles; however, in the KAA (2016), the substantive scope in Articles 1 and 
3.1 is different because only Article 3.1 has been amended.  Thus, although the Committee has suggested 
that both articles should be changed (because they both demonstrate the substantive scope), the final 
statutes show that only Article 3.1 has been changed.641  Consequently, as far as the arbitrability is 
concerned, Article 3.1 may be assumed to prevail over Article 1 because Article 1 is about the purpose of 
law whereas the text in Article 3.1 focuses on the definition of arbitration.642  Nevertheless, there is a lack 
of clarity herein associated with the interpretation and application of two different scopes of arbitrability. 
 
2.1.1. What Has Been Amended 
 
Article 3.1 of the KAA (1999) and the KAA (2016) are as follows. The revised parts are underlined.  
 
Article 3.1 of the KAA (1999) 
1. The term “arbitration” means a procedure to settle any dispute in private laws, 
not by the judgment of a court, but by the decision of an arbitrator, as agreed by 
the parties.  
 
Article 3.1 of the KAA (2016)643 
1.”Arbitration” means a procedure to settle any dispute involving an economic 
interest, not by the judgment of a court, but by the decision of an arbitrator, as 
agreed by the parties. Also, any dispute which does not involve economic interest, 
                                                             
641 No record can be found why the Committee’s suggestion was not accepted. 
642 In the KAA (2016), there is no clear ground that Article 3.1 prevails Article 1. 
643 While the KAA (1999) has an official English version, the KAA (2016) does not have one yet.  So, the author would like to 
make it sure that the English version of the KAA (2016) is translated by the author. 
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but can be resolved by an agreement of the parties may be settled by arbitration.644  
 
Ever since the Model Law was adopted, there was continuous discussion over whether the scope of 
arbitrability in Article 3.1 of the KAA (1999) was broad enough to address all disputes that were arbitrable 
in practice—not only in domestic arbitration but also in ICA.  
According to Article 3.1 of the KAA (1999), disputes in private laws were arbitrable;645 however, 
there has been a debate regarding the meaning of disputes in private laws and the interpretation of the 
scope of arbitrability.  Some say that there is no need to interpret it (i.e., it just needs to be applied as it 
says in the provision); thus, if a dispute is within the private law boundary in Korea, it is arbitrable646 (i.e., 
it not necessary to distinguish what is arbitrable vs. not arbitrable).  Others claim, however, that the 
substantive scope of arbitration should not be limited to disputes in private laws.  Indeed, even when a 
dispute is not within the private law boundary, the law should allow it to be settled by arbitration as long 
as it is disposable between the parties (i.e., does not harm the public interest).647  The rationale for this 
assertion is that disputes in public laws can be arbitrated if they do not necessarily need to be settled by 
                                                             
644 This provision was not translated literally.  It was translated based on section 1030 (1) of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure, which was referred to by the Committee. 
645 When the scope of arbitrability is concerned, Articles 1, 2 (2), and 3.1 should be considered together.  Under the different 
names of title, they specify the scope of arbitrability in different ways.  Article 2 (2) states, “This Act shall not affect any 
other Act in cases where the arbitral proceedings are not approved [where the dispute is not referred to arbitration] or where 
a dispute is referred to arbitration only according to provisions other than those of this Act, nor those treaties which come 
into operation in the Republic of Korea.”  So, Article 2 (2) provides three cases in which a dispute cannot be arbitrated; 
first, in which the arbitral proceedings are not approved, second, in which a dispute is referred to arbitration according to 
provisions other than those of this Act, and last, in which there is a treaty in effect in Korea.  Having interpreted these three 
cases mentioned above, the first one is the case in which other Korean laws prohibit the matter from being arbitrated even 
though it is under a private law to protect the public interest; the second one is the case in which other arbitration law is 
applicable; the last one is in which there is a treaty which excludes the application of the KAA. See, Sun Ju Jeong, Main 
Issues on Revision of Korean Arbitration Act, 69 Journal of Korean Law Study 211, 221(2013). 
646 Young Jun Mok, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW, Bak Young Sa, at 77. 
647 If it does not harm the public interest, the law should respect the parties’ agreement to avoid the judicial litigation.  Also, it 
is an international trend that the substantive scope of arbitrability gets broad. 
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the judicial litigation for the public interest.648  
After a heated discussion, the Committee decided to change the phrase that indicates the scope of 
arbitrability under Article 3.1. 649   They referred to Section 1030 (1) of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure650 and required that the statute include disputes that involve economic interests as well as the 
ones that are disposable between the parties without involving economic interest.651  The rationales for 
the amendment of Article 3.1 are (i) to eliminate the confusion about the interpretation of the phrase 
‘disputes in private laws’ and (ii) to extend the scope of arbitrability to areas that were not arbitrable in 
the past but are now.652  Indeed, by broadening the substantive scope of arbitrability in the KAA (2016), 
when disputes therein raise arguments about arbitrability (e.g., unfair trade and anti-trust laws and 
intellectual property rights and patent laws), they can be settled by arbitration in Korea.653  
 
2.1.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision  
 
Although the KAA (2016) ultimately broadens the scope of arbitrability, there are still several issues 
raised.  First, the meanings of some words in Article 3.1 are not clear; indeed, if the second part of Article 
3.1 is literally translated, it means “any dispute which does not involve property right, but can be resolved 
                                                             
648  Sun Ju Jeong, Main Issues on Revision of Korean Arbitration Act, 69 Journal of Korea Law Study 211, 221 (2013). 
649 As mentioned before, the Committee also changed the phrase in Article 1, which states the purpose of the law, but the final 
draft does not reflect the will of the Committee. 
650 Section 1030 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Arbitrability) (1) Any claim involving an economic interest can be 
subject to an arbitration agreement.  An arbitration agreement concerning claims not involving an economic interest shall 
have legal effect to the extent that the parties are entitled to conclude a settlement on the issue in dispute.   
651 If Article 3.1 of the KAA (2016) is translated literally, it can be translated like, ”Arbitration” means a procedure to settle 
any dispute regarding property rights as well as non-property rights that can be resolved by reconciliation between parties, 
not by the judgment of a court, but by arbitration as agreed by the parties”. 
652 Kang, Su-Mi, The Arbitrability of the Subject-matter of a Dispute on the Antitrust Law, 20(1) Journal of Arbitration Studies 
41, 41 (2010). 
653 The anti-trust law and patent law are not private laws according to the Korean law system. 
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by reconciliation may be settled by arbitration.”  Here, the meanings of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘property right’ 
are not clear.  Indeed, even though the Committee uses these words, they cannot reach an agreement 
regarding the meanings of these words;654 for example, it can be interpreted based on Section 1030 of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure (which is referenced in this provision) as the legislative history states.  
As a result, because there is no official English version of the KAA (2016) yet, the author translates the 
second part of Article 3.1 to “any dispute which does not involve economic interest, but can be resolved 
by an agreement of the parties may be settled by arbitration’ by taking Section 1030 of the German Code 
of Civil Procedure.  Thus, when a dispute can be resolved by an agreement of the parties (even if it is 
within public laws), it is arbitrable as long as it is a contractual matter; resolving, by an agreement of the 
parties, may mean that the parties can settle their disputes without the government authority being involved.  
Following this interpretation, the substantive scope of application includes matters addressed by both 
private and public laws—but disposable by the parties.  Nonetheless, how this phrase should be interpreted 
and understood is still debatable.655 
Second, it may be interpreted herein (i.e., in the KAA (2016)) that matters in patent and anti-trust 
laws are arbitrable; however, it is still not clear whether the KAA (2016) allows all matters in these laws 
to be arbitrated or not. 656   Thus, some members in the Committee have suggested providing more 
guidelines herein (i.e., on the matters in patent and anti-trust law that are arbitrable), while others have 
suggested leaving Article 3.1 as it is in the KAA (1999) and just adding some exceptional provisions (or 
                                                             
654 The Commentary of the legislative history. p.2. 
655 It will get clearer through the case study after the KAA (2016) is applied in Korea. 
656 The committee adopts Section 1030 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, but in Germany there is not one clear answer 
to the issue of whether the dispute regarding the validity of paten is arbitrable or not.  In Korea, the scope of arbitration has 
been extended to the patent law area, but the matter as to the validity of patent is not arbitrable yet. 
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special rules or regulations) therein via the provision of a list of arbitrable matters.657  Also, if the KAA 
(2016) states that “any dispute which does not involve economic interest, but can be resolved by an 
agreement of the parties may be settled by arbitration,” the scope of arbitrability is not certain enough.  
Thus, there is still a possibility that the statute will be interpreted differently case by case, and there will 
be inconsistent decisions over the scope of arbitrability in patent law and anti-trust laws.658  
Third, if the KAA (2016) is interpreted as it is stated therein, it may be interpreted that family matters 
(e.g., divorces and adoptions) are arbitrable; however, this is not true.  Thus, some members have 
suggested specifying clearly that the family matters are not arbitrable in the KAA (2016) to avoid an 
incorrect interpretation; however, the KAA (2016) is silent on this matter.   
Lastly, the KAA (2016) states that any dispute involving economic interest is arbitrable and an 
arbitrable dispute is not limited to private laws.  Consequently, although investment matters belong to the 
public law, they can be governed by the KAA (2016) because investment arbitration involves economic 
interests.  Thus, some members of the Committee have suggested that the provisions therein (i.e., 
regarding investment arbitration) should have been drafted and inserted in the KAA (2016) because they 
believed that there would be some limitation and inappropriateness in applying the KAA (2016) to 
investment arbitration; however, this suggestion was not taken.  
 
                                                             
657 Yun, Sun-Hee, Lee, Heon-Hui, A study on the Possibility of Patent Arbitration, 22(1) Journal of Arbitration Studies 111, 
111 (2012). 
658 The Commentary of the legislative history. p.2. 
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2.2. Arbitration Agreement 
Ever since the UNCITRAL Model Law was amended in 2006, the necessity of amending the KAA 
has been discussed.  Indeed, as the KAA (1999) was based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, it seemed 
necessary to revise the KAA (1999) by following the international standard; in fact, the 2006 amendment 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law was one of the reasons for the amendment of the KAA (1999).  
As previously discussed (in Chapter III), the focus of Article 7 in the UNCITRAL Model Law—
the form of the arbitration agreement—is a provision that was most significantly amended in the 2006 
amendment.  Although the UNCITRAL Model Law does not specify a preference herein (i.e., between 
Options I and II),659 the KAA includes Option I within Article 8 because it corresponds with the existing 
provision and case law in Korea.660  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
659 Part Two; Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as amended in 2006, 1 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendments as 
Adopted in 2006, 2008, para. 19 
660 Consequently, the Committee decided to revise Article 8 based on the existing KAA (1999) by omitting some parts and 
adding some detailed conditions. The Committee agreed to omit Article 8 (1), which states that that an arbitration agreement 
could exist as a separate agreement or as an arbitral clause in a main contract.  Although the purpose of this provision is to 
indicate that an arbitration agreement could be made either before or after the dispute arises, it can be interpreted to limit 
the forms of arbitration agreement, either as a separate agreement or an arbitral clause in a main contract.  The Committee’s 
suggestion was not accepted, however. 
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2.2.1. What Has Been Amended 
Article 8 of the KAA (1999) and the KAA (2016) are as follows. The revised parts are 
underlined.  
 
Article 8 of the KAA (1999) (Forms of Arbitration Agreement)661 
(1) Arbitration agreement may be in the form of separate agreement or in the 
form of an arbitration clause in a contract. 
(2) Arbitration agreement shall be in writing. 
(3) Agreement failing under any of the following subparagraphs shall be deemed 
a written arbitration agreement:  
1. Where a document signed by the parties contains arbitration agreement; 
2. Where a document exchanged by means of letters, telex, telegrams, fax or 
other means of communication contains arbitration agreement; 
3. Where one party alleges that statements of the documents exchanged between 
the parties contain arbitration agreement, and the other party does not deny it. 
(4) Where a contract cites a document containing an arbitration clause, 
arbitration agreement shall be deemed to have made: Provided, That this shall be 
limited to cases where the contract is prepared in writing, and includes an 
arbitration clause in the contract.662  
 
                                                             
661 This provision corresponds to Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
662 The official English version of the KAA (1999) states that “this shall be limited to cases where the contract is prepared in 
writing, and includes an arbitration clause in the contract.”  This translation is, however, not accurate.  This sentence means 
that the contract includes an arbitration clause in the contract, and it does not make sense at all.  It is not what this provision 
tries to mean.  This provision is talking about the case in which the contract refers to a separate document which contains 
an arbitration agreement, not a contract which contains an arbitration agreement.  On the contrary, the Korean version of 
the KAA (1999) delivers the right meaning of what it intends to do. 
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Article 8 of the KAA (2016) 
(1) Arbitration agreement may be in the form of separate agreement or in the 
form of an arbitration clause in a contract. 
(2) Arbitration agreement shall be in writing. 
(3) Agreement failing under any of the following subparagraphs shall be deemed 
a written arbitration agreement:  
1. Where the content is recorded in any form irrespective of whether or not the 
arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by 
other means.  
2. Where a document exchanged by means of telex, telegrams, fax, electronic 
mail or other electronic means of communication contains arbitration 
agreement; this shall be limited to cases where the information contained therein 
is accessible so as to be useable for subsequent reference. 
3. Where one party alleges that an arbitration agreement is contained in an 
exchange of statements of claim and defense, and the other party does not deny it. 
(4) Where a contract cites a document containing an arbitration clause, 
arbitration agreement shall be deemed to have made; this shall be limited to 
cases where the reference is such as to make that clause part of the contract.663  
 
There is no change in Article 8 (1) and (2).  Thus, an arbitration agreement can be made either as 
an arbitration clause in a contract or as a separate agreement; however, it must be in writing.  The revised 
portion in the KAA (2016) is Article 8 (3), which provides cases wherein the arbitration agreement is 
considered in writing.664  In the KAA (2016), the writing requirement is much more relaxed and the scope 
                                                             
663 The translation of this part is taken from Article 7 (6) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
664 The KAA (2016) adopts the option I of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006). 
 １６５ 
 
of writing has been broadened.665  
Article 8 (3) of the KAA (1999) and KAA (2016) provide three examples that can be deemed an 
arbitration agreement in writing; however, there are small differences.  First, Article 8 (3) 1 focuses on a 
document that contains an arbitration agreement.  The KAA (1999) requires the signatures of both 
contracting parties in written arbitration agreements; however, the KAA (2016) accepts any content that 
is recorded in any form within “written” arbitration agreements.666  Indeed, this reflects the business 
practice wherein a contract can be concluded orally, by conduct, or by any other means.  Thus, this 
provision ensures that a written arbitration agreement does not mean that the arbitration agreement must 
exist in a written form; indeed, an arbitration agreement can be recorded in any form and still be valid.667  
Thus, the methods of recording do not matter; such agreements could be made orally, by conduct, or by 
any other means.668  This provision thus confirms that arbitration begins with the autonomy of parties, 
beginning with the agreement—and this intention should be respected no matter how it is recorded;669 it 
should simply be clear how the contracting parties have agreed to arbitrate.670   
Second, the text in Article 8 (3) 2 is focused on the validity of an arbitration agreement that is 
                                                             
665 Some members of the Committee suggested adopting option II of the UNCITRAL Model Law, but the committee concluded 
that adopting option II is too advanced. 
666 It means that as long as the agreement for arbitration is recognizable and its contents, which are necessary to do arbitration, 
are recorded, an arbitration agreement is in writing. 
667 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 89Daka 20252, April 10, 1990 (S. Kor.)  The court held that according to Article 2 of the New York 
Convention, a writing requirement of arbitration agreement is fulfilled by a written agreement which indicates the parties’ 
agreement to submit their dispute to arbitration, although it does not specify the place of arbitration, an arbitral institution, 
or the governing law. 
668 As regards the record of arbitration agreement, the provision does not specify who should record, when it should be recorded 
or how detailed contents it should have.  It just makes clear that as long as it has a record of agreement to arbitrate for their 
dispute, it fulfills a writing requirement. 
669 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 89Daka 20252, April 10, 1990 (S. Kor.) 
670 So, the following cases are considered to fulfill the writing requirement, for example; a contract which both parties signed, 
or a document which was prepared by one party and exchanged between the parties, or in the cases in which one party 
offers orally and the other party accepts it in writing, or the parties confirm in writing later after they agree to arbitrate 
orally.  Kwang Hyun Suk, Proposals for the Revision of the Korean Arbitration Act – with a Focus on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Seoul Law Journal, 53 Seoul Law Journal 533, 542 (2012). 
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inserted in a document made by electronic means of communication (e.g., telegraph, fax, and email); this 
provision states that if the consent to arbitration is recognizable, the arbitration agreement therein (i.e., 
contained in a document exchanged by electronic means of communication) is in writing.  Thus, as long 
as the information about arbitration is accessible, any document can be considered as an arbitration 
agreement in writing when it contains this information—irrespective of the method used for 
communication by the parties.  As to the methods of communications, the KAA (2016) takes out ‘letters’ 
from the list but adds the electronic means into it.  This change does not have any particular meaning; it 
simply reflects a change in a modern society wherein email or other electronic methods are becoming 
more common methods of communication. 
Lastly, the text in Article 8 (3) 3 is focused on the statements of claim and defense.  The KAA (1999) 
does not specify the document wherein a party should claim the existence of an arbitration agreement; it 
simply states that if one party claims the existence of an arbitration agreement in a document that both 
parties have exchanged, the arbitration agreement is in writing.  As to this, the Committee has agreed that 
the document wherein a party must claim the existence of an arbitration agreement (and by when the other 
party should object to it) should be clear.671  Thus, under the KAA (2016), an arbitration agreement is 
considered to be in writing if one party claims the existence of arbitration agreement in a statement of 
claim and the other party does not object to it in a statement of defense.  
The last difference, in Article 8, between the KAA (1999) and KAA (2016) is the reference in a 
contract.  While both consider an arbitration agreement to exist if a main contract refers to a document 
that contains an arbitration clause (and that document is part of a contract), Article 8 of the KAA (1999) 
                                                             
671 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 4 
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states that “the contract should be prepared in writing”; however, this condition is not mentioned in the 
KAA (2016).672  However, since the writing requirement is newly regulated in Article 8 (3), this should 
not be detrimental; it should simply be emphasized via Article 8 (4) of the KAA (2016) that there is a 
valid arbitration agreement in writing if the document therein (i.e., referring to the contract) is part of a 
contract and contains an arbitration agreement.    
One concern herein (i.e., based on the relaxed writing requirement) is that Article 8 (3) could 
conflict with the New York Convention, which requires a stricter definition—namely, Article II of the 
New York Convention requires an arbitration agreement to be (i) included as an arbitral clause within a 
contract or a separate arbitration agreement (that is signed by the parties) or (ii) an agreement contained 
in an exchange of letters or telegrams.  As the provision of Convention is stricter (in terms of a writing 
requirement), there could be cases wherein a writing requirement is fulfilled under the KAA or the 
UNCITRAL Model Law but not under the New York Convention;673 nevertheless, once an arbitral award 
is rendered, there is no difficulty in its recognition or enforcement under Article VII of the New York 
Convention.674  Article VII. 1 of the Convention states that the Convention does not deprive the parties of 
a right to rely on any applicable law therein.675  For example, according to Article VII. 1 of the Convention, 
                                                             
672 As to the writing requirements, Articles 8 (2) (a), (b) and (c) are applicable.  So, it is better to omit the phrase, ‘where the 
contract is prepared in writing,’ because it could bring about the confusion. 
673 In Supreme Court [S. Ct.], Sungo 2004Da20180, December 10 2004 (S. Kr), the Korean Supreme Court held that when the 
claimant submitted the case to the Vietnam International Arbitration Center and the defendant did not object to the 
submission of arbitration, even though there was an implied arbitration agreement, it could not be interpreted as that there 
was a valid arbitration agreement under Article 2 of the New York Convention.  In this case, the Korean Supreme Court 
approved that an implied arbitration agreement was valid, but denied that an implied arbitration agreement fulfilled a writing 
requirement under the New York Convention. 
674  Sun Ju Jeong, op. cit., at. 218. 
675 Article VII. 1 of the New York Convention: The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of 
multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the 
Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the 
manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon. 
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when the arbitral award is rendered based on an arbitration agreement that does not satisfy the writing 
requirement under the New York Convention, it can be recognized or enforced in Korea as long as the 
arbitration agreement validly exists under the KAA.    
 
2.2.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
There was no special issue raised concerning this provision.  The Committee simply agreed that it 
is necessary to make the writing requirement relaxed due to current trends in ICA.  However, while there 
are some jurisdictions or states that completely eliminate the writing requirement in arbitration agreements, 
the majority of the Committee agreed that this is far too advanced.676  They noted that because most 
arbitration laws still require an arbitration agreement in writing (and with consideration of the importance 
and meaning of the existence of valid arbitration agreements), it is not advisable to permit oral arbitration 
agreements via the KAA.677  
 
3. Composition of Arbitral Tribunal 
Chapter III of the KAA (2016) has provisions that focus on the arbitral tribunal.  Namely, it has 
eight articles: number of arbitrators (Article 11), appointment of arbitrators (Article 12), grounds for 
                                                             
676 The French Code of Civil Procedure abolished the form requirement of arbitration agreement in international arbitration.  
Article 1507 of Chapter I – International Arbitration Agreement: An arbitration agreement shall not be subject to any 
requirement as to its form. 
677 As having a valid arbitration agreement means that the parties are prevented from using a judicial litigation system, it is 
crucial to know the intention of both parties.  In this sense, approving an oral arbitration agreement is not appropriate.  Sun 
Ju Jeong, op. cit. at. 216. 
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challenge (Article 13), procedures for challenge (Article 14), termination of mandate of arbitrator due to 
a failure of impossibility to act therein (Article 15), appointment of substitute arbitrator (Article 16), ruling 
of arbitral tribunal on its jurisdiction (Article 17), and interim measure (Article 18).  
 
3.1. Appointment of Arbitrators 
Article 12 is about the appointment of arbitrators;678 the principle therein is party autonomy—
namely, the parties can agree on the procedure for appointing arbitrators.  Indeed, there is not much change 
in this provision.  In the KAA (2016), however, there is one more appointing institution utilized as a third 
appointing party—namely, when the contracting parties require a third party to appoint an arbitrator.  
 
3.1.1. What Has Been Amended 
The following is Article 12 of the KAA (2016) and the revised parts are underlined. 
 
Article 12 of the KAA (2016) 
(1) No person shall be precluded by reason of his/her nationality from acting as 
an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.  
(2) The parties shall be free to agree on a procedure of appointing arbitrators. 
                                                             
678 This provision corresponds to Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
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(3) Failing such agreement under paragraph (2), arbitrators shall be appointed 
according to the following classification: 
1. In arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties are unable to agree on an 
arbitrator within thirty days after a party has received a request for initiating the 
procedure for his/her appointment from the other party; he/she shall be appointed, 
upon request of either party, by the court, or by the arbitral institution appointed 
by the court.  
2. In arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, 
and the two arbitrators thus appointed shall agree on the third arbitrator. In such 
cases, if a party fails to appoint the arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of a 
request to do so from the other party, or if the two arbitrators appointed fail to 
agree on the third arbitrator within thirty days of their appointment, the 
appointment shall be made, upon request of either party, by the court or by the 
arbitral institution appointed by the court. 
 
As to Article 12 (3) of the KAA (1999), there were concerns herein about whether it was efficient 
for the court to appoint an arbitrator.  Indeed, every court is expected to appoint the most appropriate 
person for a dispute after considering his or her career, experience as an arbitrator, nationality, and other 
relevant factors.  In reality, however, it is not easy for a court to find and appoint an ideally suited arbitrator 
unless there is a specialized court for arbitration—or the court has an exclusive department for 
arbitration.679  Furthermore, when a foreign law is designated as a substantive governing law for a dispute, 
the court has to find a foreign arbitrator who knows the law; however, this can be quite challenging.680  
                                                             
679 Sun Ju Jeong, op. cit., at. 222. 
680 Id. 
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Conversely, an arbitral institution is in a better position to efficiently appoint an appropriate 
arbitrator because it is a specialized body organized only for arbitration.681  All members of the Committee 
agreed on this and thus the KAA (2016) requires the arbitral institution to appoint an arbitrator when it is 
necessary—or upon the request of contracting parties.  
This change was made for practical reasons.  (1) The arbitral institution is better at appointing the 
most appropriate arbitrators in certain areas of disputes because it is a specialized institution.  Indeed, the 
KCAB has a wide pool of potential arbitrators in various areas and updates its list therein every year.  (2) 
The arbitral institution can more quickly appoint an arbitrator.  Thus, one considerable advantage of 
arbitration is that arbitration proceedings are generally faster (vs. judicial litigation) since the sole focus 
of an arbitral institution is arbitration, whereas the court deals with all other matters.  (3) Especially in 
ICA, if the court appoints the arbitrator, it is not easy to deliver the notice regarding the appointment of 
an arbitrator.  Indeed, provisions of timely notices are very important in arbitration because if a party does 
not get a proper notice during proceedings, the rendered arbitral award may be subsequently set aside 
(because of the defect in the arbitration proceedings).  Indeed, when arbitral institutions serve as 
appointing authorities, communications between the parties and institutions will be more efficient.  Thus, 
the Committee decided to add the arbitral institution as an appointing party referring to (i) Article 11 of 
                                                             
681 Also, if the arbitral institution appoints an arbitrator, it could prevent the arbitral proceedings from being delayed because 
an institution has its own arbitral rules regulated and the appointing process is subject to that rule which usually sets the 
time-limit for appointment. 
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the UNCITRAL Model Law,682 (ii) Article 13 of the Singapore Arbitration Act,683 and (iii) Article 24 of 
the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance.684  
 
3.1.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
All members of the Committee agreed that there has to be an appointing authority when one party 
fails to appoint an arbitrator or the contracting parties cannot agree on an arbitrator.  However, during the 
drafting process, there were three different suggestions on adding an arbitral institution as an appointing 
authority.  The first suggestion was not to amend the provision because Article 12 (3) was just fine as it 
was; the rationale herein was that it is appropriate for the court to have sole authority to appoint an 
arbitrator.  Indeed, they claimed that there could be an issue of unfairness if one specific arbitral institution 
is given the authority to appoint an arbitrator, especially for a domestic arbitration.  Since there is no 
difference in the KAA between domestic and international arbitration, this regulation also applies to 
domestic arbitration; however, in domestic arbitration, issues of unfairness can be raised when a private 
institution gets the power to appoint an arbitrator and gives this arbitrator the power to make a final 
decision.685   
                                                             
682 Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is almost same as Article 12 of the KAA.  The Model Law states that the court or 
other specified authority in Article 6 can appoint an arbitrator.  Article 6 is about the court and the arbitral institution that 
should perform the functions referred to in the law.  
683 Article 13 (3) (b) of the Singapore Arbitration Act: (3) Where the parties fail to agree on a procedure for appointing the 
arbitrator or arbitrators - (b) in an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties are unable to agree on the arbitrator, the 
arbitrator shall be appointed, upon the request of a party, by the appointing authority. 
684 Article 24 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance is exactly same as Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
685 As the Republic of Korea is a small country, the fairness of arbitrators could be more vulnerable.  Arbitration industry is 
really competitive and an arbitral institution is a private one, so some members of the Committee concerned about whether 
an arbitral institution can play a proper role as a fair appointing authority.  
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The second suggestion was to amend the provision by giving appointing authority to the arbitral 
institution only when there is a request by either of the contracting parties.  The suggested provision was 
that ‘… he/she shall be appointed by the court, or, upon request of either of parties, by the arbitral 
institution.’686  As to the second suggestion, the provision says “… he/she shall be appointed, upon request 
of either of parties, by the court OR the arbitral institution”; thus, it is not clear which body herein (i.e., 
whether the court or arbitral institution) has a prior authority to appoint an arbitrator when requested by a 
party.  Moreover, if one party requests the court to appoint an arbitrator and, at the same time, the other 
party asks the arbitral institution to appoint an arbitrator, the provision cannot give an answer to the 
question herein (i.e., which one has the appointing authority).  Another ambiguous point is the definition 
of arbitral institution in this provision; although there is only one arbitral institution in Korea—the Korean 
Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB)—this does not necessarily mean that the arbitral institute, in this 
provision, is the KCAB.  
The third suggestion was to get rid of the ambiguous points that were raised in the second suggestion 
by amending the provision via such wording as ‘by the court or by the arbitral institution appointed by the 
court’; indeed, the adjustment of such a phrase clarifies that the court has a prior authority to appoint an 
arbitrator.  Furthermore, if the court must ask an arbitral institution to appoint an arbitrator, the court will 
nominate the arbitral institution—no matter which institution the court wants to nominate.  Thus, a party 
must submit a request to a court when seeking the appointment of an arbitrator, according to this provision; 
                                                             
686 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 7.  
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the court herein appoints the arbitrator by itself or the arbitral institution (for the appointment of an 
arbitrator).687  
 
3.2. Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal 
Article 17 is about the competence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction.688  While the 
KAA (1999) adopts Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the structure of the provision is different.  
 
3.2.1. What Has Been Amended 
The KAA (2016) keeps the existing provision of the KAA (1999) as it is; however, some sections 
herein (e.g., regarding the negative ruling on the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction) are added in paragraph (6) 
and a new paragraph (9) is drafted.689  The followings are paragraphs (6) and (9) of the KAA (2016) and 
the changes are underlined.  
                                                             
687 In Korea, there is only one arbitral institution, which is the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB).  So, it is clear 
that the arbitral institution which is appointed by the court in Korea under the KAA will be mostly the KCAB.  Some 
members of the Committee suggested specifying the name of the KCAB, but the Committee decided not to specify it.  The 
reason for this is that specifying the name of certain national arbitration institute in the national statute does not look 
appropriate.  So, the Committee decided, instead of specifying the name of KCAB, to make a guideline for the court saying 
that the court should nominate the KCBA for the appointment of arbitrators when it is necessary.  By doing so, the case in 
which the court nominates a foreign arbitral institution for international commercial arbitration will be removed. 
688 This provision corresponds to article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
689 Article 17 of the KAA (2016) (As most provisions are same as ones in the KAA (1999), revised parts are underlined) (1) 
The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of 
the arbitration agreement.  In such cases, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other clauses of the contract.  (2) A plea concerning the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction shall be raised by 
not later than the submission of the statement of defense.  In such cases, a party shall not be precluded from raising such 
plea by the fact that he/she has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator.  (3) A plea that the arbitral 
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Article 17 of the KAA (Ruling of Arbitral Tribunal on its Jurisdiction) 
 (6) If the arbitral tribunal rules as preliminary question that it has jurisdiction or 
it does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (5), any party who is dissatisfied 
with that ruling may request, within thirty days after having received notice thereof, 
the court to decide on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.  
(9) If the court decides that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction under paragraph 
(6), the arbitral tribunal should continue the arbitral proceedings. In a case where 
the arbitrator cannot continue the arbitral proceedings or he/she does not want to 
continue it, the mandate of arbitrator terminates and a new arbitrator should be 
appointed under Article 16. 
 
As raised in Chapter III (wherein Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is discussed), what is 
the next step for the parties when the arbitral tribunal makes a negative ruling on its jurisdiction?  Indeed, 
the KAA (1999) does not contain any answer to this question and is thus similar to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law in this regard.  In a situation like this, there could indeed be nowhere for the parties to go to settle 
their disputes if the arbitral tribunal rejects the case due to a lack of jurisdiction; the parties would have to 
                                                             
tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its 
authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings.  (4) The arbitral tribunal may, in either case of paragraphs (2) and (3), 
admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified.  (5) The arbitral tribunal may rule a plea under paragraph (2) or (3) 
either as a preliminary question or in an arbitral award on the merits.  (6) If the arbitral tribunal rules as preliminary question 
that it has jurisdiction or it does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (5), any party who is dissatisfied with that ruling 
may request, within thirty days after having received notice thereof, the court to decide on the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal.  (7) While a request under paragraph (6) is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings or 
make an arbitral award.  (8) No appeal shall be filed against the review of the authority which is concluded by a court 
following request therefor under paragraph (6).  (9) If the court decides that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction under 
paragraph (6), the arbitral tribunal should continue the arbitral proceedings.  In a case where the arbitrator cannot continue 
the arbitral proceedings or he/she does not want to continue it, the mandate of arbitrator terminates and a new arbitrator 
should be appointed under Article 16. 
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bring the case to the court.  If the court, however, rejects the case again because it finds that the arbitral 
tribunal has jurisdiction, where can the parties go?690  The Committee has agreed that there must be a way 
that the parties can appeal against a negative ruling on the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction; otherwise, the 
agreement to arbitrate between the parties is disregarded and their options herein are severely limited.691   
The Committee amended Article 17 by adding “or it does not have jurisdiction” in paragraph (6).  
Thus, the contracting parties can now appeal the arbitral tribunal’s decision herein (i.e., to the court) 
regardless of whether the decision of the arbitral tribunal on its jurisdiction is positive or negative.  
Consequently, the parties can request that the court examine a decision when the arbitral tribunal decides 
that it does not have jurisdiction.  Conversely, the arbitral tribunal should continue the arbitral proceedings 
if the court finds the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal positive, according to Article 17 (9), which is a 
newly drafted paragraph.692  On this topic, the Committee referred to (i) Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 
1996,693 (ii) Article 1465 of the French Code of Civil Procedure,694 and (iii) Article 10 of the Singapore 
Arbitration Act.695  
Article 17 (6) provides the parties with a right to get a second opinion regarding the jurisdictional 
matter and Article 17 (9) guarantees the parties a right to arbitrate when the court finds the arbitral 
                                                             
690 The same issue is discussed in Chapter III in which Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is analyzed. 
691 Commentary in the legislative history, p.9 
692 In this context, the role of court should be remained as an assistance of arbitration proceedings.  
693 Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (Competence of tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction) (1) Unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction, that is, as to (a) whether there is a valid 
arbitration agreement, (b) whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and (c) what matters have been submitted to 
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement.  (2) Any such ruling may be challenged by any available arbitral 
process of appeal or review or in accordance with the provisions of this Part. 
694 Article 1465 of the French Code of Civil Procedure: The arbitral tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to rule on objections to 
its jurisdiction.  
695 Article 21 (4) of the Singapore Arbitration Act: (4) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised 
not later than the submission of the statement of defense.  
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tribunal’s jurisdiction positive.  These provisions, however, give an impression that the decision of the 
court (vs. arbitral tribunal) prevails because they imply that the arbitral tribunal has to arbitrate if the court 
orders it to do so.  Thus, Article 17 (9) of the KAA (2016) adds one condition—namely, it states that if an 
arbitrator cannot or will not continue the arbitral proceedings, he or she can cease the arbitration.696  If the 
arbitrator decides to cease the arbitration, the mandate of this arbitrator terminates and a new arbitrator 
will be appointed (according to Article 16).697  This provision does not intend to compel the original 
arbitrator to carry on the arbitral proceedings by the court’s order.  Indeed, the only purposes of paragraph 
(9) are (i) to give the parties an opportunity to get a second opinion from the court regarding the arbitral 
tribunal’s decision on its jurisdiction (irrespective of whether its decision is positive or negative) and (ii) 
to remove the possibility that the parties will be compelled to settle their dispute via judicial litigation 
because of the arbitrator’s judgment.   
 
3.2.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
There were also two responses to the concern that the parties do not have an opportunity to get a 
second opinion from the court when the arbitral tribunal finds its jurisdiction negative.  The first 
suggestion was to make the arbitral tribunal’s decision herein (i.e., on its jurisdiction) a provisional (vs. 
final) one. 698   Thus, if the arbitral tribunal finds its jurisdiction negative, it just stops the arbitral 
                                                             
696 The court can order the arbitrator to do arbitration if it finds a positive jurisdiction of the arbitrator, but the arbitrator also 
has a right to decide whether s/he continue the arbitration or not.  Article 17(9) of the KAA (2016) is not drafted to enforce 
the arbitrator who does not want to do arbitration to continue the arbitral proceedings. 
697 Article 16 of the KAA (1999) (Appointment of Substitute Arbitrator) When, in consequence of the termination of the 
mandate of an arbitrator, a substitute arbitrator is appointed, he/she shall be so done in conformity with the procedure that 
is followed for the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.  There is no change in article 16 in the KAA (2016). 
698 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 10. 
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proceedings and declares the termination of arbitration.  In this case, the parties can start new arbitration 
again with a newly formed arbitral tribunal.  However, the suggestion herein (i.e., making the arbitral 
tribunal’s decision a provisional one) was rejected because it is against the principle that the arbitral 
tribunal’s decision is final.699  
The other suggestion was to adopt Section 1032 (2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure.700  
Section 1032 (2) states that the parties may request the court to decide whether or not the arbitral tribunal 
has jurisdiction before the arbitral tribunal is formed.701  However, this suggestion was not accepted, 
because it can raise other issues; for example, if the court finds that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction, 
does the arbitral tribunal have to commence the arbitration without having the opportunity to make its 
own decision on its jurisdiction?  Or, what is the next step if the arbitral tribunal refuses to do arbitration 
because of the lack of jurisdiction—even after the court finds that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction?  
Indeed, there is no reason to ask the court to make a decision on the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal 
before the arbitral tribunal is actually formed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
699 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 10. 
700 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 10. 
701 Section 1032 (2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure: (2) Prior to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, an application 
may be made to the court to declare whether or not arbitration is admissible. 
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4. Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings 
4.1. Interim Measure 
Article 18 of the KAA is about the interim measure.  Indeed, this provision has changed the most 
in the KAA (2016)—just like Article 17 in the UNCITRAL Model Law.702  The UNCITRAL Model Law 
makes the interim measure (which is issued by the arbitral tribunal) recognizable and enforceable and 
many jurisdictions and states have amended their own national arbitration statutes to confirm the 
recognition and enforcement of the interim measure herein (i.e., granted by the arbitral tribunal).703  Also, 
when states are advanced in arbitration, they generally make the interim measure recognizable and 
enforceable; thus, the Korean Ministry of Justice realizes that the KAA has to be revised in the same way 
to follow up the current trend.704 
As a result, the Committee has decided to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law with some 
modifications, except that the provisions herein address preliminary orders.  Indeed, the KAA (2016) 
rearranges the paragraphs of the UNCITRAL Model Law by combining or dividing them.705  However, 
before this discussion goes further, Article 18 of the KAA (1999) will be discussed first.  
                                                             
702 Two big changes in the amendments of UNCITRAL Model Law in 2006 are article 7, which is about the arbitration 
agreement, and article 17, which is about the interim measure. 
703 They are Australia, Belgium, Hong Kong, Ireland, New Zealand, Peru, Slovenia, Florida in US, and etc.  These countries 
and jurisdictions amended their arbitration law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law amended in 2006.  Cf. 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html   
704 Also, the Committee believed that, if the interim measure granted by the arbitral tribunal is recognizable and enforceable, 
the proceedings of arbitration will be faster and efficient and it will strengthen the advantage of arbitration more. 
705 The following table compares the structure of article 18 of the KAA (2016) and article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
Title 
Article 18 of the KAA 
(revised statute) 
UNCITRAL Model Law 
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Article 18 of the KAA (1999) 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request 
of a party, order any party to take such interim measure of protection as the 
arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the 
dispute. In such cases, the arbitral tribunal may determine the amount of security 
to be provided by the respondent in lieu of such interim measure.  
(2) The arbitral tribunal may order the party requesting the interim measure to 
provide appropriate security. 
 
                                                             
<different titles are used for this 
provision> Article 18 (interim measure) 
Article 17(power of arbitral tribunal 
to order interim measure) 
Conditions for granting interim 
Measure 
Article 18. 2 Article 17 A 
Modification, suspension, 
termination of interim measure 
Article 18. 3 Article 17 D* 
Provision of security Article 18. 4  Article 17 E 
Disclosure Article 18. 5 Article 17 F 
Costs and damages Article 18. 6 Article 17 G 
Recognition and enforcement 
of interim measure 
Article 18. 7 Article 17 H 
Grounds for refusing 
recognition 
or enforcement 
Article 18. 8 Article 17 I 
* Article 17 B and article 17 C are provisions about preliminary orders.  These provisions are not adopted by the KAA, however.  
So, they do not appear in the table.  
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Article 18 of the KAA (1999) is the same as Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (1986).706  
Under this provision, the arbitral tribunal has a default power to order an interim measure of protection 
when the tribunal considers it necessary.707  However, Article 18 of the KAA (1999) does not clarify 
whether the interim measure should be (i) treated as the preservative measure under the Civil Execution 
Act or (ii) considered as a separate and different concept because there is no definition of interim measure 
provided in the law.708  Also, even though the interim measure is understood as a different concept from 
the preservative measure, there is no detailed regulation about its scope or contents therein. 709  
Furthermore, according to Article 37 of the KAA (1999), which focuses on the recognition or enforcement 
of the arbitral awards, the interim measure is not included in the scope of recognition or enforcement of 
the awards; thus, the law does not guarantee its recognition and enforcement.710  This means that the 
interim measure is effective only based on the assumption that the parties will comply with it voluntarily.  
In other words, if the opposing party therein (i.e., to whom the interim measure is directed) refuses to 
comply with it, it becomes meaningless.  
Thus, the arbitral tribunal (or a party therein) must ask the court to grant an enforceable interim 
measure under Article 10 of the KAA (1999).711  In this sense, Article 18 of the KAA (1999) treats the 
interim measure as a component of arbitration proceedings (vs. a binding order).712  The only way to 
                                                             
706 Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which is about interim measure, is not discussed in the Chapter III, so it will be 
dealt with in this part. 
707 Stavros L. Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, Chapter 1V, A , Article 17 [Power of arbitral to order 
interim measure] in Loukas A. Mistelis(ed), op. cit., at. 616.  
708 Moses also points out the ambiguity in concept of interim measure.  Margaret L. Moses, op. cit., at. 56. 
709 Sun Ju Jeong, op. cit., at. 226. 
710 Id. 
711 Article 10 of the KAA (1999) (Arbitration Agreement and Interim Measures by court) A party to arbitration agreement may 
request, before the commencement of or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of protection and for 
a court to grant such measure. 
712 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 15 
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enforce the interim measure is to request that the court take a preservative measure therein (i.e., against 
the party who is refusing to comply with the interim measure issued by the arbitral tribunal), in accordance 
with the Civil Execution Act. 
Second, Article 18 (1) of the KAA (1999) limits the scope of the interim measure to the subject-
matter of the dispute.  Indeed, this means that the arbitral tribunal has no power to issue an order that goes 
beyond the subject-matter of the dispute submitted therein.  The interpretation regarding the scope of the 
interim measure can be found in the CLOUT Cases.  In CLOUT Case No. 565, the court made clear that 
Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (1985)713 limited the interim measures that were directly related 
to the protection of the subject-matter of the dispute—and did not confer any power on the arbitral tribunal 
therein (i.e., to enforce its order).714  In another case, however, the court held that when the court grants 
the interim measure upon a request by the arbitral tribunal (or a party under Article 9715 of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law (1985)), the interim measure should be interpreted as having wider application (vs. merely 
                                                             
713 This one is the previous one before 2006 amendment, and it corresponds to Article 18 of the KAA (1999). 
714 The facts of the case are as follows.  The claimant who was a professional track and field athlete, had been suspended by 
the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) for negligent use of stimulant drugs.  Because of the 
suspension, the German Tract and Field Federation (DLV), who was the respondent, rejected his application to participate 
in a German championship tournament.  Regarding this decision, a DLV arbitral tribunal was formed and issued a temporary 
injunction which ordered the respondent to authorize the claimant to take part in the tournament.  After that, the claimant 
brought the injunction to the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg for its enforcement through expedited proceedings under 
Sections 1063 (3) and 1041 (2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure.  So, the claimant participated in the tournament 
and declared the dispute settled afterwards.  The respondent opposed this declaration and brought the case requesting the 
Court to reject the claimant’s application to declare the tribunal’s temporary injunction enforceable.  Upon the respondent’s 
request, the Court defined the prerequisites under which a State Court can declare interim measure of protection rendered 
by an arbitral tribunal under Section 1041 (1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure.  The reasons for the Court’s decisions 
are, first, the Court said that the measure must be classified as interim measures.  In this particular case, the arbitral tribunal 
defined the measures as interim measures and the Court found itself not entitled to evaluate the substance of the tribunal’s 
decision, and the Court added that it was common practice of German Courts.  Second, as the interim measure of protection 
had to be rendered by an arbitral tribunal, and in this particular case, the respondent’s procedural terms, which both parties 
agreed, stated that the tribunal’s decision would be final and binding, even though the arbitral tribunal was a body of the 
Federation itself.  So, recourse to the State Court system was explicitly ruled out.  CLOUT Case No. 565, Germany: 
Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, 5 April 2001 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V05/878/28/PDF/V0587828.pdf?OpenElement 
715 This one is the previous one before 2006 amendment, and it corresponds to Article 10 of the KAA (1999). 
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being an order to preserve ‘the subject-matter of the dispute’ stated therein).716  As can be seen from the 
two cases, the scope of the interim measure under Article 17 of the Model Law (1985) and Article 18 of 
the KAA (1999) is often varied.  
 
4.1.1. What Has Been Amended 
As Article 18 of the KAA (2016) is a long provision, the whole provision is in the footnote.  
Only some parts of Article 18 will be discussed here.  
 
Article 18 of the KAA (2016) (Interim Measure) 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request 
of a party, grant interim measures that the arbitral tribunal considers necessary.  
(2) An interim measure is any temporary measure, at any time prior to the issuance 
of the award by which the dispute is finally decided, by which the arbitral tribunal 
orders a party to,  
1. Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; 
                                                             
716 The defendant, a Hong Kong company, tried to set aside a Mareva injunction that was rendered by the court to the plaintiff, 
also a Hong Kong company.  The issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to grant such an interim measure of protection, 
based on the fact that a charter-party agreement between the plaintiff and defendant contained an arbitration clause and it 
stated that “any dispute will be settled before Hong Kong Arbitrators and under British Maritime law…”The court, referring 
the decision on Fung Sang Trading v. Kai Sun Sea Products and Foods Co. Ltd., found that the UNCITRAL Model Law 
covered this dispute because a substantial part of the obligations provided in the charter-party was to be performed outside 
Hong Kong.  The court held that the interim measure of protection referred to in Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
was wide enough to cover a Mareva injunction.  Consequently, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to grant a Mareva 
injunction in support of domestic arbitration carried out in Hong Kong, both under Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
and Section 14 (6) of the Arbitration Ordinance. CLOUT Case No. 39.  Hong Kong: High Court of Hong Kong. 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/899/70/IMG/V9389970.pdf?OpenElement 
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2. Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to 
cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself; 
3. Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be 
satisfied; or 
4. Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the 
dispute. 
 
As previously noted, the KAA (1999) limits the scope of the interim measure herein (i.e., ordered 
by the arbitral tribunal) to ‘the subject-matter of the dispute’ and this phrase has been deleted from the 
KAA (2016).  Indeed, the KAA (2016) does not state the scope of interim measure at all; it just contains 
generic definitions like ‘any temporary measure.’717  However, paragraph (2) gives specific examples of 
what kinds of orders may become interim measures.  By doing so, paragraph (2) reduces the possibility 
of another dispute over whether the order therein (i.e., issued by the arbitral tribunal) is an interim measure 
or not.718  Indeed, these listed examples are essential because the provision does not give a definite 
meaning of interim measure; however, there are associated concerns herein.  For example, if the arbitral 
tribunal’s authority in this respect (i.e., to issue an interim measure) is expanded more and more, the statute 
will need to add more and more measures within future lists.719  Thus, unless the law states that the 
examples of interim measures are only examples therein (i.e., for the interim measure) and do not limit 
the scope or form of interim measure, this provision will require repeated revisions.720  Thus, some 
                                                             
717  Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006, United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.08.V4, Part Two, at para.27. 
718 Sun Ju Jeong, op. cit., at. 231. 
719 Id. 
720 Id. 
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members of the Committee have suggested specifying a clear definition of ‘interim measure’ without 
providing examples of interim measures—thereby leaving its interpretation to the court or arbitral 
tribunal.721  
The only difference in the Article herein (i.e., between the UNCITRAL Model Law and the KAA 
(2016)) is that the KAA (2016) does not mention the form of the interim measure while the Model Law 
states that “an interim measure is any temporary measure, whether in the form of an award or in another 
form…”  The KAA (2016) merely regulates the time that the interim measure may be issued by stating 
“before the issuance of the award.”  Indeed, the Committee submitted a draft that states the forms of 
interim measures therein and on a par with the Model Law; however, the Ministry of Justice eliminated 
this with no further explanation.722  
Since an interim measure has not been finalized (and is not even necessarily about the subject-matter 
of a dispute), granting an interim measure in the form of an award may indeed be problematic.723  Also, if 
the interim measure is issued in the form of an award, it requires (i) the scope of the award to include the 
interim measure and (ii) the interim measure to be recognizable and enforceable under Article 37 of the 
KAA—namely, on the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award.  Also, the award should be 
defined differently in this case.  Due to these concerns, an interim measure is often granted in the form of 
an order (vs. an award).724 
                                                             
721 Id. 
722 As there is no official document available that explains why the Korean legislature changes the committee’s draft, the reason 
for this is unknown. 
723 Michael Mcllwrath & John Savage, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION-A PRACTICAL GUIDE, Kluwer Law 
International, 2010. para. 5-156. 
724  Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION, 6th ed. Para. 7.21, Oxford University Press, 2015 and Sun Ju Jeong, op. cit., at. 238. 
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The second provision discussed herein is Article 18.7; its text focuses on the recognition and 
enforcement of an interim measure. The underline shows the difference in the UNCITRAL Model Law.   
 
Article 18.7 (Recognition and Enforcement of Interim Measures) 
(1) The party who is seeking recognition of an interim measure granted by the 
arbitral tribunal may apply for the court’s decision on its recognition and the party 
who wants compulsory execution based on the interim measure may apply for the 
court’s decision on its enforcement.  
(2) The party who is seeking recognition or enforcement of an interim measure and 
the other party shall inform the court of any termination, suspension or 
modification of that interim measure.  
(3) The court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it considers it 
proper, order the requesting party to provide appropriate security if the arbitral 
tribunal has not already made a determination with respect to security or where 
such a decision is necessary to protect the rights of third parties.  
(4) With regard to the enforcement of interim measure, the provisions related to 
the preservative measure under the Civil Execution Act shall apply.  
 
As previously noted, an interim measure differs from an arbitral award.  Thus, the KAA (2016) 
includes an independent provision (i.e., Article 18. 7) for its recognition and enforcement since the interim 
measure can be granted as an order—and recognized or enforced without being changed into the arbitral 
award.725  
                                                             
725 Suk, Kwang Hyun, Courts’ Roles in the Arbitral Procedures, 37 Bar Association at. 84 (2007). 
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Article 18.7 (1) of the KAA (2016) specifies that when a party is seeking recognition or enforcement 
of interim measures, it should apply for the court’s decision on it.  Article 18.7 (2) specifies who should 
inform the court of this when there is any modification, suspension, or termination of an interim measure; 
it imposes this obligation on both parties while the UNCTRAL Model Law imposes this obligation only 
on (i) the party who is seeking (or has obtained) the recognition and (ii) enforcement of the interim 
measure.726  Also, Article 18.7 (4) regulates the law enforcing the interim measure; indeed, the interim 
measure, ordered by the arbitral tribunal, is enforced through the same procedure as those for the 
preservative measure under the Civil Execution Act.  
As the interim measure is recognized or enforced under separate and different regulations (vs. those 
for awards), there must also be separate regulations for refusing its recognition or enforcement.  Article 
18.8727 states the grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of interim measures; indeed, most 
                                                             
726 If the interim measure is modified in a favorable way towards the other party or suspended or terminated, it could be the 
other party who wants more to inform the court of these modification or suspension or termination of the interim measure. 
727 Article 18.8 (Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement) (1) Recognition or enforcement of an interim measure may 
be refused only: 1. At the request of the party against whom it is invoked if the court is satisfied that: (a) If the party against 
whom it is invoked proves that: 1) Such refusal is warranted on the grounds set forth in Article 36(2)1(a) or (d); or 2) The 
party against whom it is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral 
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or 3) The interim measure deals with a dispute not contemplated 
by or not failing within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decision on matters beyond the scope of 
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those 
not so submitted, that part of the interim measure which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be 
recognized and enforced. (b) The decision with respect to the provision of security in connection with the interim measure 
issued by the arbitral tribunal or the court has not been complied with; or (c) The interim measure has been terminated or 
suspended by the arbitral tribunal.  2. If the court, ex officio, finds that: (a) The interim measure is incompatible with the 
powers conferred upon the court unless the court decides to reformulates the interim measure to the extent necessary to 
adapt it to its own powers and procedures for the purposes of enforcing that interim measure and without modifying its 
substance; or (b) Any of the grounds set forth in Article 36(2)2(a) or (b), apply to the recognition and enforcement of the 
interim measure.  (2) The court where recognition or enforcement is sought under Article 18.7 shall not, in making that 
determination, undertakes a review of the substance of the interim measure.  (3) Any determination made by the court on 
any ground in paragraph (1) of this Article shall be effective only for the purposes of the application to recognize and 
enforce the interim measure. 
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grounds are the same as those under Article 36 of the KAA (i.e., for actions for setting aside arbitral 
awards via the courts), except for the addition of Article 18. 8 (1) 2 (a).728   
 
Article 18.8 (1) 2 (a) of the KAA (2016) 
(1) Recognition or enforcement of an interim measure may be refused only: 
[….some parts of 1 are omitted….] 2. If the court, ex officio, finds that: (a) The 
interim measure is incompatible with the powers conferred upon the court unless 
the court decides to reformulates the interim measure to the extent necessary to 
adapt it to its own powers and procedures for the purposes of enforcing that interim 
measure and without modifying its substance; 
 
Article 18.8 (1) 2 (a) states that the court may refuse recognition or enforcement of an interim 
measure if the interim measure is incompatible with the powers conferred upon the court.  This provision 
is indeed reasonable because an interim measure is quite different from an award in terms of content; for 
example, an interim measure is mostly a series of orders—such as to maintain or restore the status quo, 
take action to prevent an arbitral process, provide a means of preserving assets, and preserve evidence.  
Thus, a key arbitration development has been the enabling of interim measures that are issued by 
arbitral tribunals—namely, to be recognizable and enforceable under independent and separate regulations.  
However, this will be meaningless if the court cannot deal with this quickly.  Thus, a separate court might 
deal with arbitration only—in order to address such issues efficiently and quickly.729  For example, in 
                                                             
728 While the UNCITRAL Model Law says that an interim measure issued by an arbitral tribunal should be recognized as 
binding, Article 18.8 paragraph (1) implies a binding effect of interim measure by providing a list of grounds which its 
recognition and enforcement may be refused based on. 
729 Sun Ju Jeong, op. cit., at. 239.  
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Germany, issues associated with setting aside an arbitral award (or recognition and enforcement therein) 
should be submitted only to the High Court.730  In sum, a separate court for arbitration is beneficial because 
a specialized court can address arbitration matters quickly and efficiently (whenever this is required).  
 
4.1.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
The adoption of regulations herein (i.e., associated with the interim measure) is indeed important 
within the context of arbitration; thus, many issues have been raised and discussed.  These include the 
preliminary order that is regulated under Article 17 B and C of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  The 
Committee has discussed whether or not the KAA (2016) should have adopted the provisions herein (i.e., 
about the preliminary order) from the UNCITRAL Model Law; however, most members of the Committee 
agreed not to adopt them.  The preliminary order is an unfamiliar system in Korea because it does not 
exist in other areas of Korean national law.731  Also, as the UNCITRAL Model Law does not approve the 
enforcement of the preliminary order under Article 17 C (5),732 the Committee believed that there would 
be no actual effect therein.733  
                                                             
730 Section 1062 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (1) The Higher Regional Court (“Oberlandesgericht”) designated in 
the arbitration agreement or, failing such agreement, the Higher Regional Court in whose district the place of arbitration is 
situated, is competent for decisions on applications relating to…. 
731 The preliminary order is from the common law system.  So, in the civil law system like Korea legal system, it does not exist 
and it is an unfamiliar concept.  Also, because the preservative measure in the civil law system implies to include 
preliminary order and it is enforceable, adopting the preliminary orders does not have practical benefit in Korea.  Cf. Sun 
Ju Jeong, op. cit., at. 231~236. 
732 Article 17 C (5) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Specific regime for preliminary orders) (5) A preliminary order shall be 
binding on the parties but shall not be subject to enforcement by a court.  Such a preliminary order does not constitute an 
award. 
733 Born said that the preliminary order which was drafted assuming the parties’ voluntary execution is ‘ill-considered’ one.  
Cf. Gary B. Born, op. cit., at. 2018.  
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Second, the Committee had an argument over Article 18.8 (1) 2 (a).734  This provision says that the 
court may reformulate the interim measure herein (i.e., enforce it) as long as the substance of the interim 
measure has not been changed.  Some members of the Committee have had doubts about whether it is 
appropriate for the court to have a right to reformulate an interim measure ordered by an arbitral 
tribunal;735 most members have asserted that if the interim measure is not acceptable under Korean law, 
it should be refused for recognition or enforcement by the court.  As previously noted, the contents of 
interim measures are quite different from those of arbitral awards.  Thus, as a compromise, the KAA (2016) 
allows a court to reformulate an interim measure for recognition or enforcement whenever necessary—
without changing or harming its substance.  
The third issue was the geographical scope of interim measures that are enforceable in Korea.  The 
Committee has discussed the enforceability of interim measures ordered in foreign countries.  Some 
members of the Committee have contended that when interim measures are ordered in foreign countries, 
they should be enforceable as stated within the UNCTRAL Model Law—namely, in Article 17 H (1).736  
The line of reasoning herein is that because the court has a right to reformulate an interim measure that is 
not compatible with Korean law, there would never be a case wherein the court could not enforce an 
interim measure ordered in a foreign country. 
                                                             
734 Article 18. 8 (1) 2 (a) (Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement) Recognition or enforcement of an interim measure 
may be refused only if the court finds that the interim measure is incompatible with the powers conferred upon the court 
unless the court decides to reformulate the interim measure to the extent necessary to adapt it to its own powers and 
procedures for the purposes of enforcing that interim measure and without modifying its substance. 
735 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 16. 
736 Article 17 H (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Recognition and Enforcement) An interim measure issued by an arbitral 
tribunal shall be recognized as binding and, unless otherwise provided by the arbitral tribunal, enforced upon application 
to the competent court, irrespective of the country in which it was issued, subject to the provisions of article 17 I. 
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Nevertheless, other Committee members have disagreed.  They believe that (i) enforcing an interim 
measure, ordered in a foreign country, is too advanced and (ii) the act of permitting the enforcement of 
interim measures, ordered in Korea, is sufficiently attractive (i.e., helps bring ICA to Korea).737  After 
much debate, the Committee decided to draft a provision stating that ‘an interim measure issued by an 
arbitral tribunal in Korea shall be recognized or enforced’; however, the KAA (2016) does not say 
anything about the nationality of the interim measures.738  Indeed, whether or not an interim measure 
herein (i.e., issued in a foreign country) is enforceable in Korea under the KAA is dependent on how the 
court will interpret it after the KAA (2016) becomes effective in Korea.  
Fourth, regarding the grounds to refuse recognition or enforcement of the interim measure, Article 
18.8 (1) 1 (c) states that “recognition or enforcement of an interim measure may be refused when it has 
been terminated or suspended by the arbitral tribunal.”  
 
Article 18.8 (1) 1 (c) 
(1) Recognition or enforcement of an interim measure may be refused only: 1. At 
the request of the party against whom it is invoked if the court is satisfied that: [….. 
(a) and (b) are omitted….] (c) The interim measure has been terminated or 
suspended by the arbitral tribunal. 
 
                                                             
737 Commentary in the legislative history, p.17. 
738 Article 18.8 (1) of the KAA (2016) (Recognition and Enforcement of Interim measures) (1) The party who is seeking 
recognition or enforcement of an interim measure may apply for the court’s decision on its recognition or enforcement. 
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The original draft made by the Committee was “…. when it has been terminated or suspended by 
the arbitral tribunal or the court”; however, in the provision drafted, which court the provision indicates 
is not clear.  Thus, the Committee agreed to change the draft (e.g., via “the interim measure has been 
terminated or suspended by the arbitral tribunal or, where so empowered, by the court of the State in which 
the arbitration takes place or under the law of which that interim measure was granted”) in order to make 
this more specific.  Nevertheless, omitted in the KAA (2016) is (i) the court of the State wherein the 
arbitration takes place, (ii) the case associated with the termination of the interim measure, and (iii) the 
law associated with the granting of the interim measure.  The KAA (2016) simply stipulates that “…when 
the interim measure has been terminated or suspended by the arbitral tribunal.” 
Fifth, as emergency arbitrators are closely related to the interim measure, some members have 
wanted to explore this topic further.  The first suggestion was to draft provisions about the emergency 
arbitrator; 739  however, the majority agreed that the emergency arbitrator is a matter that should be 
incorporated into arbitration rules of arbitral institutions (vs. arbitration law).740  Another suggestion was 
that the revised statute should state that emergency arbitrators are considered to be arbitrators; thus, interim 
measures, issued by emergency arbitrators, are also recognizable or enforceable—referring to Article 2 
(1) of the Singapore Arbitration Act.741  In the end, the Committee agreed to leave such matters herein 
(i.e., regarding emergency arbitrators) to arbitral institutions.      
                                                             
739 For supporting opinion for this, see Jeong, Kou Hwa, A Study on Emergency Arbitrator Proceeding – With a Focus on 
Emergency Arbitrator Procedures Adopted by Major Arbitral Institutions, 5 Bub Hak Pyung Ron 68, 115 (2015). 
740 Commentary in the legislative history, p.17 
741 Article 2 (1) of the Singapore Arbitration Act (Interpretation) (2) “arbitral tribunal” means a sole arbitrator or a panel of 
arbitrators or an arbitral institution, and includes an emergency arbitrator appointed pursuant to the rules of arbitration 
agreed to or adopted by the parties including the rules of arbitration of an institution or organization. 
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Sixth, as there are a few changes between the UNCITRAL Model Law and the KAA (2016), some 
members of the Committee have suggested translating the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
directly, so they could be adopted as they are (i.e., without changing their structures).742  The Committee, 
however, rejected this suggestion because the majority believed that the provisions should be rearranged 
or modified by splitting and combining the paragraphs or sentences to fit them into the style or structure 
of Korean national law—even though Korea has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law.743  As a result, the 
paragraphs of the UNCITRAL Model Law have been reorganized and rewritten, according to the typical 
style of Korean national law.744  
 
4.2. Place of Arbitration  
The text in Article 21 focuses on the place of arbitration.745  Indeed, there is not a significant 
change in this provision.  Paragraphs (1) and (2) remain the same (as in the KAA (1999));746 however, the 
structure of paragraph (3) has been changed to deliver the meaning more clearly.  
 
                                                             
742 Commentary in the legislative history, p.17 
743 Commentary in the legislative history, p.17 
744 Again, it has to be remembered that the English version of the revised parts of KAA is translated and written by an author 
because there is no official English version for the revised parts.  The author tries to use as many provisions of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as possible without changes unless the contents are different. 
745 This provision corresponds to article 20 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
746 Article 21 of the KAA (2016) (Place of Arbitration) (1) The parties shall be free to agree on the place of arbitration.  (2) 
Failing such agreement under paragraph (1), the place of arbitration shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal having 
regard to all circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties.  One thing that I would like to point out is 
Article 21 (1) of the KAA.  It says that “the parties shall be free….”, but the word, ‘shall’ is not appropriate in this context.  
The Korean version of this provision says that “the parties are free….”, so it must have been changed to ‘shall’ while it was 
translated into English.  Although it does not have much difference in meaning, the word, ‘shall’ had better be removed.  
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4.2.1. What Has Been Amended 
The followings are Article 21 (3) of the KAA (1999) and the KAA (2016). The difference between 
these two is underlined.  
 
Article 21 (3) of the KAA (1999) 
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the arbitral tribunal may, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for 
consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts of the parties, or 
for inspection of goods, place or documents.  
 
Article 21 (3) of the KAA (2016) 
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the arbitral tribunal may, meet at any 
place it considers appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing 
witnesses, experts of the parties, or for inspection of goods, place or documents. If 
the parties agreed otherwise, the arbitral tribunal shall not do so.  
 
The principle in this provision is that the parties can agree on the place of arbitration; however, if 
there is no agreement on the place of arbitration between the parties, the arbitral tribunal can make this 
determination (after having considered all of the circumstances associated with the dispute).  Thus, Article 
21 (3) exists for cases wherein arbitral tribunals want to gather at venues that differ from where the parties 
have agreed to meet for hearings and examinations.  Indeed, while there was no intention initially to 
change the meaning of this provision, the Committee agreed that ‘unless otherwise agreed by the parties’ 
could cause misinterpretation—namely, that the arbitral tribunal can supposedly meet at any location for 
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a hearing or examination if there is no specific, agreed-upon venue therein (i.e., by the parties).  However, 
this is not the actual meaning in this provision; Article 21 (3) of the KAA instead states that the arbitral 
tribunal can meet at any location to hear witnesses and experts (associated with the parties) or for the 
inspection of goods, places, or documents—unless the parties specifically prohibit the arbitral tribunal 
from meeting at another location.  
Consequently, in order to eliminate misinterpretation and ambiguity in this provision, the 
Committee decided to change the structure therein.  Thus, paragraph (3) now states that the arbitral tribunal 
can meet at any location for a hearing and examination if they find it appropriate; however, if the parties 
agree not to allow an arbitral tribunal to do so, it should not do so.  For a clearer meaning, the second part 
of paragraph (3) has been amended and states that “if the parties agreed otherwise, the arbitral tribunal 
shall not do so”; this implies that the parties can take away the arbitral tribunal’s right to determine a 
different place for a hearing and examination. 
 
4.2.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
Some members of the Committee suggested combining Articles 21 (1) and (2) just like Article 20 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law; however, the Committee decided not to do so because there is no rationale 
to change them.  Other than this, there was no other issue raised regarding Article 21. 
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4.3. Hearings747 
The text in Article 25 focuses on the hearings.748  There is no significant change in this provision.  
Paragraphs (1) and (2) remain; however, some words in paragraphs (3) and (4) are changed to make the 
meaning clearer.  
 
4.3.1. What Has Been Amended 
The followings are the provisions of the KAA (1999) and KAA (2016) and the differences 
between these two are underlined. 
 
Article 25 of the KAA (1999) 
(3) All statements, documents or other information supplied to the arbitral tribunal 
by a party shall be communicated to the other party. 
(4) Any expert report or evidentiary document on which the arbitral tribunal may 
rely in making its decision shall be communicated to the parties. 
                                                             
747 This provision corresponds to Article 24 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  The structure of the provision is different, but the 
contents are the same. 
748 Article 25 of the KAA (2016) (Hearings) (1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether 
to hold oral hearings or whether the proceedings shall be only conducted on the basis of documents: Provided, That unless 
the parties have agreed that no hearings shall be held, the arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings at an appropriate stage 
of the proceedings, if so requested by a party.  (2) The arbitral tribunal shall provide the parties sufficient notice of any oral 
hearing and of any meeting for the purpose of inspection of other evidence.  (3) All statements, documents or other 
information supplied to the arbitral tribunal by a party shall be provided to the other party immediately.  (4) Any expert 
report or evidentiary document on which the arbitral tribunal may rely in making its decision shall be provided to the parties. 
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Article 25 of the KAA (2016) 
(3) All statements, documents or other information supplied to the arbitral tribunal 
by a party shall be provided to the other party immediately. 
(4) Any expert report or evidentiary document on which the arbitral tribunal may 
rely in making its decision shall be provided to the parties 
 
The KAA (1999) requires that when an arbitral tribunal receives information (e.g., statements and 
documents) from one party, the information must be submitted to the other party as well.  Also, any type 
of expert report or evidentiary document therein (i.e., relied upon by the arbitral tribunal) should be 
communicated to both parties, according to Article 25 of the KAA (1999).  However, the meaning of 
‘communication’ is not clear in this context. Furthermore, since the Committee was concerned that 
‘communication’ could be interpreted and understood as ‘informing’ or ‘giving a notice,’ they agreed to 
use a different word that can deliver the right meaning (as intended in this provision).  
When Article 25 (3) of the KAA (1999) states that the documents submitted by one party should be 
communicated to the other party, it does not mean that one party should inform the other party of the fact 
that the documents have been submitted to the arbitral tribunal.  The intended meaning within this 
provision is that the other party should physically have all of the documents that the original party 
submitted to the arbitral tribunal.  If the other party is not provided with these documents, the arbitral 
award may be set aside based on procedural defect (i.e., unfair treatment during the arbitral proceedings).  
Consequently, the Committee decided to use ‘provide’ (vs. ‘communicate’). By doing so, the provision 
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can deliver the right meaning—namely, by making clear that both parties should be provided with all 
necessary documents that are related to the proceedings of the arbitration.  
Another change, in this provision, is that the Committee added the word ‘immediately’ in paragraph 
(3).  ‘Immediately’ means that ‘as soon as’ one party submits the documents to the arbitral tribunal, the 
other party should be provided with them.  Article 25 does not expressly specify who has an obligation to 
provide the documents to the parties; however, the Committee says that the provision should be interpreted 
that the arbitral tribunal has an obligation to provide the parties with the documents.  Thus, if one party 
submits a document, the arbitral tribunal or an arbitral institution (if it is an institutional arbitration) should 
ensure that the other party has the document as well.  
 
4.3.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
There was no other issue discussed in relation to this provision.  
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4.4. Court Assistance749 
The text in this provision is focused on court assistance when the arbitral tribunal accepts evidence 
and examines witnesses.  Although an arbitration is a private DRS, there are some stages wherein the 
court—as a governmental authority—must be involved.750 
 
4.4.1. What Has Been Amended 
In Article 28 of the KAA (2016), some words have been changed and two paragraphs are added.  
The followings are Article 28 of the KAA (1999) and the KAA (2016).  The differences between these 
two are underlined.  
 
Article 28 of the KAA (1999) 
(1) The arbitral tribunal may, ex officio or in receipt of the application of the 
parties, entrust the court with the taking of evidence.  
(2) Where paragraph (1) applies, the arbitral tribunal may, in writing, specify the 
matters to be entered in the report on evidence by the court and others subject to 
the taking of evidence. 
(3) The court from which the arbitral tribunal requests the assistance shall, after 
taking evidence, send the records with respect to the taking of evidence, such as a 
certified copy of the report on witness examination and transcripts of the report on 
admissibility of the evidence to the arbitral tribunal without delay.  
                                                             
749 This provision corresponds to Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
750 Arbitration is based on the agreement between the parties.  Arbitrators are appointed by the agreement of the parties and 
their power is given by the parties.  So, the power of the arbitral tribunal is limited only to the parties.  As the arbitral 
tribunal does not have any authority over others, the assistance of the court is essential. 
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(4) The arbitral tribunal shall pay necessary expenses incurred in taking evidence 
to the court from which it requests the assistance.  
 
Article 28 of the KAA (2016) 
(1) The arbitral tribunal may, ex officio or in receipt of the application of the 
parties, entrust the court with the taking of evidence or request the court to assist 
in taking evidence.  
(2) Where the arbitral tribunal entrusts the court with the taking evidence, the 
arbitral tribunal may, in writing, specify the matters to be entered in the report on 
evidence by the court and others subject to the taking of evidence. 
(3) Where paragraph (2) applies, when the court takes evidence, the arbitral 
tribunal or the parties can participate in taking of evidence after getting permission 
from the presiding judge.751  
(4) Where paragraph (2) applies, the court shall, after taking evidence, send the 
records with respect to the taking of evidence, such as a certified copy of the report 
on witness examination and transcripts of the report on admissibility of the 
evidence to the arbitral tribunal without delay.  
(5) Where the arbitral tribunal requests the court to assist in taking evidence, the 
court may take a measure which is considered appropriate such as ordering the 
witness to attend the hearing or ordering the person who possesses the document 
to submit it to the arbitral tribunal.752 
(6) The arbitral tribunal shall pay necessary expenses incurred in taking evidence 
to the court. 
 
Article 28 is amended to enable the arbitral tribunal to have more controlling power in the 
acceptance of evidence.  First, Article 28 of the KAA (1999) specifies that the arbitral tribunal may entrust 
                                                             
751 Paragraph (3) is newly drafted in the KAA (2016). 
752 Paragraph (5) is newly drafted in the KAA (2016). 
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the court with accepting evidence.  The word, ‘entrust’ is interpreted herein as the court doing what the 
arbitral tribunal requests.  Thus, the court accepts evidence herein on behalf of the arbitral tribunal.  That 
is why the following paragraph (2) states that the arbitral tribunal can, in writing, specify the evidentiary 
matters that the court should include in the report on evidence.  Thus, the court does what the arbitral 
tribunal asks in writing.  However, under Article 28 of the KAA (1999), there is no way that the arbitral 
tribunal can take the evidence directly by itself. 
Indeed, the acceptance of evidence indirectly through the court is not problematic or difficult when 
the evidence can be provided via written documents (e.g., in association with queries about certain facts 
or requests for deliveries of documents).753  However, when a case requires the examination of one or 
more witnesses, it is not efficient for the court to undertake this on behalf of the arbitral tribunal.  Thus, 
the Committee decided to add that ‘the arbitral tribunal may request the court to assist in taking evidence’ 
to Article 28 (1) and paragraph (5) is thus newly drafted.  However, paragraph (5) only applies when the 
arbitral tribunal asks the court for assistance therein (i.e., in accepting evidence).  Alternatively, when the 
arbitral tribunal requests the court to assist in examining a witness or other evidence under paragraph (1), 
the court can order the witness to attend the hearing or submit documents therein (i.e., when it is necessary 
under paragraph (5)).  These paragraphs require the arbitral tribunal to examine witness(es) and documents 
directly.  This direct examination assists the arbitral tribunal with (i) determining what they need to know 
                                                             
753 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 24. 
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and (ii) making correct decisions in relation to the dispute.  This provision refers to Section 44 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996754 and Article 30 of the Singapore Arbitration Act.755  
Second, another newly drafted provision, paragraph (3) of Article 28, provides the arbitral tribunal 
and the parties with an opportunity to participate in accepting evidence under the permission of the 
presiding judge when the court takes evidence via a request from the arbitral tribunal.  Here, it is not clear 
what ‘participation’ in paragraph (3) means.  For example, does it mean that the arbitral tribunal and 
parties can examine the evidence under the permission of the presiding judge?  As this text is newly drafted, 
the meaning of participation becomes clearer when paragraph (3) is applied; otherwise, it must be 
interpreted by the court after the KAA (2016) becomes effective.  
Third, paragraph (5) also contains newly drafted text (as previously noted); it applies only when the 
arbitral tribunal requests the court to assist with accepting evidence.  As can be seen in the provision, this 
paragraph makes clear that requesting such assistance is different from entrusting the court herein.  
Paragraphs (2) through (5) are divided into two categories; paragraph (5) states what the court may do 
when there is a request for assistance by the arbitral tribunal, while paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) are 
applicable only when the arbitral tribunal entrusts the court with taking evidence.756  
                                                             
754 Section 44 of Arbitration Act 1996 (Court powers exercisable in support of arbitral proceedings): (1) Unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, the court has for the purposes of and in relation to arbitral proceedings the same power of making 
orders about the matters listed below as it has for the purposes of and in relation to legal proceedings. (2) Those matters are 
(a) the taking of the evidence of witness… [The rest is omitted] 
755 Article 30 of the Singapore Arbitration Act (Witnesses may be summoned by subpoena): (2) The Court may order that a 
subpoena to testify or a subpoena to produce documents shall be issued to compel the attendance before an arbitral tribunal 
of a witness wherever he may be within Singapore.  [The rest is omitted] 
756 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 24. 
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Fourth, paragraph (6) of the KAA (2016), which corresponds to paragraph (4) of the KAA (1999), 
changes the phrase ‘the court from which it requests the assistance’ into ‘the court.’  Paragraph (4) of the 
KAA (1999) in the Korean version states ‘the court which the arbitral tribunal entrusts’; however, the 
English version of this paragraph is wrongly translated as “the court from which it requests the 
assistance.”757  The KAA (2016) states ‘the court’ in order to include all courts that are involved in taking 
evidence—either under entrustment or assistance.  The Committee made clear that ‘the court’ includes 
any court that is involved either directly or indirectly with accepting evidence.758  
  
4.4.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
Three issues were raised during the revision of Article 28.  The focus of the first issue was on who 
can entrust the court with accepting evidence.  Some members of the Committee claimed that the parties 
should be given a right to entrust the court with accepting evidence if (i) there is consent by the arbitral 
tribunal or (ii) the parties agree to do so without consent of the arbitral tribunal. 759   However, this 
suggestion was rejected based on the notion that the arbitral tribunal should make the decision therein (i.e., 
whether this action is necessary or not).760  Also, the parties can request, at any time, that the arbitral 
tribunal entrust the court with accepting evidence.761  
                                                             
757 As discussed before, entrusting and requesting for assistance are different. 
758 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 24. 
759 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 25. 
760 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 25. 
761 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 25. 
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The second focused on the examination of a witness by the arbitral tribunal.  The KAA (2016) 
allows the arbitral tribunal to examine a witness under the assistance of the court; however, there is no 
way to prevent a witness therein (i.e., a third party) from committing perjury.  In this sense, some members 
of the Committee have contended that only a court should have a right to examine a witness—leaving the 
provision as it is in the KAA (1999).762  
The last issue focuses on the procedure of accepting evidence, which is regulated in paragraph 28 
(3) of the KAA (2016).  Some members of the Committee have claimed that in order to avoid ambiguity 
in interpreting the word ‘participation,’ paragraph (3) should provide examples therein—such as looking 
through documents, verifying or investigating submitted objects, or questioning a witness or expert under 
the permission of a presiding judge.763  However, this suggestion was also ultimately rejected based on 
the determination that it should be a presiding judge who decides what ‘participation’ means and allows 
the arbitral tribunal (or parties) to undertake such actions.764  Thus, it is not appropriate to define the 
meaning of ‘participation’ and make a list of what the arbitral tribunal or parties can do when they 
participate in accepting legal evidence therein.  Therefore, the Committee determined that interpretations 
of the word ‘participation’ should be made by presiding judges who are entitled to undertake such 
decision-making after considering the circumstances within each case. 
 
 
                                                             
762 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 25. 
763 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 25. 
764 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 25. 
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5. Termination of arbitration and Newly Drafted Provision 
Chapter V consists of eight articles, including two newly drafted ones: (i) rules applicable to the 
substance of disputes (Article 29), (ii) decision-making by an arbitral tribunal (Article 30), (iii) settlement 
(Article 31), (iv) form and details of arbitral awards (Article 32), (v) termination of proceeding (Article 
33), (vi) correction or interpretation of award or additional award (Article 34), (vii) allocation of the costs 
of arbitration (Article 34. 2), and (viii) delayed interest (Article 34. 3). Among these provisions, Article 
34.2 and 34.3 are newly drafted in the KAA (2016).  
 
5.1. Allocation of the Cost of Arbitration 
This provision is a newly drafted one.  Although the KAA (1999) does not specify the cost of 
arbitration, the bearers of such costs are typically noted in the arbitral awards rendered in Korea.  During 
the revision process, however, the necessity of such a provision (i.e., regulating the cost of arbitration) 
was raised.  The Committee determined that the parties can agree on the allocation of arbitration costs; 
however, in a case with no agreement between the parties, the law should specify that the arbitral tribunal 
can determine this matter.765  Some members of the Committee claimed that the law should provide more 
detailed regulations—such as the basis of determination, with examples of the grounds on which the 
arbitral tribunal may make such determinations.766  
                                                             
765 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 28. 
766 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 28. 
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5.1.1. What Has Been Amended 
 
Article 34.2 (Allocation of costs of arbitration) 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may determine the 
allocation of the costs of or incidental to any proceedings of arbitration with 
consideration of all relevant circumstances.  
 
This new provision makes clear that the parties can agree on the allocation of arbitration costs and 
if they do not, the arbitral tribunal can determine such fees; however, a specific itemization therein (i.e., 
of such costs) is not clear although Article 34.2 says ‘the costs of or incidental to any proceedings of 
arbitration with consideration of all relevant circumstances.’  This provision refers to Section 1057 of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure,767 Article 49 of the Japanese Arbitration Law,768 Section 61 of the 
                                                             
767 Section 1057 (1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Decision on costs) (1) Unless the parties agree otherwise, the 
arbitral tribunal shall allocate, by means of an arbitral award, the costs of the arbitration as between the parties, including 
those incurred by the parties necessary for the proper pursuit of their claim or defense.  It shall do so at its discretion and 
take into consideration the circumstances of the case, in particular the outcome of the proceedings. (2) To the extent that 
the costs of the arbitral proceedings have been fixed, the arbitral tribunal shall also decide the amount to be borne by each 
party.  If the costs have not been fixed or if they can only be fixed once the arbitral proceedings have been terminated, the 
decision shall be taken by means of a separate award. 
768 Article 49 of the Japanese Arbitration Law (Appointment of the Costs of the Arbitral Proceedings) (1) The costs disbursed 
by the parties with respect to the arbitral proceedings shall be apportioned between the parties in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties. (2) Failing an agreement as described in the preceding paragraph, each party shall bear the costs 
it has disbursed with respect to the arbitral proceedings. (3) In accordance with the agreement of the parties, if any, the 
arbitral tribunal may, in an arbitral award or in an independent ruling, determine the apportionment between the parties of 
the costs disbursed by the parties with respect to the arbitral proceedings and the amount that one party should reimburse 
to the other party based thereon. (4) If the matters described in the preceding paragraph have been determined in an 
independent ruling, such ruling shall have the same effect as an arbitral award. (5) The provisions of article 39 shall apply 
to the ruling described in the preceding paragraph. 
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Arbitration Act 1996,769 and Section 74 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance.770  The Arbitration Act 
(1996), with seven articles under the heading of ‘costs of the arbitration,’ has detailed regulations (e.g., to 
explain the costs of arbitration,771 the revocable costs of arbitration,772 and how these costs should be 
determined).  However, in spite of the suggestion for detailed regulations like ones in the Arbitration Act 
1996, the Committee has decided to draft the provision based on Article 1057 (1) of the German Code of 
                                                             
769 Section 61 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (Award of costs) (1) The tribunal may make an award allocating the costs of the 
arbitration as between the parties, subject to any agreement of the parties. (2) Unless the parties otherwise agree, the tribunal 
shall award costs on the general principle that costs should follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in 
the circumstances this is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs. 
770 Section 74 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Arbitral tribunal may award costs of arbitral proceedings) (1) An 
arbitral tribunal may include in an award directions with respect to the costs of arbitral proceedings (including the fees and 
expenses of the tribunal). (2) The arbitral tribunal may, having regard to all relevant circumstances (including the fact, if 
appropriate, that a written offer of settlement of the dispute concerned has been made), direct in the award under subsection 
(1) to whom and by whom and in what manner the costs are to be paid (3) The arbitral tribunal may also, in its discretion, 
order costs (including the fees and expenses of the tribunal) to be paid by a party in respect of a request made by any of the 
parties for an order or direction (including an interim measure). (4) The arbitral tribunal may direct that the costs ordered 
under subsection (3) are to be paid forthwith or at the time that the tribunal may otherwise specify. (5) Subject to section 
75, the arbitral tribunal must (a) assess the amount of costs to be awarded or ordered to be paid under this section (other 
than the fees and expenses of the tribunal); and (b) award or order those costs (including the fees and expenses of the 
tribunal). (6) Subject to subsection (7), the arbitral tribunal is not obliged to follow the scales and practices adopted by the 
court on taxation when assessing the amount of costs (other than the fees and expenses of the tribunal) under subsection 
(5). (7) The arbitral tribunal (a) must only allow costs that are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances; and (b) 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, may allow costs incurred in the preparation of the arbitral proceedings prior to the 
commencement of the arbitration. (8) A provision of an arbitration agreement to the effect that the parties, or any of the 
parties, must pay their own costs in respect of arbitral proceedings arising under the agreement is void. (9) A provision 
referred to in subsection (8) is not void if it is part of an agreement to submit to arbitration a dispute that had arisen before 
the agreement was made.  
771 Section 59 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (Costs of the arbitration) (1) References in this Part to the costs of the arbitration are 
to (a) the arbitrators’ fee and expenses, (b) the fees and expenses of any arbitral institution concerned, and (c) the legal or 
other costs of the parties. (2) Any such reference includes the costs of or incidental to any proceedings to determine the 
amount of the recoverable costs of the arbitration. 
772 Section 63 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (The revocable costs of the arbitration) (1) The parties are free to agree what costs 
of the arbitration are recoverable. (3) The tribunal may determine by award the recoverable costs of the arbitration on such 
basis as it thinks fit. (5) Unless the tribunal or the court determines otherwise (a) the recoverable costs of the arbitration 
shall be determined on the basis that there shall be allowed a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred, 
and (b) any doubt as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount shall be resolved in favor of 
the paying party.  
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Civil Procedure.773  Indeed, as both the Korean and German legal systems are civil law systems, the 
Committee tended to focus on German law more (vs. common-law legal systems).774  
 
5.1.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
All members of the Committee agreed on the necessity of having a new provision to focus on the 
allocation of arbitration costs; thus, the KAA (2016) includes a default rule (via the adoption of Article 
1057 (1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure).  During the process of drafting the provision, several 
issues were raised.  The first issue was whether it is necessary to specify details, such as a clarification of 
arbitration costs and what is included therein.775  For example, some members have claimed that the law 
should at least clarify that arbitration costs include attorneys’ fees.776  Indeed, after a significant discussion, 
the Committee agreed that having detailed provisions would be convenient in some ways; however, since 
this is a new provision, they would need some time to see how it would work after the KAA (2016) 
becomes effective.777  
Second, some Committee members have suggested that the allocation of arbitration costs should 
follow one of two different methods—and the arbitral tribunal should make the decision therein.  Namely, 
that when a party loses a case, it should pay the whole cost of arbitration or each party should bear its own 
                                                             
773 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 28. 
774 Also, it is true that most members of the Committee studied in Germany, rather than in U.K or U.S., so it naturally affects 
the way of revision. 
775 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 28. 
776 With regard to the attorney’s fee, even though the Committee considered it necessary to specifically include the attorney’s 
fee in the cost of arbitration, they also agreed that specifying this matter in the statute needs more consideration because it 
could be varied in different jurisdictions. 
777 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 29. 
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costs.778  However, the majority of the Committee agreed that the provision of such directives is too 
simplistic and thus may constrain the decision-making autonomy of arbitral tribunals (seeking to consider 
all relevant circumstances).779 
Third, in the case of ad hoc arbitration, the total cost of arbitration is not determinable.  Thus, two 
options were presented: (i) adopting Article 1057 (2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure, which states 
that the arbitral tribunal should determine the amount of costs therein, i.e., the sums each party has to bear 
(vs. making an allocation) or (ii) creating a separate provision that allows the parties to request the courts 
to determine the total amounts of arbitration costs.780  
The last issue was whether it is necessary to use compulsory language for this provision via the 
utilization of “shall” (vs. “may”).  This suggestion was made because some members of the Committee 
were concerned about cases wherein there is no agreement between the parties about the cost of 
arbitration—and the arbitral tribunal does not determine the allocation of the costs of arbitration.  In such 
cases, the parties may request that the court determines who pays what.  Furthermore, in order to avoid a 
further dispute like this, they have asserted that it is necessary to impose this obligation on the arbitral 
tribunal (by using compulsory language).781 
 
 
                                                             
778 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 29. 
779 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 29. 
780 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 29. 
781 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 29. 
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5.2. Delayed Interest 
The KAA (1999) does not have a provision about delayed interest.  Thus, the Committee agreed 
to draft a new provision that stipulates when an arbitral tribunal can order the payment of delayed interest 
therein (i.e., when there is no agreement between the parties).  
 
5.2.1. What Has Been Amended 
Article 34.3 of the KAA (2016) (Delayed Interest) 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may award, at the 
time when the award is rendered, the delayed interest which is considered 
appropriate having considered all circumstances related to the dispute. 
 
Article 34.3 allows the parties to agree on the matter of delayed interest—and gives the arbitral 
tribunal authority to award the delayed interest.  When the provision was drafted, the Committee agreed 
to take out ‘at the time when the award is rendered’ because it could be interpreted as imposing a limitation 
on the time (or period) that the arbitral tribunal can order the payment of delayed interest.  However, in 
spite of the Committee’s suggestion, the KAA (2016) still includes this phrase.  This article refers to (i) 
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Section 49 of the Arbitration Act 1996,782 (ii) Article 35 of the Singapore Arbitration Act,783 and (iii) 
Sections 79 and 80 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance.784 
 
5.2.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
Although the new provision provides an arbitral tribunal with the power to award delayed interest, 
some members of the Committee have questioned whether awarding delayed interest is a procedural 
                                                             
782 Section 49 of Arbitration Act 1996 (Interest) (1) The parties are free to agree on the powers of the tribunal as regards the 
award of interest. (2) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the following provisions apply. (3) The tribunal may award 
simple or compound interest from such dates, at such rates and with such rests as it considers meets the justice of the case 
(a) on the whole or part of any amount awarded by the tribunal, in respect of any period up to the date of the award; (b) on 
the whole or part of any amount claimed in the arbitration and outstanding at the commencement of the arbitral proceedings 
but paid before the award was made, in respect of any period up to the date of payment. (4) The tribunal may award simple 
or compound interest from the date of the award (or any later date) until payment, at such rates and with such rates as it 
considers meets the justice of the case, on the outstanding amount of any award (including any award of interest under 
subsection (3) and any award as to costs). (5) References in this section to an amount awarded by the tribunal include an 
amount payable in consequence of a declaratory award by the tribunal. (6) The above provisions do not affect any other 
power of the tribunal to award interest. 
783 Article 35 of the Singapore Arbitration Act (Interest) (1) Subject to subsection (3), unless otherwise agreed by the parties, 
the arbitral tribunal may, in the arbitral proceedings before it, award simple or compound interest from such date, at such 
rate and with such rest as the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate, for any period ending not later than the date of payment 
on the whole or any part of (a) any sum which is awarded by the arbitral tribunal in the arbitral proceedings; (b) any sum 
which is in issue in the arbitral proceedings but is paid before the date of the award; or (c) costs awarded or ordered by the 
arbitral tribunal in the arbitral proceedings. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall affect any other power of the arbitral tribunal 
to award interest. (3) Where an award directs a sum to be paid, that sum shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry 
interest as from the date of the award and at the same rate as a judgment debt.  
784 Section 79 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Arbitral tribunal may award interest) (1) Unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties, an arbitral tribunal may, in the arbitral proceedings before it, award simple or compound interest from the dates, 
at the rates, and with the rests that the tribunal considers appropriate, subject to section 80, for any period ending not later 
than the date of payment (a) on money awarded by the tribunal in the arbitral proceedings; (b) on money claimed in, and 
outstanding at the commencement of, the arbitral proceedings but paid before the award is made; or (c) on costs awarded 
or ordered by the tribunal in the arbitral proceedings. (2) Subsection (1) does not affect any other power of an arbitral 
tribunal to award interest. (3) A reference in subsection (1) (a) to money awarded by the tribunal includes an amount 
consequence of a declaratory award by the tribunal. 
Section 80 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Interest on money or costs awarded or ordered in arbitral proceedings) 
(1) Interest is payable on money awarded by an arbitral tribunal from the date of the award at the judgment rate, except 
when the award on otherwise provides. (2) Interest is payable on costs awarded or ordered by an arbitral tribunal from (a) 
the date of the award or order on costs; or (b) the date on which costs ordered are directed to be paid forthwith, at the 
judgment rate, except when the award or order otherwise provides. (3) In this section, “judgment rate” means the rate of 
interest determined by the Chief Justice under section 49 (1) (b) (Interest on Judgments) of the High Court Ordinance. 
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matter or a substantial matter and the interest before and after the date of an award should be the same or 
different.785  Thus, this article needs more discussion (in relation to how the interest rate should be 
different).786  As to all the questions and issues raised herein, the Committee decided to discuss them later 
because of time constraints.787  
 
6. An Arbitral Award 
Chapters VI and VII focus on the arbitral award.  Chapter VI has two articles: (i) Article 35 (which 
focuses on the effect of arbitral awards) and (ii) Article 36, which is focused on recourse against the award.  
Chapter VII (i.e., the last chapter) is focused on the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.  
 
6.1. Effect of Arbitral Award 
Article 35 states that an arbitral award is final and has the same effect as the judicial decision. 
 
6.1.1. What Has Been Amended 
Article 35 of the KAA (2016) builds on the text within the KAA (1999) via the inclusion of an 
additional condition (as seen in the text below).  
                                                             
785 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 30~31. 
786 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 31. 
787 Commentary in the legislative history, p. 31. 
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Article 35 of the KAA (1999) 
Arbitral awards shall have the same effect on the parties as the final and conclusive 
judgment of the court.  
 
Article 35 of the KAA (2016) 
Arbitral awards shall have the same effect on the parties as the final and conclusive 
judgment of the court unless its recognition or enforcement is refused under article 
38. 
 
Article 35 of the KAA (1999) clarifies the effects of arbitral awards; however, the Committee’s 
question was whether the arbitral award is still binding and has the same effect as the final and conclusive 
judgment of the court—even if it is refused for recognition or enforcement.788  In order to answer this 
question, four articles herein (i.e., related to arbitral awards) have to be interpreted together.  (1) Article 
35 of the KAA (1999), which focuses on the effects of the arbitral award, states that an arbitral award is 
the same as the final judgment of the court.  (2) Article 37 (which is about the recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards) states that arbitral awards are recognized or enforced through a court’s judgment.  (3) 
Recognition and enforcement therein (i.e., clarified in Article 37) are subject to Article 38 (if they are 
domestic arbitral awards) or Article 39 (if they are foreign arbitral awards).  Thus, unless there is a ground 
for refusal of recognition or enforcement in the arbitral award, it will be recognized or enforced.  
(Conversely, if there is a ground for refusal, it will not be recognized or enforced.)  However, Article 35 
of the KAA (1999) was of concern to the Committee because it can be understood that even when an 
                                                             
788 Commentary in the legislative history, p.34 
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arbitral award is refused for recognition or enforcement, it still has a binding effect (on a par with a court’s 
final judgment).789  Setting aside is the only way to make the arbitral award ineffective; thus, if the award 
is not set aside, it has a binding effect (regardless of whether or not it is refused for recognition or 
enforcement).790  However, some members of the Committee have claimed that if the award is refused for 
recognition or enforcement because of a certain ground, it should be set aside automatically (because the 
grounds for setting aside are the same as those for refusal of recognition or enforcement).791  Thus, if the 
award is refused for recognition or enforcement, it no longer has a binding effect.  
Nevertheless, there is a the potential interpretation herein (i.e., of Article 35 of the KAA (1999)) 
that the award still has the same effect on the parties as the final and conclusive judgment of the court—
even if it is refused for recognition or enforcement based on the ground specified in Article 38.792  As a 
result, in order to eliminate the misunderstanding or misinterpretation of Article 35 of the KAA (1999), 
the Committee added one condition thereon.793  Article 35 of the KAA (2016) states that arbitral awards 
have the same effect on the parties as the final and conclusive judgment of the court (unless they are 
refused for recognition or enforcement under Article 38);794 this indeed clarifies that the arbitral award is 
not final and conclusive (like the court’s judgment) if its recognition or enforcement is refused—
regardless of whether it has been set aside or not.  
 
                                                             
789 Commentary in the legislative history, p.34. 
790 Commentary in the legislative history, p.34 
791 Commentary in the legislative history, p.34 
792 Commentary in the legislative history, p.34 
793 Commentary in the legislative history, p.34 
794 Article 38 of the KAA is about recognition and enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. 
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6.1.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
The first issue herein was the relationship between the effect and vacation of an arbitral award.  
Some members of the Committee have asserted that even when there is a ground whereon an arbitral 
award may be set aside, the arbitral award should have a binding effect unless it is set aside.795  Thus, 
setting aside the arbitral award is the only way to make an arbitral award ineffective and non-binding.  
Conversely, other members have claimed that as long as a ground exists for setting aside, the arbitral 
award should not have a binding effect (even though it has not been set aside); thus, they have suggested 
inserting this into the provision.796  However, how does one know whether a ground for setting aside even 
exists?  Indeed, if the law states that an arbitral award is not binding when there is a ground for setting 
aside, every arbitral award should be reviewed by a court before it is given a binding effect.  However, 
this conflicts with the role of arbitration and a key goal herein (i.e., less involvement of the courts in 
arbitration).   
Article 35 of the KAA (2016) has an additional condition that applies to domestic arbitral awards 
only; some Committee members have expressed concern that this results in the law making the effect of 
domestic arbitral awards weaker.797  Also, they have claimed that there should not be two different 
standards herein (i.e., in the binding effects of domestic and foreign arbitral awards).  However, the KAA 
does not actually include two different standards (in spite of this claim).  For the foreign arbitral awards, 
the KAA simply states that the New York Convention applies to foreign arbitral awards that are rendered 
in Contracting States (because Korea ratified the New York Convention).  The purpose of the Convention 
                                                             
795 Commentary in the legislative history, p.35 
796 Commentary in the legislative history, p.35 
797 Commentary in the legislative history, p.35 
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is to ensure that foreign arbitral awards have a binding effect, irrespective of borders.  Thus, the 
Convention states that a Contracting State should recognize foreign arbitral awards as binding and enforce 
them; however, it also provides for the basis for refusing recognition and enforcement.  Thus, the statute 
simply states that the Convention is applicable to foreign arbitral awards within Contracting States.  
Third, some members of the Committee have suggested that the grounds for setting aside an arbitral 
award should have appeared in Article 35, which focuses on the effect of the arbitral award.798  The 
rationale for this suggestion was that it is more logical to specify that ‘the arbitral award should have the 
same effect as the final and conclusive judgment of the court unless it is set aside under the following 
grounds’ and the following grounds should be listed.799  In this case, Article 35 would have two regulations 
therein (i.e., about the effect of arbitral awards and grounds for setting aside).  If this suggestion had been 
accepted in the KAA (2016), it would have required the court to review every arbitral award in order to 
get a final and conclusive effect; heretofore, an arbitral award would not have been final and conclusive. 
 
6.2. Setting Aside of Arbitral Award 
Article 36 focuses on the basis whereon an arbitral award may be set aside.  This provision was 
wholly adopted from Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1999.800  
                                                             
798 Commentary in the legislative history, p.35 
799 Commentary in the legislative history, p.35 
800 Article 36 of the KAA (2016) (Action for Setting Aside Arbitral Awards to Court): (1) Recourse against an arbitral award 
may be raised only by an action for setting aside such arbitral award to a court.  (2) An arbitration award may be set aside 
by the court only if:  1. The party making an application for setting aside furnishes proof that:  (a) A party to arbitration 
agreement was under some incapacity under the law applicable to him/her; or the said agreement is not valid under the law 
to which the parties have subjected it, or failing any indication thereon, under the law of the Republic of Korea;  (b) A party 
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6.2.1. What Has Been Amended 
In comparison to Article 36 of the KAA (1999), a small change has been made in Article 36 (2) 1 
(b), which is underlined below. 
 
Article 36 (2) 1 (b) of the KAA (2016) 
(Action for Setting Aside Arbitral Awards to Court) 
(2) An arbitration award may be set aside by the court only if: 
1. The party making an application for setting aside furnishes proof that: 
 (b) A party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment 
of an arbitrator or of arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present 
his/her case; 
 
There is no change in the contents of this article; however, the Committee has suggested that 
Article 36 (2) 1 (b) of the KAA (1999)801 has a word that could make the meaning of the provision differ 
                                                             
making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of arbitral proceedings or was 
otherwise unable to present his/her case;  (c) The award has dealt with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within 
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: 
Provided, That if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not submitted, only that part 
of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside.  (d) The composition of the 
arbitral tribunal or arbitral proceedings were not in accordance with agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was 
in conflict with any mandatory provision of this Act from which the parties cannot derogate, or failing such agreement, 
were not in accordance with this Act;  2. The court finds on its own initiative that:  (a) The subject-matter of the dispute is 
not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the Republic of Korea;  (b) The award is in conflict with the good 
morals and other forms of social order of the Republic of Korea.  (3) An action for setting aside an arbitral award shall be 
raised within three months from the date on which the party making such application has received the duly authenticated 
copy of the award or the duly authenticated copy of a correction or interpretation or an additional award under Article 34.  
(4) After a final and conclusive judgment for recognition or execution of the relevant award by a court of the Republic of 
Korea is rendered, no action for setting aside the award may be raised. 
801 The Korean version of Article 36 (2) 1 (b) of the KAA (1999) (Recourse Against Award) : (2) An arbitral award may be set 
aside by the court specified in article 6 only if: 1. The party making an application for setting aside an arbitral award 
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from the text in the UNCITRAL Model Law.  When the UNCITRAL Model Law was translated into 
Korean in 1999, the wording in the Model Law was ‘unable to present his case’; however, the Korean 
version of the KAA (1999) specifies ‘unable to present the issue of his/her case’ and the English version 
of the KAA (1999) says ‘unable to present his/her case.’  Thus, the English version of the KAA (1999) 
contains the same wording as the Model Law; however, the Korean version narrows the scope of issues 
that the parties may raise.  According to Article 36 (2) 1 (b), the award may be set aside only when a party 
cannot present the issue of his or her case therein because of an improper notice; however, this is not what 
was intended. Thus, the Committee agreed to omit the word ‘issue’ in the KAA (2016).  
 
6.2.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
First, in order to attract more ICA to Korea, some members of the Committee suggested that the 
KAA (2016) should clearly specify that the parties, by their agreement, are not allowed to exclude certain 
grounds that are specified in the law—and are not allowed to agree to prohibit the application for setting 
aside.802  However, this suggestion was rejected because the majority of the Committee agreed that 
keeping (vs. changing) the UNCITRAL Model Law would be preferable.  
     Second, there was a suggestion that the KAA (2016) should specify the next step after the arbitral 
award is set aside.  When an arbitral award is set aside, there could be two likely outcomes: (i) the 
                                                             
furnishes proof that: (b) A party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or 
of arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present the issue of his/her case. 
802 Ho Won Lee, General International Laws: Expansion and Limitation of the Grounds for Setting Aside International Arbitral 
Awards – With Regards to the Judicial Review on the Merits, 21(2) Journal of International Commercial Law Studies 181, 
181 (2012) & Kwang Hyun Suk, Proposals for the Revision of the Korean Arbitration Act – with a Focus on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Seoul Law Journal, 53 Seoul Law Journal 533, 572 (2012). 
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arbitration agreement is extinct, there is no valid arbitration agreement, and the parties can go to court to 
settle their disputes or (ii) the arbitration agreement is revived and the parties can undertake arbitration 
again.803  Some members of the Committee suggested specifying the associated choice therein (i.e., after 
the arbitral award is set aside) in Article 36 of the KAA (2016); however, the majority of the Committee 
agreed that this is not a matter that the law needs to specify—and thus this must be interpreted case by 
case.804 
 
6.3. Recognition or Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
Chapter VII (which is about the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards) has three articles.  
Indeed, the KAA has separate provisions for the recognition or enforcement of domestic and foreign 
arbitral awards.  
 
6.3.1. Recognition or Enforcement of Arbitral Award 
Article 37 of the KAA (1999) states that “recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards shall be 
made by recognition or judgment by a court.”  When this provision was enacted, the need for the court’s 
judgment on the recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award was raised.  In practice, the need for the 
court’s judgment therein (i.e., on the recognition and enforcement of awards) could hinder the efficiency 
                                                             
803 Kap You Kim, JOONGJAE SILMOO GANG UI, Bak Young Sa, (2012), at 380. 
804 For more discussion about this issue, see Young Jun Mok, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW (Bak Young Sa, 2011), at 264 
& Kap You Kim, op. cit., at 291. 
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and speed of arbitration.805  Many scholars and practitioners have contended that the arbitral award should 
be recognized or enforced by the court’s decision, which is more like a confirmation (vs. a court’s 
judgment).806  As a result, Article 37 has been completely amended.  
 
6.3.1.1. What Has Been Amended 
Before Article 37 of the KAA (2016) is discussed, a clarification of the need to thoroughly amend 
Article 37 is required.  The following is Article 37 of the KAA (1999). 
 
Article 37 of the KAA (1999) 
(1) Recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards shall be made by recognition or 
judgment by a court.  
(2) The party applying for the recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award 
shall submit the following documents: Provided, That if the award or arbitration 
agreement is made in a foreign language, a duly certified Korean translation shall 
be accompanied: 
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof; 
(b) The original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.  
 
Article 37 of the KAA (1999) states that the arbitral award should be recognized or enforced via the 
court’s judgment; this requires the parties to submit both an authenticated original award and a certified 
                                                             
805 Commentary in the legislative history, p.40. 
806 Sun Ju Jeong,op. cit., at. 243. 
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copy of the arbitral award and arbitration agreement to the court.  The arguable point in this provision is 
that paragraph (1) could be wrongly interpreted—namely, that the court should make a judgment on the 
subject-matter of a dispute before it decides whether the award is recognizable or not.  Furthermore, it 
could lead to the misconception that both an arbitral tribunal and a court have jurisdiction—or a court 
needs to review the arbitral award rendered by the tribunal.807  
Although the provision says that recognition is made by the court’s judgment, this does not mean 
that the court must actually review all arbitral awards to make a judgment over a dispute.  Article 35 
confirms this; it specifically says that an arbitral award has the same effect as the judgment of the court, 
which means that the award does not need to be judged by the court again.  In fact, this article makes 
arbitral awards recognizable or enforceable via the courts bestowing governmental authority herein—
since arbitral awards are rendered via arbitration, which is a private DRS.  Consequently, the Committee 
agreed to make this a procedural process.808  They referred to Section 1063 of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure809 and Article 45 (1) of the Japanese Arbitration Law.810  Article 37 of the KAA (2016) is as 
follows. 
                                                             
807 Commentary in the legislative history, p.40. 
808 Commentary in the legislative history, p.40. 
809 Section 1063 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (General Provisions) (1) The court shall decide by means of an order.  
The party opposing the application shall be given an opportunity to comment before a decision is made.  (2) The court shall 
order an oral hearing to be held, if the setting aside of the award has been requested or if, in an application for recognition 
or declaration of enforceability of the award, grounds for setting aside in terms of section 1059 are to be considered.  (3) 
The presiding judge of the civil court senate (“Zivilsenat”0 may issue, without prior hearing of the party opposing the 
application, an order to the effect that, until a decision on the request has been made, the application may pursue 
enforcement of the award or enforce the provisional or conservatory measure of protection of the arbitral tribunal pursuant 
to section 1041.  In the case of an award, enforcement of the award may not go beyond measure of protection.  The party 
opposing the application may prevent enforcement by providing an amount corresponding to the amount that may be 
enforced by the applicant as security.  (4) As long as no oral hearing is ordered, applications and declaration may be put on 
record at the court registry. 
810 Article 45 of the Japanese Arbitration Law (Recognition of Arbitral Award) (1) An arbitral award (irrespective of whether 
or not the place of arbitration is in the territory of Japan; this shall apply throughout this chapter) shall have the same effect 
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Article 37 of the KAA (2016) 
(Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral awards) 
(1) An arbitral award is recognized unless there is a ground for non-recognition 
under Articles 38 or 39. However, if a party requests, the court may make a 
decision on the recognition of arbitral award.  
(2) The enforcement of arbitral award shall be made, upon the party’s request, 
only after the court allows it through the enforcement decision. 
(3) The party applying for recognition or enforcement to the court shall supply the 
original award or a copy thereof. If the award is made in a foreign language, the 
party shall supply a duly certified Korean translation of the award. 
(4) When there is a request under the second part of paragraph (1) or paragraph 
(2), the court shall determine the date for defense or hearing that both parties can 
participate in and communicate the determined date to both parties.  
(5) The court shall provide the reasons for the decision on recognition requested 
under the second part of paragraph (1) or enforcement requested under paragraph 
(2). However, if the hearing is not held, the court may provide a summary of the 
reason.  
(6) A party can appeal immediately against a decision made under the second part 
of paragraphs (1) or paragraph (2). 
(7) The appeal made under paragraph (6) shall not stop the enforcement of arbitral 
award. However, the appellate court may order the party who appealed to provide 
the security, or order the court to stop the enforcement of arbitral award without 
the security provided, or order the court to stop the enforcement of arbitral award 
in part or in whole, or order the court to continue the enforcement of arbitral 
award only after the security is provided by the party who appealed.  
                                                             
as a final and conclusive judgment.  Provided, an enforcement based on the arbitral award shall be subject to an enforcement 
decision pursuant to the provisions of the following article.  And this article states the grounds for non-recognition. 
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(8) The application for recourse against the decision made by the court under 
paragraph (7) shall not be allowed.  
 
First, Article 37 of the KAA (2016) states that an arbitral award is recognizable if there is no ground 
for non-recognition under Articles 38 (i.e., grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards) or 39 (i.e., grounds for non-recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards).  Thus, 
this no longer requires the court’s judgment; the court will decide whether it is recognizable or enforceable 
only when there is a request by a party for recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award.  All members 
of the Committee agreed that this amendment would make Korea a more favorable and friendly place for 
arbitration and attract more ICA into Korea since the process of recognition and enforcement of the arbitral 
award will become more time-efficient—and efficient overall.811  
Article 37 adds one more condition to the court’s decisions associated with recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards—namely, when there is a request for recognition under the second part of 
paragraph (1) or enforcement of the arbitral award under paragraph (2), the court should determine the 
date of the defense or hearing that both parties can participate in.  (However, it is not clear whether or not 
a defense or hearing should be held anytime when there is a request for recognition or enforcement of an 
award.)  Furthermore, the court is required to provide a summary of the reasons for its decision; although 
the Committee did not give a rationale for this, they mentioned that they referred to Section 1063 of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure for this article.812  
                                                             
811 Commentary in the legislative history, p.43. 
812 Commentary in the legislative history, p.41 
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The drafting of Article 37 of the KAA (2016) differed from some of the Committee’s 
recommendations and raised some questions.  First, according to Section 1063 (1) of the German Code of 
Civil Procedure, when a party opposes the application for recognition (or enforcement) of an arbitral award, 
the court should give that party an opportunity to comment before it makes a decision.  Thus, under 
German law, the opposing party is entitled to comment (vs. a hearing); indeed, a hearing is a different 
procedure from making a comment (e.g., it is more complicated).813 
Second, the German law requires a court to have a hearing only when one party requests the court 
to set aside the arbitral award—or the court finds that the grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement 
under Section 1059 must be considered.  Conversely, the KAA requires a hearing to be held whenever a 
party requests the court to make a decision over recognition or enforcement of the award.  Indeed, a 
hearing with both parties may be acceptable under German law because the setting aside of an arbitral 
award is an important matter and must be done with a great care.  However, the process of making an 
award recognizable should indeed be different—namely, more straightforward (vs. the process of setting 
it aside).  Consequently, if the Committee intended to adopt the German law, the statute should be drafted 
more precisely in order to avoid misinterpretation or misunderstanding.814  
                                                             
813 Giving a chance to make a comment to an opposing party is different from having a hearing with both parties. 
814 If ‘a party’ is changed to ‘the opposing party’ in paragraph (1) of the revised Article 37 of the KAA, the statute makes more 
sense.  Arbitral awards are recognized unless there is a ground under Articles 38 or 39, but if the opposing party requests, 
the court may make a decision on recognition.  So, if there is no reason for non-recognition or non-enforcement subject to 
Articles 38 or 39, the award is recognized without a special procedure.  But, the party against who the arbitral award is 
rendered can request the court to decide whether the award is recognizable or not under Article 37(1), and in this case, the 
court should ask both parties to participate in the hearing under Article 37 (4) before it makes a decision. 
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Third, Article 37 (5) requires the court to provide the reasons for its decision under the second part 
of paragraph ○1 or paragraph ○2,815 which burdens the court and makes the procedure of recognition or 
enforcement more complicated.  Indeed, it would have been more reasonable and practical if the KAA 
had required the court to provide its reasoning only when the court denies recognition or enforcement (e.g., 
on a par with Section 1488 of the French Code of Civil Procedure816); conversely, when the court finds 
the arbitral award recognizable or enforceable, it should just confirm the recognition—or order the 
enforcement.  
Fourth, another key consideration herein is how ‘the reasons for decision’ differ from ‘the summary 
of the reason’ under paragraph (5) of Article 37.  This requires the court to provide the reasons for the 
decision on recognition after having a hearing with both participating parties; however, if the hearing is 
not held, the court may provide a summary of the reasons.  Does this mean that the court may give a brief 
reason for its decision without having the hearing because it did not have a chance to hear from both 
parties?  
 
6.3.1.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
Although Article 37 has been thoroughly amended, there were not many arguments for or against 
it; only one issue—an appeal against the arbitral award in arbitration—raised significant debate.  Under 
the KAA, the only way to object to the decision of the arbitral tribunal is via application for the setting 
                                                             
815 Actually, in the Korean version of the KAA (2016) states that “the court shall write the reasons for its decision….”.  So, the 
court should provide the reasons in writing. 
816 Article 1488 of the French Code of Civil Procedure: An order denying enforcement shall state the reasons upon which it is 
based. 
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aside of arbitral awards, and this is true in most states and jurisdictions.  Thus, finality is a key advantage 
of arbitration; however, there has been continuous discussion about appealing arbitral awards—not only 
in Korea but also internationally.817  Indeed, there are some jurisdictions that allow an appeal against an 
arbitral award; for example, the Arbitration Act 1996 allows an appeal on point of law if (i) all parties to 
the proceedings agree or (ii) the court allows it;818 also, there are some international arbitral institutions 
that have appeal systems.819  Thus, some members of the Committee have suggested adding regulations 
about an appeal system to the KAA (2016) by referring to Article 44 of the Japanese Arbitration Law.820  
                                                             
817 In the 7th of Geneva Global Arbitration Forum which was held in 1998, the appeal system in arbitration was discussed.  See. 
http://www.ggaf.ch/7.php for more information. 
818 Section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (Appeal on point of law) (1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral 
proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising out 
of an award made in the proceedings.  An agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal’s award shall be considered 
an agreement to exclude the court’s jurisdiction under this section.  (2) An appeal shall not be brought under this section 
except (a) with the agreement of all the other parties to the proceedings, or (b) with the leave of the court.  The right to 
appeal is also subject to the restrictions in section 70 (2) and (3).  (3) Leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is 
satisfied (a) that the determination of the question will be substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties, (b) 
that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine, (c) that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the award 
(i) the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong, or (ii) the question is one of general public importance 
and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and (d) that, despite the agreement of the parties to resolve 
the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all circumstances for the court to determine the question. [The rest is omitted]     
819 These institutions are, for example, WTO, ICSID, CPR (International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution), and 
CEA (European Court of Arbitration). 
820 Article 44 of the Japanese Arbitration Law (1) A party may apply to a court to set aside the arbitral award when any of the 
following grounds are present: (i) the arbitration agreement is not valid due to limits to a party’s capacity; (ii) the arbitration 
agreement is not valid for a reason other than limits to a party’s capacity under the law to which the parties have agreed to 
subject it (or failing any indication thereon, under the law of Japan); (iii) the party making the application was not given 
notice as required by the provisions of the laws of Japan (or where the parties have otherwise reached an agreement on 
matters concerning the provisions of the law that do not relate to the public policy, such agreement) in the proceedings to 
appoint arbitrators or in the arbitral proceedings; (iv) the party making the application was unable to present its case in the 
arbitral proceedings; (v) the arbitral award contains decisions on mattes beyond the scope of the arbitral proceedings; (vi) 
the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral proceedings were not in accordance with the provisions of the law of 
Japan (or where the parties have otherwise reached an agreement on matters concerning the provisions of the law that do 
not relate to the public policy, such agreement); (vii) the claims in the arbitral proceedings relate to a dispute that cannot 
constitute the subject of an arbitration agreement under the laws of Japan; or (viii) the content of the arbitral award is in 
conflict with the public policy or good morals of Japan.  (2) The application described in the preceding paragraph may not 
be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making the application had received the notice 
by the sending of a copy of the arbitral award (including the document constituting the ruling of the arbitral tribunal 
described in the provisions of article 41 through 43), or after an enforcement decision under article 46 has become final and 
conclusive.  (3) Even when the case for application described in paragraph (1) falls within its jurisdiction, a court may, 
upon request or by its own authority, if it finds it appropriate, transfer all or part of said case to another competent court.  
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Although the majority of the Committee agreed that it may be necessary to allow appeals, they 
believed that finality is one distinguishable characteristic of arbitration—and allowing appeals in 
arbitration is too advanced at the moment.  Thus, they decided not to draft regulations about appeals and 
added paragraph (6) in Article 37, which simply notes the possibility of appealing a court’s decision on 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (and thus indicates that the parties can ask the court to 
reconsider its decision).  
Additionally, some members of the Committee have claimed that (i) a party’s right to have a neutral 
trial should be protected and (ii) the recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award should be made after 
a proper trial.  They said that there is always a doubt about whether the arbitrators (who are private persons) 
are making correct decisions or not.  Thus, the court should ensure that (i) each arbitrator’s decision is 
correct (through the merit of review) and (ii) the role of the court therein (i.e., in arbitration) is as an 
authority body that supervises the arbitration.  Based on their rationale, they suggested that Article 37 
should be revised to guarantee the party’s basic right to have a trial.  However, this suggestion was refused 
because it challenges the role of arbitration (which is based on an agreement between parties to avoid 
judicial litigation).  
                                                             
(4) An immediate appeal may be filed against a decision made under the provisions of article 5, paragraph (3) or the 
preceding paragraph regarding the case for application described in paragraph (1).  (5) A court may not make a decision 
with respect to the application described in paragraph (1), unless and until an oral hearing or oral proceedings at which the 
parties can attend was held.  (6) Where an application is made under paragraph (1), an arbitral award may be set aside by 
the court in the event that it finds any of the grounds described in each of the items under the same paragraph to be present 
(with respect to the grounds described in items (i) through (vi) of the same paragraph, this shall be limited to where the 
party making the application has proved the existence of such grounds).  (7) Where the ground described in paragraph (1), 
item (v) is present, and where the part relating to matters prescribed in the same item can be separated from the arbitral 
award, only that part of the arbitral award may be set aside by the court.  (8) An immediate appeal may be filed against the 
decision regarding the application in paragraph (1). 
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6.3.2. Recognition or Enforcement of Domestic Arbitral Award 
6.3.2.1. What Has Been Amended 
The text in Article 38 is focused on the recognition and enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.  
The followings are Article 38 of the KAA (1999) and the KAA (2016). 
 
Article 38 of the KAA (1999) 
Arbitral awards made in the Republic of Korea shall be recognized or enforced, 
unless any ground referred to in Article 36 (2) exists. 
 
Article 38 of the KAA (2016) 
Arbitral award made in the Republic of Korea shall be recognized or enforced, 
unless any following ground exists. 
1. A party furnishes proof that: 
(a) The grounds referred to in Article 36 (2) 1 exist.821 
(b) The following fact exists: 
                                                             
821 Article 36 (2) 1. of the KAA (2016): (2) An arbitration award may be set aside by the court only if:  1. The party making an 
application for setting aside furnishes proof that: (a) A party to arbitration agreement was under some incapacity under the 
law applicable to him/her; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it, or failing 
any indication thereon, under the law of the Republic of Korea;  (b) A party making the application was not given proper 
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his/her case;  (c) 
The award has dealt with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided, That if the decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on 
matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside.  (d) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or arbitral proceedings 
were not in accordance with agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with any mandatory provision 
of this Act from which the parties cannot derogate, or failing such agreement, were not in accordance with this Act; 
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1) The arbitral award is not binding yet on the parties, or 
2) The arbitral award is set aside by the court 
2. The grounds referred to in Article 36 (2) 2 exist.822 
 
The grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement of domestic arbitral awards, under Article 
38 of the KAA (1999), are the same as the ones under Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  Indeed, 
these grounds are the same as the ones for non-recognition or non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
under Article 39 of the KAA (1999).  The KAA (2016), however, adds two more grounds therein (i.e., 
that constitute a basis for refusing a domestic arbitral award for recognition or enforcement).  First, when 
the arbitral award is not yet binding therein (i.e., on the parties), the court may refuse the recognition or 
enforcement of awards; for example, if another court refuses to recognize the award or if a setting aside 
of the award is under process, the court may refuse to recognize or enforce it on the ground of Article 38. 
1 (a) 1).   The second additional ground is that if the arbitral award is set aside by the court, the court may 
refuse to recognize or enforce it, based on the ground of Article 38. 1 (a) 2).       
 
6.3.2.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
Some members of the Committee claimed that there should not be separate regulations regarding 
recognition or enforcement of domestic and foreign arbitral awards.  They asserted that the same grounds 
                                                             
822 Article 36 (2) 2: 2. The court finds on its own initiative that: (a) The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration under the law of the Republic of Korea;  (b) The award is in conflict with the good morals and other forms 
of social order of the Republic of Korea. 
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should be applied for both foreign and domestic arbitral awards; however, this suggestion was rejected 
without any further discussion. 
 
6.3.3. Recognition or Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award 
6.3.3.1. What Has Been Amended 
There is no change in this provision; the text in paragraph (1) focuses on the arbitral awards that 
are rendered or issued in countries ratifying the New York Convention823 (i.e., Contracting States) and the 
text in paragraph (2) focuses on arbitral awards that are rendered or issued in other countries (i.e., non-
Contracting States).  As Korea is a Contracting State, Korea recognizes and enforces foreign arbitral 
awards herein (i.e., subject to the New York Convention).  However, arbitral awards rendered in non-
Contracting States are recognized or enforced subject to Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act824 and 
                                                             
823 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
824 Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act (Recognition of Foreign Country Judgment) : (1) A final and conclusive judgment 
rendered by a foreign court or a judgment acknowledged to have the same force (hereinafter referred to as “final judgment, 
etc.”) shall be recognized, if all of the following requirements are met; (a) That the international jurisdiction of such foreign 
court is recognized under the principle of international jurisdiction pursuant to the statutes or treaties of the Republic of 
Korea.  (b) That a defeated defendant is served, by a lawful method, a written complaint or document corresponding thereto, 
and notification of date or written order allowing him/her sufficient time to defend (excluding cases of service by public 
notice or similar), or that he/she responds to the lawsuit even without having been served such documents.  (c) That the 
approval of such final judgment, etc. does not undermine sound morals or other social order of the Republic of Korea in 
light of the contents of such final judgment, etc. and judicial procedures.  (d) That mutual guarantee exists, or the 
requirements for recognition of final judgment, etc. in the Republic of Korea and the foreign country to which the foreign 
country court belongs are not far off balance and have no actual difference between each other in important points.  (2) A 
court shall ex officio investigate where the requirements under paragraph are satisfied. 
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Article 26 (1)825 and Article 27826 of the Civil Execution Act.  The following is Article 39 of the KAA 
(2016), which is same as Article 39 of the KAA (1999).  
 
Article 39 of the KAA (2016) 
(Arbitral Awards in Foreign Country) 
(1) Recognition or enforcement of a foreign award which is subject to the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards shall 
be governed by that Convention. 
(2) Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 26(1) and 27 of the Civil 
Execution Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the recognition or execution of a 
foreign arbitral award which is not subject to the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
 
6.3.3.2. Issues Left for the Next Revision 
Some members of the Committee have suggested eliminating paragraph (2) of Article 39 (which 
is focused on the recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards rendered in non-Contracting States) 
based on the notion that (i) it would not be difficult to recognize or enforce the non-Contracting States’ 
                                                             
825 Article 26 (1) of the Civil Execution Act (Compulsory Execution by Foreign Trial) (1) Compulsory execution based upon 
the final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a trial the effect of which is recognized as the same therewith 
(hereinafter referred to as "final and conclusive judgment, etc.") may be conducted only if a court of the Republic of Korea 
has permitted such compulsory execution by means of a judgment of execution. 
826 Article 27 of the Civil Execution Act (Judgment of Execution) (1) A judgment of execution shall be made without making 
any examination as to whether the judgment is right or wrong.  (2) A lawsuit seeking a judgment of execution shall be 
dismissed without prejudice if it falls under any of the following;  (a) When it has not been proved that the final and 
conclusive judgment, etc. of a foreign court has become final and conclusive;  (b) When the final and conclusive judgment, 
etc. of a foreign court fails to fulfill the conditions under Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act. 
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foreign arbitral awards subject to the New York Convention and (ii) it would be meaningless to have 
separate regulations for foreign arbitral awards because almost all countries are currently Contracting 
States.  Nevertheless, the conclusion herein was to have separate regulations for foreign arbitral awards 
because there are still countries that have not ratified the New York Convention; thus, the law should 
regulate it differently.    
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion  
 
With establishment of Seoul IDRC (International Dispute Resolution Center), Korean has a 
reasonable chance of becoming an ADR center for Asia.  This aspiration is bolstered by Korea’s increasing 
visibility in global commerce.  Having ‘the UNCITRAL regional center for Asia and the Pacific’ located 
in Korea is a further step in this direction.  These indicia are not a failsafe guarantee.  It is an absolute 
requisite that Korean legal system educate students and lawyers (but, especially judges) about arbitration 
and its significance for global commerce.  All manner of instruction for these groups should be developed 
so that Korea can begin to mold its reputation in ICA such as Hong Kong or Singapore.  Korea has to 
engage fully in these efforts.    
In Korea, arbitration is still at a formation stage.  It is not widely recognized and does not have much 
standing or presence in the Korean judicial system.  It has been just over fifty years since the first Korean 
arbitration law was drafted.  There is no long-standing history of arbitration in Korea.  Even the first KAA 
had numerous flaws and lacked a clear understanding of its regulatory mission.   
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Thirty-three years later, Korea adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law as its national arbitration law.  
The objective was to have a law that incorporated international standard and rules on ICA.  By doing so, 
Korea began a march to make itself arbitration-friendly.  Much still needs to be done.  The standing of 
arbitration remains embryonic.  Misunderstandings and confusion persist.  The average perception is that 
arbitration is nothing more than a modified form of mediation and a first step to be taken prior to judicial 
litigation.  That same perception sees arbitration as a non-binding process; arbitration is a precursor either 
to settlement or judicial litigation.  Binding determination is exclusively the product of the legal process.  
The main reason for this misunderstanding is that arbitration is conducted by private arbitrators and seems 
to be dissociated from the judicial system.  Judicial litigation, on the other hand, involves judges who have 
governmental authority to decide cases in a final and binding judgment that can be coercively enforced.   
The recent Korean interest in arbitration is something of a break-through in traditional Korean views.  
In fact, any attention of the KAA remained inactive until 2013.  At that time, the Korean government 
established the Seoul IDRC, representing it as a center of ADR in Asia.  In keeping with this new approach, 
the government amend the KAA to make Korea an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.  The substantive 
reconstruction of the KAA was completed in 2016.  More and more policy-makers, lawyers, and legal 
practitioners now realize that ICA has become a true global industry and a real business.  It, therefore, 
behooves Korea to embrace ICA and build its status in the field.  
The 2016 amendment of KAA focused on four objectives; (1) broader application and greater 
availability of arbitration, (2) faster and more efficient arbitral procedures, (3) greater powers for arbitral 
tribunal, and (4) a simpler and faster process for the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards.  First, 
when the KAA (2016) defines ‘arbitration’, it provides a broader scope of substantive application.  While 
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the KAA (1999) limited the scope of arbitrable disputes to “disputes under private law,” the KAA (2016) 
allows parties to settle not only “any dispute which involves an economic interest,” but also disputes that 
can be “resolved by an agreement of the parties,” even though they do not involve an economic interest.  
The underlying objective of this amendment is to make disputes relating to unfair trade practices under 
anti-trust law or patent disputes arbitrable.  Because such disputes were beyond the range of private 
contractual authority under the Korean legal system, they were not arbitrable under the KAA (1999).  
Under the new KAA (2016), they are now arbitrable.  The ultimate purpose of broadening the scope of 
arbitrability is to encourage parties to have recourse to arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism in as 
much areas as possible.  
More wide-ranging arbitration mirrors contemporary business practices; it loosens formalistic legal 
restrictions.  In the ICA setting, most legal systems recognize the validity of non-written contract if the 
parties agreed.  Therefore, Article 8 of the KAA (2016) recognizes an arbitration agreement valid as long 
as it can be established that contracting parties agreed to arbitrate.  By doing so, the KAA (2016) tries to 
prevent parties from resorting to a judicial litigation to decide on arbitrability.  Under an arbitration law 
with a stricter written requirement for arbitration agreements, parties would have to bring their case to a 
court if their contract for arbitration proved deficient.   
Second, the KAA (2016) creates the possibility of a faster and more efficient arbitral procedure.  
When an arbitral proceeding is delayed because an arbitrator ca not be appointed, Article 12 of the KAA 
(2016) allows a court either to appoint arbitrators by itself or designate an arbitral institution to appoint 
arbitrators.  In contrast, Article 12 of the KAA (1999) only allowed courts to remedy appointment 
problems; the revised statute adds another option of nominating an arbitral institution to select the 
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arbitrators.  By doing so, an arbitral proceedings need not suffer delay.  Moreover, an arbitral institution 
is generally far better at selecting arbitrators than a court.   
Another set of delaying circumstances relates to the determination of jurisdiction of the threshold 
of the proceeding.  If an arbitral tribunal arguably decides its jurisdiction differently than a court, the 
matter must be determined by a court.  If a court holds that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction and the 
arbitral tribunal rules that it did not, contracting parties may have nowhere to go for the settlement of their 
dispute.  A court would reject the case because of the arbitral tribunal’s right to rule and the arbitral tribunal 
would decline to hear the case because it concluded it had no right to assert its authority over the matter.  
Neither the UNCITRAL Model Law nor the KAA (1999) provided a solution to this dilemma.  The KAA 
(2016) does provide a solution to this conflict of jurisdiction; when there is a clash of jurisdiction 
determinations between a court and arbitral tribunal, the law provides for the constitution of a new arbitral 
tribunal which will commence or continue arbitral proceedings.  The court’s decision on jurisdiction 
prevails only to give effect to the parties’ intent to arbitrate.  A pro-arbitration remedy is provided 
statutorily.  The law thereby respects the first arbitral tribunal’s decision (lack of jurisdiction), but it also 
enables the arbitration to continue without further delay.  The KAA (2016) strengthens the speed and 
efficiency of arbitration.  
Third, the KAA (2016) provides greater and more thorough rules for the granting of interim measure 
by arbitrators.  Although the KAA (1999) contained provisions on interim measures, they were neither 
detailed nor clear and were, therefore, difficult to apply.  The older statute simply stated that an arbitral 
tribunal could order interim measures if it found them necessary.  It was, in effect, a non-rule rule.  It did 
not provide useful practical guidance.  The KAA (2016), however, has an entire sub-chapter on interim 
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measures; it specifies (i) the types of interim measures an arbitral tribunal may grant, (ii) the requirements 
that need to be fulfilled by a requesting party, (iii) the process of granting such relief, (iv) the form in 
which the interim measure is granted, (v) its recognition and enforcement, and (vi) the grounds for denying 
enforcement.  With more detailed and specific regulations, interim measures become a reality.  The law 
makes it easier for an arbitral tribunal to grant interim measures and, as a result, it increase their utility.  
This arbitration-friendly change will make the use of arbitration more compelling.    
The 2016 KAA’s most extensive revision relates to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards.  Its core purpose is to eliminate obstacles to recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.  
Article 37 of the KAA (2016) specifies in detail the procedure for the recognition or enforcement of an 
arbitral award through a number of practical processes, e.g., (i) having a hearing with parties before 
making a decision on recognition or enforcement, (ii) providing reasons for the decision on recognition or 
enforcement, (iii) giving parties a chance to appeal for the court’s decision on recognition or enforcement, 
et al.  The primary reason for providing for such specific procedures is to give a guidance to judges on the 
procedure of recognition and enforcement in order to have a smooth process that functions without a delay.  
Also, because so many judges are unfamiliar with arbitration, the process of recognition and enforcement 
was riddled with flaws and negative outcomes.  The statutory remedy was to create an additional chamber 
to deal with arbitration.  Although it is too early to determine whether the new statutory provisions will 
work, the fact that the KAA is to make courts friendlier to arbitration is a good starting point for the 
development of arbitration in Korea.  
Korea focused on ICA much later than either Hong Kong or Singapore.  Korea must develop its 
arbitration infrastructure to compete effectively with Hong Kong and Singapore and to become an Asian 
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center for ICA.  Not only should the government support the arbitration industry, but the lawyers and 
business parties’ understanding of arbitration should be corrected and deepened.  In Korea, it is difficult 
for lawyers to recognize arbitration as a business because the KCAB sets arbitrators’ fee on the basis of 
the amount in dispute.  Fees are quite modest as a result.827  The reason for having fixed arbitrators’ fee is 
to ease burden on parties (companies) that want to use arbitration to resolve future disputes.  It makes 
arbitral adjudication more attractive to business interest.  There continue to be obstacles to the acceptance 
of arbitration in Korea.  The lack of substantial fees for arbitrators converts arbitration to a pro bono 
activity that has few adherents and users.  Such local views makes it difficult to sell Korea as a hospitable 
jurisdiction to arbitration.  Like the Japanese, Koreans see arbitrators as less qualified as judges.  They 
have no public law purpose.  They can ignore or misinterpret the law or procedural fairness.  The judicial 
route is long-standing and has accomplished its social task.  There are strict requirement for fairness.  
Arbitration is a lesser adjudicatory process.   
The Korean government should lead the effort to establish an arbitration industry in Korea.  Hong 
Kong and Singapore are constantly investing in arbitration and declare, plausibly and persuasively, that 
they are the centers of ICA in Asia and now for the entire world.  They have a strong and secure position.828  
                                                             
827 According to the arbitration rules of KCAB, some examples of arbitrator’s fee are as follows. 
 
The amount of dispute/case Arbitrator’s fee 
USD910,000 (KRW100,000,000) USD9,104 (KRW9,960,000) 
USD9,140,000 (KRW1,000,000,000) USD21,115(KRW23,100,000) 
USD91,400,000 (KRW10,000,000,000) USD43,317(KRW47,400,000) 
 
828 According to the survey conducted by Queen Mary University of London and White & Case’s 2015 International Arbitration 
Survey, the HKIAC (Hong Kong International Arbitration Center) is ranked in the third position and the SIAC (Singapore 
International Arbitration Center) in the fourth for the most preferred and used arbitral institution worldwide.  Also, the 
HKIAC is selected as the most improved arbitration institution and the SIAC, ICC and LCIA follow in order.  The 
respondents pointed out the seat’s established formal legal infrastructure for their selection of seat such as the neutrality 
and impartiality of the legal system, the national arbitration law, and its track record for enforcing agreements to arbitrate 
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Singapore, especially, is aggressively chasing Hong Kong with substantial government support.829  In 
2012, the Singapore government decided that legal fees related to arbitrations conducted in Singapore 
would be exempt from tax by 50%.  Singapore also relaxed its regulation of foreign law firms making it 
easy for foreign and local law firms to cooperate and work together without much in the way of restrictions.  
The SIAC is a well-known and well-regarded arbitration organization.  Further, in 2015, the government 
established the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC); it is intended to be a leading forum for 
legal services in ICA.830  The SICC is a department of the Singapore High Court.831  It consists not only 
of Singapore national judges but also foreign judges who are approved internationally.  Its jurisdiction is 
established when the parties agree to or the Supreme Court Justice of High Court transfers the case.  The 
SICC takes cases governed by Singapore national law and other national laws.  Foreign laws are allowed 
to appear before the court if they register with the SICC.  Unlike other arbitration processes, an appeal to 
the Court of Appeal is allowed.832  Singapore’s ultimate aim is to be a leading ICA forum. 
There is no doubt that Korea ranks far behind Hong Kong and Singapore as an arbitral destination.  
Nonetheless, it should devote large amounts of money and time to being an effective and meaningful 
competitor.  Korea’s global economic standing merits such a campaign.  There is also a cultural reason 
                                                             
and arbitral award.  Cf. 
http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2016%20Improvements%20and%20Innovations%20in%20International%20
Arbitration/176756.html 
829 In 2013, 259 cases were submitted to the SIAC increasing by 10% comparing it in 2012.  On the contrary, the number of 
cases submitted to the HKIAC were 260 and it was decreased by 10% comparing it in the previous year.  Although more 
cases were submitted to the HKIAC, the amounts for disputes handled in the SIAC were greater than those in the HKIAC. 
(In 2013, its amounts were 48billions and 35billions (Singapore Dollars) respectively.)  cf. http://www.siac.org.sg/ and 
http://www.hkiac.org/ 
830 The SICC is modelled on the ‘International Financial Centre Court’ in Dubai, the London Commercial Court and the 
Supreme Court’s Commercial Division in New York. 
831 The Singapore Supreme Court is composed of High Court and Appellate Court.   
832 https://www.sicc.gov.sg/ 
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that speaks to intellectual integrity for engaging in such a reconstruction.  Korean values and practices 
should be part of the returns to global commerce.  The Korean legal system’s regulation of arbitration 
needs to reflect the circumstances of the 21st century.  Korean law should stand as a beacon of adaptability 
and globalism.  It should end useless conflicts of sovereignty and jurisdiction and concentrate on the law’s 
ability to civilize human relations and to allow society to achieve greater prosperity.  Because it adopted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, Korea should stand as a truly international venue for arbitration.  
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[The List of Abbreviations] 
 
 International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) 
 the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB)  
 the Korean Bar Association (KBA)  
 the Korea Chamber of Commerce (KCC) 
 the Seoul International Dispute Resolution Center (Seoul IDRC) 
 the American Arbitration Association (AAA)  
 the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC)  
 the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)  
 the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) 
 the Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC) 
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